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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Embracing the Apocalypse:
Surrealism and Political Pessimism in Interwar Paris
by
Kyle Young
Doctor of Philosophy in French Language and Literature
Washington University in St. Louis, 2021
Professor Stamos Metzidakis, Chair
Whether dreaming of the end of earth itself, the end of civilization, the end of history, the
end of capitalism or the end of logic, surrealism seems inevitably drawn to the end, or rather the
ends of the world as we know it. This project will endeavor to untangle the apparent paradox of
an obsession with teleology (one of the central components of Aristotelian logic) in a movement
predicated on a rejection of Western rationalism. While feelings of dread were certainly not
exclusive to surrealism between the World Wars, surrealism is a unique case of apocalyptic
obsession, and one which has received very little attention from critics. Perhaps more than any
other artistic movement of the period, surrealism struggled with and attempted to reconcile the
opposing impulses of revolutionary idealism and apocalyptic pessimism. This project will
explore how the surrealists drew inspiration from their pessimistic, apocalyptic desires, while
also attempting to maintain faith in their revolutionary ideals. In addition, this project will focus
on historical dialectics and theories of the end of history, stretching from Hegel and Marx to
contemporary thinkers such as Fukuyama and Žižek. Indeed, the abundance of recent material on
the end of history (to say nothing of the enormous popularity of apocalyptic fiction in 21st-
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century popular culture) perhaps suggests that our current political moment is not so different
from the one faced by the surrealists almost a century ago
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Introduction
In his 1948 essay “La Lampe dans l’horloge,” André Breton admits that his surrealist
movement had, in prior decades, existed as the latest iteration of a long poetic tradition of
embracing the end of the world: “d’innombrables études en cours de publication n’établissentelles pas que depuis un siècle [les poètes] se sont laissé aller—et par eux le plus aigu de la
sensibilité moderne—à la tentation de la fin du monde ?” (OC III: 773; Breton’s emphasis).
Nevertheless, Breton claims that he no longer feels the pull of this temptation. In the face of the
nuclear threats of the Cold War, Breton finds the apocalypse much less appealing than he had
before:
Et pourtant cette fin du monde, je n’éprouverai pas le moindre embarras à dire
qu’aujourd’hui nous n’en voulons plus. Nous n’en voulons plus depuis que nous
voyons les traits sous lesquels elle se dessine et qui, contre toute attente, la
frappent à nos yeux d’absurdité. […] Une telle fin du monde, surgie d’un faux pas
de l’homme plus inexcusable puisque plus décisif que les précédents, est pour
nous dénuée de toute valeur, déplorablement caricaturale. Nous avons beau nous
interroger sur ce qui peut couver dans les boucles du professeur Einstein ou
prospérer derrière la brosse dure de l’étrange camarade Staline, non : ce n’est
vraiment pas de ce suprême tableau de chasse qu’il s’agissait. Cette fin du monde
n’est pas la nôtre. (OC III: 773; Breton’s emphasis)
In what way had the imagined apocalypse changed after the Second World War? If the
terrifyingly real possibility of nuclear annihilation was not Breton’s end of the world, then what
was? Certainly, it was not the older, Christian conception of the Last Judgment. In fact, there is
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no simple way to define the surrealist vision of apocalypse. In the interwar period, the
surrealists’ engagement with this concept was a subtle balance of archaic, contemporary and
prescient views of world’s end. Our task in this study will be to untangle and examine the
surrealists’ various, unique perspectives on the apocalypse and the diverging political
worldviews that correspond to them.
Our study will focus primarily on the period between the World Wars with a small
number of examples taken from the beginning of the Second World War, before the full extent of
that conflict’s horror became apparent. As Breton explains in his essay, the end of the world
takes on a very different meaning after 1945. Even more so than the First World War, the Second
is often described as the apocalyptic moment of the twentieth century. The world that emerged
from the rubble of that conflict was, in a sense, already post-apocalyptic. James Berger
elaborates on this point: “after the Second World War, the apocalypse became, to a much greater
degree, a matter of retrospection. It had already happened. The world, whether it knew it or not,
was a ruin, a remnant. More destruction could occur, but it could only be more of the same.
Nothing more could be revealed” (390). For this reason, the use of apocalyptic themes in the
period leading up to the Second World War is particularly interesting for our investigations,
especially because, in recent years, it has received less attention from critics than the terror of the
war itself, or the subsequent, white-knuckle paranoia of the Cold War. The surrealists of the
1930s were keenly aware that the world was at the precipice of a catastrophe. Part of our task in
this study will be to unravel why they found the promise of such a catastrophe so seductive.
In his book The Sense of an Ending (1966), Frank Kermode highlights the perennial
attractiveness of apocalyptic narratives: “Apocalypse and the related themes are strikingly longlived; and that is the first thing to say about them, although the second thing to say about them is
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that they change. […] When it appears that it cannot be so, [people] act as if it were true in a
different sense” (Kermode 29). The concept of apocalypse endures in nearly every era, though
the form it takes depends on the preoccupations of that time. As such, it is not surprising that
interwar surrealism would articulate its own unique visions of the end. What is perhaps
surprising, however, is the extent to which surrealism breaks with the meta-narrative that
Kermode traces of the evolution of apocalyptic narrative. According to Kermode, Western
eschatology gradually shifted from concerning the fate of humanity as a whole to the fate of the
individual: “[N]aïve apocalypticism has been modified to produce (under the pressure and
relevance of great new systems of knowledge, technological and social change, of human
decision itself) a sense of ends only loosely related to the older predictive apocalypse, and to its
simpler notions of decadence, empire, transition, heavens on earth” (Kermode 26-7). Although
decidedly modern, surrealism seems in some ways very close to the “naïve apocalypticism” that
Kermode attributes to antiquity. As will become clear in the course of this study, the surrealists
were driven by this ostensibly archaic preoccupation with the fate of humanity. That said, many
surrealist depictions of the apocalypse proved to be prescient by depicting visions of the world’s
end that would only become commonplace after the Second World War. One of the goals of this
study is to show how surrealism occupies a unique position within a period of transition between
more ancient and more modern conceptions of the apocalypse.
Of course, the surrealists were not alone in their anticipation of the disaster that was the
Second World War. Indeed, Berger sees this kind of apocalyptic obsession in the work of several
interwar modernists:
[F]or Lawrence, Hemingway, Djuna Barnes, Henry Miller, and other writers of
the teens, twenties, and thirties, the memory of the historical catastrophe of the
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First World War produced the need to imagine an even greater catastrophe that
would finish the job. But this second, imaginary, disaster would be apocalyptic in
a way that the first, the historical, catastrophe could not be, for it would be
revelatory: would reveal, as it obliterated, the full meaning of civilization’s
failures. These modernist writers wrote at what they took to be a moment of
transition, between two apocalypses, one historical—and thus merely
destructive—and one to be imagined. The imagined apocalypse would then
convey retrospectively a fully apocalyptic status to the material, cultural, and
human devastation of history. The modernist apocalyptic vision, marked and
wounded by the past, nevertheless extended forward, if only toward some even
greater catastrophe. (389)
The surrealists were certainly part of this larger trend (although Berger curiously neglects to
mention them), but their works are distinct from other modernist visions of apocalypse in two
key ways. First, the surrealists embraced the occult and seemingly supernatural forces in a way
that places their movement much more in line with historical apocalyptic traditions. Second, the
organization of surrealism interestingly parallels that of apocalyptic religious groups, since they
similarly emphasized the need to operate within a group (or groups) and endorsed collective
action with the aim of demolishing the present world order.
Until now, critics have paid surprisingly little attention to apocalyptic themes in
surrealism, but we must acknowledge the few who have touched on the topic. The work of protosurrealist Guillaume Apollinaire has received more study within this domain that the later
members of the movement proper. Robert Couffignal’s 1966 essay L'Inspiration biblique dans
l'oeuvre d'Apollinaire dedicates a few insightful pages to Apollinaire’s allusions to biblical
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apocalypses. Couffignal shows that Apollinaire’s conception of himself as not only poet but also
prophet derives, at least in part, from the inspiration he took from the apocalyptic prophets of the
Bible. James Leveque dedicates even more attention to this topic in his recent dissertation Words
Like Fire (2014). He explores the apocalyptic undercurrent in some of Apollinaire’s works, as
well as those of his contemporaries Filippo Tommaso Marinetti and Ezra Pound. Leveque
focuses on apocalyptic imagery that was used as a way of processing the trauma of the First
World War. He also illustrates how Apollinaire, Marinetti and Pound were able to draw from
biblical traditions while forging boldly ahead with their avant-garde ambitions. In our first
chapter, we will also look at Apollinaire’s work, but our focus will be on an apocalyptic reading
of Les Mamelles de Tirésias, which receives little more than a passing reference in Coufignal’s
and Leveque’s respective studies.
As for the surrealist movement itself, Edward Ahearn touches on Breton and Louis
Aragon in a chapter of his book Visionary Fictions (1996). Ahearn discusses Breton’s and
Aragon’s radical political views, briefly comparing their revolutionary beliefs to apocalypticism,
but he ultimately devotes very little attention to any reading of apocalyptic themes within their
works themselves. Séverine Rezette studies the apocalypse within the work of Georges Bataille
in her dissertation, Georges Bataille et Saint Jean: Visionnaires de l’Apocalypse (2001). Rezette
analyzes the similarities in the depictions of human suffering and death found in Bataille and
John of Patmos, the author of the Book of Revelation, concluding that Bataille is the biblical
author’s modern analog. Our treatment of Bataille will concentrate instead on his role as the
theorist of a nihilistic eschatology which is, in fact, radically different from anything we find in
John of Patmos. While the present does of course build on the work that came before, it is the
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first attempt to analyze apocalyptic themes within the surrealist movement as a whole, rather
than focusing on individual authors.
Before we continue, it is also important to clarify that, while we will focus on the
surrealist movement, the authors covered in this study are not limited to the “official” surrealist
group organized around Breton. As such, we will consider works not only by those who signed
the original 1924 Manifeste du surréalisme, but also those who were inspired by and worked
closely with these signatories. It is for this reason that, for example, we will look closely at the
works of Georges Bataille, even though he was never fully welcomed into Breton’s group. In
addition, we will briefly touch on works by Anaïs Nin (who was influenced by her friend
Antonin Artaud). We will also consider the post-surrealist works of several former members of
the movement (notably Philippe Soupault, Aragon and Artaud), since, in many cases, their
refusal of the surrealist label was related more to their departure from Breton’s circle than to any
profound shift in aesthetic preoccupations.
We must also clarify what we mean by “apocalypse.” Biblical scholar John Collins
explains that the study of apocalypse can be divided into three different fields, each based on a
different sense of the term : “[S]cholars distinguish between ‘apocalypse’ as a literary genre,
‘apocalyptic eschatology’ as a particular religious perspective and structure of thought, and
‘apocalypticism’ as a sociological ideology” (Collins 3). This tripartite division translates into
the following three topics of inquiry: the literary genre of apocalypse refers to first-hand, written
accounts of apocalyptic visions (of which The Book of Revelation is the most famous example);
apocalyptic eschatology refers to metaphysical and/or theological reflections on humanity’s
ultimate fate (as we find in certain writings by, for example, Paul the Apostle or Tertullian); and
apocalypticism refers to the beliefs of certain religious groups in the imminent end of the world
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(the most extreme examples of which are doomsday cults such as Heaven’s Gate). To these three
different senses of the word “apocalypse,” we can also add the secular conception of the term,
which similarly evokes a cataclysmic end, albeit one typically divorced from any religious
significance (as is manifested, for example, in the fear of a nuclear war). Each of the following
four chapters will focus on one of these approaches to the study of apocalypse, while also
tackling a political question or debate that was explored by the surrealists through their use of
apocalyptic themes.
In the first chapter, we will explore how the literary genre of apocalypse is applicable to
certain surrealist works. To this end, we will take a close look at Collins’ definition of an
apocalyptic text, and what separates this genre from other forms of prophetic literature. In
particular, we will apply this definition to the analysis of one of surrealism’s most famous texts,
Breton’s Manifeste du surréalisme (1924), and one of its most obscure, Robert Desnos’ Livres de
prophéties (1925). As we will see, elements of both of these texts are strikingly close to
apocalyptic religious texts. Desnos’ text predicts catastrophes ranging in scale from the marital
problems of his friends to the collapse of entire nations. The end imagined in Breton’s Manifeste,
however, is the vaguely defined surrealist revolution, through which the surrealists hoped to
transform reality itself. Our analysis of these texts will lead us to a consideration of the political
implications of this kind of apocalyptic prophecy. As we will see, Desnos attempted to use
prophecy to create positive (if limited) change in the present. Breton, by contrast, imagined a
future revolution which would deliver humanity from the evils and mediocrities of the present,
but which seemed to be on an infinitely-receding horizon.
The second chapter will look at the parallels between surrealist thinking and apocalyptic
eschatology, ultimately allowing us to distinguish between two different, surrealist eschatologies,
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that is, two distinct theories of how human history will come to a close. On the one hand,
surrealists like Breton embraced a revolutionary eschatology that promised a future collapse of
the current world order and the installation of a kind of post-historical utopia. These surrealists
followed the model of materialist dialectics put forth by thinkers like Alexandre Kojève, who
argued that the state communism of the USSR was the vehicle through which humanity would be
delivered to its post-historical condition. On the other hand, surrealists like Bataille subscribed to
an annihilationist eschatology, believing that the world would end through slow and irreversible
decay. While Bataille was influenced by Kojève, with whom he maintained a lengthy
correspondence, he struggled to accept that history was imminently approaching its end. For this
reason, much of Bataille’s revolutionary fervor slowly withered away, leading him to a more
nihilistic view of humanity’s ultimate fate.
The third chapter will tackle the question of how surrealist apocalypticism translated into
different approaches to political praxis. Just as apocalyptic religion is often structured around the
question of how the believers can put a divine plan into action, the surrealists grappled with how
best to transform the nature of everyday life. Indeed, as we will see, Breton’s attempts to guide
his circle in this domain led him to fulfill a strikingly similar role to that of a charismatic leader
at the head of an apocalyptic religious group. In addition, the apocalyptically pessimistic theories
of surrealist Pierre Naville will also feature prominently in this chapter. Naville encouraged his
fellow surrealists to join the Communist Party’s efforts to bring about a revolution, while also
claiming that they should remain as pessimistic as possible about their ability to succeed in any
of their goals. Naville’s counter-intuitive doctrine of revolutionary pessimism had a profound
impact on the surrealist movement as a whole, but his ideas were perhaps best put into action by
surrealist poet Benjamin Péret. Although he seemed to see nothing but doom and gloom around
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every corner, Péret dedicated his life to the revolutionary cause. However, other surrealists,
notably Aragon, were not seduced by Naville’s pessimistic outlook, believing that the best path
forward was to embrace Stalinist optimism. As we will explore, these diverging political beliefs
led to very different depictions of revolution and apocalypse.
The fourth chapter will focus on the secular conception of apocalypse, as defined by
theorist Evan Calder Williams. Since Williams’ model discounts the presence of the
supernatural, the revelatory component becomes a matter of retrospective realization instead of
prophetic anticipation. That is to say, in a secular apocalypse, the end is not what is revealed, but
rather the very thing that reveals. This secular understanding of apocalypse will help us analyze
the works of Artaud and Soupault, who both parted ways with Breton’s official group, because
they refused to support the Communist Party, preferring to maintain a largely apolitical stance in
their writing. As we will see, their refusal to accept the communist vision of humanity’s destiny
parallels their texts’ rejection of apocalyptic prophecy. Soupault’s novel Les Dernières nuits de
Paris expresses a belief that, though it goes through cycles of death and rebirth, the world will
always continue in more or less the same way. Artaud, on the contrary, does aspire to a
fundamental transformation of life, but refuses to believe that we can anticipate it in the language
of the present. His unfinished theatrical piece Il n’y a plus de firmament therefore presents the
possibility of an apocalypse but refuses to give it a concrete shape.
Over the course of this study, we will see that interwar surrealism not only featured
apocalyptic imagery prominently, it did so in a variety of unique ways, each of which reveal a
different approach to the political turmoil of interwar Europe. In addition, the insights garnered
from studying the apocalyptic themes of interwar surrealism may help shed light on our present
situation. As we enter the third decade of the third millennium, we may find that our current
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perspective—in the grips of a global pandemic while contending with rising tensions between
nuclear powers and the looming threat of environmental devastation—is not so different from
that of the authors and artists who, nearly a century ago, saw apocalypse on their own horizon.
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Chapter 1
Foreseeing the Death of the Real:
Surrealism and Apocalyptic Prophecy
In our first chapter we will begin by briefly tracing the sources of surrealism’s
apocalyptic thinking. In particular, we will look at the work of several authors and poets who
anticipated certain developments of the later surrealist movement: D. A. F. de Sade, William
Blake, Isidore Ducasse, Arthur Rimbaud, Stéphane Mallarmé and Guillaume Apollinaire. After
that, we will explore how the surrealists developed their own unique brand of apocalypticism in
their literary apocalypses from the interwar period. Before continuing, however, it is essential to
define what we mean by “apocalypse.” While in later chapters we will engage with other senses
of the word, here we will concern ourselves mainly with the genre of revelatory text called
“apocalypse.” Indeed, the term apocalypse comes from the Greek word for revelation
(ἀποκάλυψις). Collins defines the genre as follows: “‘Apocalypse’ is a genre of revelatory
literature with a narrative framework, in which a revelation is mediated by an otherworldly being
to a human recipient, disclosing a transcendent reality which is both temporal, insofar as it
envisages eschatological salvation, and spatial insofar as it involves another, supernatural world”
(Collins 9). It will be necessary to return to this same definition at several points in the current
chapter since several surrealist texts (notably the works of Breton, Soupault and Desnos) share
important characteristics with the apocalyptic genre delineated by Collins. In particular, we will
draw comparisons with The Book of Revelation by John of Patmos (often referred to simply as
L’Apocalypse in French), which is the archetypal apocalypse in the Western canon. As we will
see, prophecy played an integral role in surrealism from the moment of the movement’s
inception. Further, we will explore the retrospective structure of prophecy in Breton’s works,
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notably L’Amour fou. I will argue that this particular quality renders the path to Breton’s socalled surrealist revolution difficult, if not impossible, to discern.

Apocalyptic Precursors

In his ambitious study of apocalyptic themes in modern, Western literature, Edward
Ahearn establishes the French revolution as perhaps the most important apocalyptic moment in
the modern era of Western civilization. The near-complete destruction of the established order
came notably not from the heavens but from a political movement which took great pains to
dismantle the very idea of the sacred. After 1789, political revolution and apocalypse were
thereby closely linked in the Western imaginary. As we will see, this association would become
very important for the surrealists, who envisioned a revolution that would alter not only the
political landscape but also the metaphysical foundations of reality. For the surrealists, one of the
most influential figures that emerged from the revolution was D. A. F. de Sade. In essays like
“Français, encore un effort si vous voulez être républicains” (1795), Sade develops his libertine
philosophy, prescribing a condition of perpetual revolt. In some ways, Sade’s political ideas
prefigure the notion of permanent revolution that Leon Trotsky would later theorize (albeit in
very different terms) and which would have a profound impact on surrealists like Breton. Sade’s
dream of a world largely without laws or taboos could be seen as a kind of end state of human
history (a topic which we will explore in much more depth in the next chapter), where the logic
of transgression is pushed it its limit, and to which the grand meta-narratives of history (the rise
and fall of empires, the evolution of social mores, etc.) would no longer apply. As Roger
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Shattuck notes, the somewhat apocalyptic undercurrent of Sade’s thinking allowed him to enjoy
a renewed appreciation following the nightmare of the Second World War:
[The] horrors that had been taking place in Germany and the Soviet Union drove
some readers to seek shelter in the imaginary and seemingly harmless horrors of
Sade. But his rehabilitation remains difficult to explain. I attribute it more to an
eerie post-Nietzschien death wish in the 20th century. That death wish seeks
absolute liberation knowing that it will lead to absolute destruction—physical,
moral, and spiritual. For some, apocalypse exerts a strong attraction.
(“Rehabilitating a Prophet” 126)
Perhaps prescient of the pertinence the author would have for the terror that was to come, the
surrealists were already working to rehabilitate Sade well before the Second World War.
William Blake was another artist who was particularly impacted by the French
Revolution, although he only experienced it as an outside observer from across the Channel. The
surrealist Philippe Soupault expressed his profound respect for Blake and dedicated a great deal
of time to the study and translation of his work. In his monograph on Blake, Soupault
emphasizes the artist’s passion for the revolution: “En 1789, la Révolution française
provoque l’enthousiasme de William. Il parcourt les rues de Londres, coiffé d’un bonnet
phrygien, et fréquente les milieux révolutionnaires de la ville (William Blake 16). Of course,
Soupault also highlights that Blake was motivated by religious visions: “Ses gravures, ainsi que
ses poèmes, n’étaient donc que des éclairs qui devaient permettre d’apercevoir à leur lueur un
autre monde. Il ne s’agit plus d’esthétique mais d’une sorte de révélation” (William Blake 39).
Blake’s work reflects an obsession with visions and apocalypse, even while he attempts to free
these concepts from the monopoly held over them by organized religion. In The Marriage of
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Heaven and Hell (1793), for example, Blake expresses a profound skepticism toward the church:
“Prisons are built with stones of Law, Brothels with bricks of Religion” (Blake 67). His radically
anti-establishment approach to religious themes earned Blake the admiration of the staunchly
anticlerical surrealists.
Isidore Ducasse, the self-styled comte de Lautréamont, also had an enormous influence
on the surrealists, who viewed their “discovery” of his work as a kind of apocalyptic revelation
in itself. As Breton explains:
Aux yeux de certains poètes d’aujourd’hui, les Chants de Maldoror et Poésies
brillent d’un éclat incomparable ; ils sont l’expression d’une révélation totale qui
semble excéder les possibilités humaines. […] Un œil absolument vierge se tient à
l’affût du perfectionnement scientifique du monde, passe outre au caractère
consciemment utilitaire de ce perfectionnement, le situe avec tout le reste dans la
lumière même de l’apocalypse. Apocalypse définitive que cette œuvre dans
laquelle se perdent et s’exaltent les grandes pulsions instinctives au contact d’une
cage d’amiante qui enferme un cœur chauffé à blanc. (OC II : 987; Breton’s
emphasis)
Several critics have commented on the apocalyptic themes in Les Chants de Maldoror (1869).
Ahearn, for example, sees Lautréamont’s work as a kind of continuation of Blake’s project: “The
effect is something like a massive extension of certain portions of The Marriage of Heaven and
Hell, in that diabolical rebellion and biblical forms are burlesqued while nonetheless retaining a
powerful impact” (Ahearn 72). In his study of biblical themes in Lautréamont, Philippe Sellier
observes that Lautréamont uses many biblical motifs, only to parody or “invert” them:
“Lautréamont ‘retourne’ maintes données bibliques : Maldoror s’attribue certaines
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caractéristiques de Dieu, Dieu prend les apparences réservées à Satan” (404-5). Sellier notes, for
example, that descriptions of Maldoror (an avatar of evil comparable to Satan) sometimes match
quite closely the radiant, white-haired Jesus whom we encounter in John of Patmos’ Revelation:
“Lautréamont ne cesse d’attribuer à Maldoror les caractéristiques divines telles que les a fixées
l’apocalyptique : ‘auréole de rayons étincelants’, ‘cheveux … blancs comme la neige’” (Sellier
411). God (referred to as “le Créateur” or “le Tout-Puissant”) is depicted as vile and
cannibalistic, however. In a scene from Les Chants that reads like a parody of John of Patmos’
description of the throne of God, the Creator is shown perched upon his throne while devouring
human bodies that he fishes out of a nearby vat of blood.
One of the most interesting inversions of apocalyptic themes is found in the conclusion of
Les Chants. Just as John of Patmos concludes his apocalypse with a confrontation between
God’s forces and the avatars of evil, Les Chants de Maldoror end with a climactic battle between
the eponymous character and the Creator, who has taken the form of a rhinoceros. While
Maldoror triumphs over his nemesis by shooting him with a revolver, the narrator is careful to
explain that the bullet does not kill him: “La balle troua sa peau, comme une vrille ; l’on aurait
pu croire, avec une apparence de logique, que la mort devait infailliblement apparaître. Mais
nous savions que, dans ce pachyderme, s’était introduite la substance du Seigneur. Il se retira
avec chagrin” (356). Maldoror has won the battle, but not necessarily the war. Indeed, earlier in
the book, Maldoror describes himself as being locked in a kind of eternal stalemate with the
Creator: “nous vivons, tous les deux, comme deux monarques voisins, qui connaissent leurs
forces respectives, ne peuvent se vaincre l’un l’autre, et sont fatigués des batailles inutiles du
passé. Il me craint, et je le crains ; chacun, sans être vaincu, a éprouvé les rudes coups de son
adversaire, et nous en restons là” (216). Maldoror’s triumph in the final scene seems to do little
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to alter this state of affairs. The Creator, wounded but not destroyed, will presumably continue to
serve as a rival for Maldoror. In this way, Les Chants conclude with an inversion of John of
Patmos’ biblical apocalypse, not only in the sense that God is defeated, but also in the sense that
the book refuses to offer a definitive resolution to its central conflict. To borrow a phrase from
Umberto Eco, Les Chants thus represent an “apocalypse postponed.”1 The incompleteness of the
apocalypse is further reinforced by the fact that Les Chants comprising the book number only six
(a number which represents evil in Johannine numerology, e.g. 666, the number of the Beast),
whereas the Book of Revelation is structured around the divine number seven (e.g. the seven
churches, the seven seals, the seven trumpets, etc.). Les Chants thus further subvert religious
iconography by concluding on a number that, in the apocalyptic logic of John of Patmos, is both
evil and incomplete.
Philippe Soupault’s writing on Lautréamont shows an almost pious reverence for the
poet. Using the vocabulary of a religious experience, Soupault blissfully recounts his discovery
of Les Chants (which he would later share with his acquaintances Breton and Aragon, sparking
their interest and leading to a series of collaborations between the three that would culminate in
the formation of the surrealist movement) : “C’est à cette époque que je lus les Chants de
Maldoror, qui demeurent pour moi la plus grande révélation” (Histoire d’un blanc 75). Soupault

1

This term comes from Eco’s eponymous book, although he uses the notion of an “apocalypse

postponed” in a very different context, i.e. as a tongue-in-cheek criticism of the snobbishness of
certain 20th-century cultural critics who claimed that mass culture had brought about a cultural
apocalypse.
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describes his chance encounter with the book in a bookstore across the street from the military
hospital where he was convalescing:
Au rayon ‘mathématiques’, je remarquai un ouvrage broché sous une couverture
beige. Le titre : Les Chants de Maldoror. L’auteur : Comte de Lautréamont. Cet
exemplaire, échoué dans cette librairie à la suite de circonstances qu’il me fut
impossible de découvrir, portait une brève inscription au crayon à la mine de
plomb : ‘rare’… Le prix (sept francs or) n’était pas au-dessus de mes moyens.
J’achetai le livre parce que j’avais feuilleté un numéro de la revue de Paul Fort et
d’André Salmon, Vers et Prose, dans lequel avait été publié le premier chant des
Chants de Maldoror. […] Un titre, un nom. Simple curiosité. On ne sait jamais. Je
ne savais pas, en effet, ce que cette découverte dans une librairie de quartier allait
provoquer. (Mémoires de l’oubli 52)
While it is not an apocalypse in the strict sense of the term, this “revelation” of Lautréamont
shares interesting characteristics with a subtype of apocalyptic revelation in which “the
revelation is contained in a written document, usually a heavenly book” (Collins 6).2 Soupault’s
assertion that he found the book misplaced in the mathematics section is significant because Les
Chants contain a lengthy elegy to mathematics in which Maldoror thanks the discipline for
giving him a tool with which he can resist the tyranny of faith : “Vous me donnâtes la logique,
qui est comme l’âme elle-même de vos enseignements […] Avec cette arme empoisonnée que
vous me prêtâtes, je fis descendre, de son piédestal, construit par la lâcheté de l’homme, le

2

Paradigm 1.4 in Collins’ system of classification.
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Créateur lui-même !” (194). Thus the staging of Soupault’s discovery reinforces the antireligious content of the revelation.
Indeed, in a chapter of his 1927 memoir Histoire d’un blanc, Soupault follows
Lautréamont’s convention of religious parody by giving the author the traits of a saint who
serves as his intercessor: “Il m’importe peu de découvrir, ici ou là, d’autres intercesseurs”
(Histoire d’un blanc 77). Soupault goes as far as to depict Lautréamont as a Christ figure who
will deliver mankind from the damnation of literary convention: “Est-ce que la vraie vie de
Ducasse ne fait que commencer ? Est-ce que cette force, que contiennent avec peine les feuillets
d’un livre, ne va pas tout à coup se déchaîner et nous délivrer de cette angoisse qu’on nomme
parfois littérature” (Histoire d’un blanc 78). Soupault imagines an encounter that reads as an
inversion of John of Patmos’ meeting with Jesus at the beginning of the Book of Revelation.
First, let us look at the biblical scene: “His face was like the sun shining in all its brilliance.
When I saw him, I fell at his feet as though dead. Then he placed his right hand on me and
said: ‘Do not be afraid. I am the First and the Last. I am the Living One; I was dead, and now
look, I am alive for ever and ever! And I hold the keys of death and Hades[’]” (Rev. 1.16-18).
Now let us compare this scene with Soupault’s imagined encounter with Lautréamont: “Je ne
veux pas m’incliner devant toi comme devant le dernier dieu, mais simplement m’éteindre près
de toi dans ce petit lit de bois et baiser notre mort. Je sais que c’est elle qui nous présentera :
‘Monsieur Philippe Soupault… Monsieur Ducasse.’ Je rougis de plaisir. J’ai tellement attendu ce
jour. Ô nuit que je te désire” (Histoire d’un blanc 80-1). A juxtaposition of the two scenes
reveals an interesting contrast: In the Book of Revelation, Jesus’ presence is radiant; he has
triumphed over death and his face shines with the brilliance of the sun. Soupault’s somber,
nocturnal scene, however, depicts a motionless, silent Lautrémont, lying in his deathbed and
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united with Soupault not in spite of death, but because of it. In addition, John of Patmos drops to
the feet of his God and king, while Soupault explicitly refuses to do so because he does not
recognize Lautréamont as either of these. Indeed, despite his genuine admiration for the poet and
his parodic use of religious language, Soupault is careful to caution the reader against deifying
Lautréamont: “Je voudrais détruire pour toujours la gloire que certains imbéciles construiront
autour de ton nom. Que l’on sache une fois pour toutes qu’il n’y a pas de gloire pour Isidore
Ducasse, comte de Lautréamont. Qu’on le répète ! Je suis probablement né pour cette seule
raison” (Histoire d’un blanc 80). If Lautréamont inverts the biblical apocalypse, then Soupault
inverts the role of the apocalyptic prophet. John of Patmos’ vision convinced him that his raison
d’être was to bring glory to God; Soupault’s revelation gave him the mission to guard against the
glorification of Lautréamont.
Nevertheless, in spite of Soupault’s ostensible efforts, Lautréamont remained an object of
quasi-religious veneration for the surrealists. Breton celebrates Lautréamont as “un homme, un
poète, un prophète même” (OC I : 814). For Breton, Lautréamont’s work is a prophetic
anticipation of the political chaos that would descend upon Paris shortly after the poet’s death.
Ahearn explains: “Lautréamont’s Maldoror is eerily predictive of the class war that ended in the
destruction of the Commune in 1871” (9). As we will see, Breton hoped that his own work
would similarly presage his envisioned revolution. Furthermore, his sense of ownership of and
responsibility for Lautréamont’s legacy became a source of conflict with his friend and
collaborator, Soupault. Aragon and Breton mercilessly attacked Soupault because, according to
them, he had committed the unpardonable error of confusing Isidore Ducasse with a certain Félix
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Ducasse in the biography he included in his preface to Lautréamont’s Oeuvres complètes.3 The
most infamous example of the surrealist veneration of Lautréamont took place on February 14,
1930, when Breton, Aragon and a handful of other surrealists (though not Soupault, since he was
no longer affiliated with the group) ransacked a bar in Montparnasse. The establishment in
question had the audacity to call itself Maldoror, a crime which surrealist André Thirion labeled
“sacrilège” (Thirion 243). Writing for the newspaper Candide, Odette Pannetier recounted the
events of that evening, noting that “Ils disent comme ça que Maldoror pour un surréaliste c’est
l’équivalent de Jésus-Christ pour un chrétien et que voir ce nom-là employé comme enseigne, ça
va sûrement scandaliser ces messieurs Breton et Aragon” (qtd. in Breton OC I : 813-14). As we
have seen, this is not far from the truth; Maldoror (or, in certain contexts, his creator) does exist
in the surrealist imagination as a kind of Christ figure, albeit in a parodic, inverted form.
Maldoror, however, is not to be venerated at an altar, but rather in a barfight.
Of course, the self-identified voyant, Arthur Rimbaud, was also an important influence on
the surrealists, especially on the visionary character character of the movement. Critics have long
noted the apocalyptic themes in his work. As Marc Eigeldinger observes, “Rimbaud appartient
certainement à la catégorie de ceux qui portent en eux ‘le désir de l’Apocalypse’ et qui vivent
dans l’attente de son avènement, promis par l’expérience du messianisme poétique” (182). One
of the more notable examples of Rimbaud’s apocalyptic desire is found at the end of his poem
“Après le déluge,” where the dissipation of the floods is a source of frustration, rather than relief:

3

In a much later interview, Soupault would continue to defend himself by insisting that Aragon

and Breton could produce no proof that the anecdote that Soupault had attributed to Isidore
belonged in fact to Félix.
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“Eaux et tristesses, montez et relevez les Déluges. / Car depuis qu’ils sont dissipés, — oh les
pierres précieuses s’enfouissant, et les fleurs ouvertes ! — c’est un ennui !” (Rimbaud 290). This
disappointment with the dissipation of a catastrophe is perhaps indicative of political
disappointment after the suppression of the Paris Commune. Indeed, Eigeldinger draws a direct
connection between apocalypse and revolution in Rimbaud’s poetry: “‘Soir historique’ évoque le
grand soir promis par l’espérance de la Révolution, mais le sens du poème s’élargit en
conclusion pour figurer le déferlement d’une révolution cosmique qui fait présager les temps de
l’Apocalypse” (Eigeldinger 188). The poem “Soir historique” does indeed invite a political
interpretation from the beginning by evoking in the opening lines “nos horreurs économiques,”
and concluding with a refusal of “magie bourgeoise,” along with a subsequent embrace of the
apocalypse: “Le moment de l’étuve, des mers enlevées, des embrasements souterrains, de la
planète emportée, et des exterminations conséquentes, certitudes si peu malignement indiquées
dans la bible et par les Nornes et qu’il sera donné à l’être sérieux de surveiller. — Cependant ce
ne sera point un effet de légende !” (Rimbaud 311-12). For Rimbaud, the only hope of escape
from socio-political oppression lies in the promise that one day the prophesied destruction of the
established order will leave the realm of legend and become reality.
Stamos Metzidakis also finds subtle Johannine themes in Rimbaud’s poem “Voyelles”:
“les voyelles de Rimbaud sont aux couleurs de son poème ce que les voix de l’Apocalypse sont
aux nombreuses couleurs mentionnées dans le texte de Saint Jean” (59). According to
Metzidakis, the eponymous vowels evoke the seven vowels of the Greek language, which
correspond to the many sets of seven in The Book of Revelation. In addition, Rimbaud’s pairing
of colors and vowels (“A noir, E blanc,” etc.) mirrors the color associations we find in John of
Patmos: “chaque fois dans cette histoire que Saint Jean entend une voix, il est dit qu’il voit une
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couleur. Qui plus est, lorsqu’il entend la voix du Christ […] il croit voir quelqu’un assis sur un
trône entouré d’un arc-en-ciel” (Metzidakis 59). However, Rimbaud’s most important
contribution to our present discussion is his approach to poetic inspiration through a kind of
voyance which destabilizes the self as well as the grammatical structures that are used to express
it. As he explains in his famous “Lettres du voyant” : “C’est faux de dire : je pense : on devrait
dire : On me pense […] Je est un autre” (340). As we will see, this kind of othering of the
poetic/prophetic voice will become very important for the poetic and prophetic practices of the
surrealists.
Stéphane Mallarmé’s radical experimentation with poetic form also inspired many of the
surrealists, but one of his projects in particular is important in the context of apocalyptic
prophecy. For decades, Mallarmé worked on what he believed to be his magnum opus, Le Livre,
which he imagined as a grand, twenty volume work that could be read in an infinite number of
ways and which would provide the orphic explanation of the entire world. Mallarmé’s
descriptions of the project do not give us a very clear notion of what, exactly, the book would
contain, and it seems to exist more in the future of the poet’s imagination than it does in any
present. Indeed, Maurice Blanchot highlights the complicated relationship that Le Livre has with
the concept of time : “L’on pourrait se demander si Mallarmé ne confie pas à la lecture le soin de
rendre présente cette œuvre où se jouent des temps qui la rendent inabordable” (Le Livre à venir
355). Mallarmé never came close to finishing Le Livre, and it seems probable that it would have
been impossible to finish. As Louis Marvick explains : “If ‘le monde existe pour aboutir à un
livre,’ then the completion of the book must coincide with the end, l’aboutissement, of the world.
No wonder that Valéry should have called the project ‘par définition irréalisable,’ and that others
(including, sometimes, Mallarmé himself) should have been of the same opinion” (Marvick 289).
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The completed version of Mallarmé’s Livre, like the end of the world, seems to exist on an
infinitely receding horizon, always in sight but never within reach. As we will see later in this
chapter, Breton shares this taste for the pursuit of the unattainable, and it shapes his conception
of the apocalypse as an imminent revolution which is never realizable in the present moment.
Guillaume Apollinaire was another important influence on surrealism (indeed he
originally coined the term), especially in his insistence on the poet’s role as prophet: “Les poëtes
modernes sont donc des créateurs, des inventeurs et des prophètes” (Oeuvres en prose II : 952).
Robert Couffignal traces the influence of biblical prophecy on Apollinaire’s poetry: “Drapé dans
le manteau d’Élie ou d’Ézéchiel, le poète parsème ses propos d'allusions aux Livres saints, de la
Genèse à l’Apocalypse” (102). Indeed, in one of his earliest works, L’Enchanteur pourissant
(1909), the biblical prophets Enoch and Elias (who have long been associated with the two
witnesses from The Book of Revelation) feature prominently, in fact. The eponymous enchanter
encounters Elias and harasses him, but the prophet responds by claiming that the final judgment
will not be kind to the enchanter: “les quinze signes du jugement dernier ne te ressusciteraient
pas” (Oeuvres en prose I : 60). That said, Couffignal is careful to explain that Apollinaire’s
fixation with biblical figures is not an expression of his faith: “s'il emprunte à l’univers biblique
ses formules et ses personnages, c’est pour en reporter la charge sacrée sur le domaine de la
poésie par qui seront transfigurés l’homme et le monde d’aujourd’hui” (103). Apollinaire
appropriates biblical themes to add them to a larger poetic repertoire. James Leveque reaches a
similar conclusion in his study of prophetic themes in Apollinaire’s work: “Christianity and
biblical literature provided material for Apollinaire to manipulate, re-cast, and re-combine with
other sources – all with the intention of expressing the present situation as open to the
possibilities of creativity, heroism, and beauty” (Leveque 30). As Apollinaire writes in “Sur les
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prophéties” : “Il n’y a pas d’esprit religieux dans tout cela /Ni dans les superstitions ni dans les
prophéties / Ni dans tout ce que l’on nomme occultisme / Il y a avant tout une façon d’observer
la nature / Et d’interpréter la nature / Qui est très légitime” (Œuvres poétiques 187). Apollinaire
values the Bible as a source of inspiration, but he does not confer a privileged, religious status to
the book; it is simply one attempt to understand the world, among many others. Similarly,
biblical prophecy is just as valid for Apollinaire as any occult divination technique.
It is because of Apollinaire’s eclectic approach that works like L’Enchanteur pourissant
seamlessly blend characters and elements from various sources: Biblical, Arthurian and
mythological. If Apollinaire’s work shows a fascination for apocalyptic themes in particular, it is
perhaps because Apollinaire is keenly aware of the creative energy sparked by the threat of
disaster. As Apollinaire remarked in April 1914, less than four months before the outbreak of the
First World War, “L’époque sera légère, mais troublée sans doute, car on ne danse jamais plus
que dans les temps de révolutions, ni mieux que sur un volcan” (qtd. in Read 23). We also see a
desire for the apocalypse in Apollinaire’s “Les Fiançailles,” where the speaker exclaims :
“[J]’espérais la fin du monde / Mais la mienne arrive en sifflant comme un ouragan” (Œuvres
poétiques 128). According to his friend Jean Mollet, Apollinaire even planned (but never
finished) a novel tentatively titled La Fin du monde (Couffignal 98). The surviving fragments of
the project are collected on a single page of the Pléiade edition of his Œuvres en prose. While
the fragments do not give us a very complete idea of what La Fin du monde would have been
about, the final paragraph does give us a sense of the dark tone that Apollinaire had in mind:
“Dernier. Il se tue. Pas de pain. Rien stérilité tous se lamentent. Il est impossible de vivre. Tu as
tué celui qui étais [sic] notre mère. La seule femme. Homme mais femme. Maintenant rien
stérilité. Ville inutile. Il faut mourir” (Œuvres en prose I : 1040). While La Fin du monde would
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never see the light of day, the themes of sterility and ambiguous gender identities would become
key elements of Apollinaire’s 1917 “drame surréaliste” Les Mamelles de Tirésias.
The protagonist of Les Mamelles, Thérèse, tired of her role as a housewife, discards her
breasts and adopts the male identity of Tirésias (whose name recalls the mythical prophet who
was supernaturally transformed into a woman), starting a military career and inspiring women to
stop having babies. The husband, alarmed by Tirésias’s movement, fears a crisis of depopulation
and resolves to correct the problem by giving birth to children on his own. He seems to
overcompensate, however, when he gives birth to over 40,000 children in a single day, leading to
concerns about overpopulation and famine. The chaos is resolved, however, when a cartomancer
arrives prophesying that children will make Zanzibar’s fortune, not its ruin. This cartomancer
reveals herself to be none other than Thérèse. By returning to her role as loving wife, Thérèse
manages to restore order, but not before establishing herself as her husband’s equal.
In Les mamelles de Tirésias, Apollinaire deals with two topics that were widely discussed
in 1917. First, according to Peter Read, the revolt of Thérèse/Tirésias was inspired in part by the
numerous female workers’ strikes that occurred in France during the First World War. Second,
the play’s preoccupation with population was inspired by concerns that the colossal loss of life
caused by the war would lead to a depopulation crisis. There has been much debate among critics
about whether the play is pro- or anti-feminist and whether or not Apollinaire is serious in his
assertion that his play was intended to instruct the public in the virtues of procreation. Willard
Bohn, however, claims that neither repopulation nor feminism are particularly central to the
play’s message: “The most important theme is neither political nor demographic, it turns out, but
erotic. […] Although much of what he says is implicit, the final scene exhorts the members of
the audience to go home and make love.” (qtd. in Bohn 124). In this reading of the play, Les
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Mamelles de Tirésias expresses less a genuine concern about repopulation than a desire to bring
joy back to a war-weary Paris and a conviction that—despite the poet’s earlier enthusiasm for the
conflict—the time was fast approaching when France would need to make love, not war.
Les Mamelles de Tirésias reinforces this message by repeatedly breaking the fourth wall.
In the final act, several interactions between the characters in the play and the audience are
written into the script, and the play’s premiere was famously raucous and highly interactive. As
one attendee reported: “Le spectacle était dans la salle,” (Bohn 105). Crucially, the play ends
when Thérèse refuses to take back a basket of rubber balls meant to signify her breasts. Instead,
she throws them to the audience exclaiming “Allez nourrir tous les enfants / De la repopulation”
(913). The play therefore concludes with a call to arms that shifts the focus and the responsibility
onto the audience. Indeed, this notion of responsibility is reinforced by the fact that the feared
apocalyptic disaster is distinctly man-made. In Les Mamelles de Tirésias, it is the character’s
choices and perceptions that lead to cries of catastrophe and to panicked hyper-correction.
If Apollinaire, like Lautréamont, postpones the apocalypse, it is perhaps for two key
reasons. First, he aimed to charge his audience with the energy necessary to face contemporary
challenges. Apollinaire hoped to give his audience the joy and hope necessary to make it through
the rest of the war. Second, by breaking the fourth wall and shifting the focus onto the audience,
Apollinaire reminds us of our own role in man-made catastrophes. In a way, the spectators or
readers can choose to further postpone the apocalypse, or not. Terrifyingly enough, the choice—
or more precisely the responsibility—is ours to bear. While the surrealists felt uncomfortable
with the optimistic, almost nationalistic outlook that Apollinaire sometimes adopted in his final
years, the influence of his work on the movement is undeniable, especially in reinforcing the idea
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that we should not expect the apocalypse to be handed down from the heavens, but rather to be
the consequence of our own actions.

Surrealism and “Profane Illumination”

Of course, in highlighting the religious themes in surrealism and its antecedents, I do not
mean to suggest that surrealism embraced apocalyptic religion in the proper sense of the term.
Indeed, Walter Benjamin appreciated the surrealist movement precisely because it so
enthusiastically attacked religion. The great German critic characterized the poetic praxis of the
surrealists as “profane illumination,” a kind of revelation stripped of any religious significance.
According to Benjamin, the project of the surrealist movement was to “win the energies of
intoxication for the revolution” (Benjamin 236). He clarifies, however, that surrealism cannot be
reduced to drug-induced delirium. Surrealist intoxication is more profound:
It is a cardinal error to believe that, of “Surrealist experiences”, we know only the
religious ecstasies or the ecstasies of drugs. […] [T]he true, creative overcoming
of religious illumination certainly does not lie in narcotics. It resides in a profane
illumination, a materialistic, anthropological inspiration, to which hashish, opium,
or whatever else can give an introductory lesson. (Benjamin’s emphasis 227)
In her book Profane Illumination, Margaret Cohen emphasizes that Benjamin’s word choice in
his writing on surrealism draws a connection between the surrealist experience and the shock
experience (Chockerlebnis) central to much of his other work: “Benjamin uses here the luminous
language found in surrealism’s descriptions of its momentary, unexpected, and transfiguring
image juxtapositions and encounters” (188). While Cohen’s essay focuses on the political
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implications of profane illumination, I would argue that the obvious religious implications of the
term are at least as significant. Benjamin’s characterization of surrealist experiences as a profane
illumination, as opposed to the divine illumination of Christian theology, is in keeping with the
surrealists’ parodic use of religious vocabulary and iconography for decidedly anti-religious
ends. Following in the footsteps of their idol Lautréamont, the surrealists often invert the logic of
religion.
In his analysis of Nadja, Benjamin Andréo characterizes Breton’s use of religion as being
at once an appropriation of its imagery and an immanent critique of its logic: “Nadja met aussi
en œuvre une sacralité qui illustre une technique oppositionnelle d’appropriation par
détournement : en se plaçant à l’intérieur d’un discours dominant et en y introduisant des
changements ponctuels, la narration se crée un nouvel espace discursif au sein duquel elle est
libre d’y faire se jouer les intérêts propres au groupe surréaliste” (110). To cite only one example
from Nadja (a book which Benjamin identified as one of the best examples of profane
illumination), the narrator invokes the rite of communion in a description of a kiss he shares with
the eponymous character: “Avec respect je baise ses très jolies dents et elle alors, lentement,
gravement, la seconde fois sur quelques notes plus haut que la première : ‘la communion se
passe en silence… la communion se passe en silence.’ C’est m’explique-t-elle, que ce baiser la
laisse sous l’impression de quelque chose de sacré, où ses dents ‘tenaient lieu d’hostie’” (OC
I : 703). As Andréo observes, this passage borrows the language and imagery of communion, all
the while subverting the metaphysical logic of the rite: “Pour Breton, pas de transsubstantiation,
pas d’au-delà; quoi de plus solidement réel, concret, que des dents ?” (75). The white wafer that
mysteriously becomes the body of an immortal God is replaced by mundane, white teeth,
comprising quite obviously a part of a mortal body.
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However, this kind of surrealist appropriation of religious iconography is not always
intended to destroy completely the very concept of the sacred, but rather to transform it radically,
or as in the example of the kiss above, to locate the sacred paradoxically within the profane.
Describing the language used in Breton’s manifestoes, Robert Champigny asserts, for example,
that Breton’s conception of surrealism creates a tension between sacred and profane criteria: “Le
premier des deux critères a un caractère sacré, religieux. Le manifeste adopte ici et là une
tournure évangélique : il annonce la bonne nouvelle de la surréalité” (21). Of course, this
surrealist “good news” does not promise salvation in the afterlife, but rather in a transformation
of the profane (that is, secular) experience of quotidian existence. We see Breton’s conception of
the “good news” in the inexplicable sense of anticipation that he associates with the boulevard
Bonne-Nouvelle in Nadja. For Breton, the promise of this boulevard finally comes to fruition in
the riots sparked by the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti: “le boulevard Bonne-Nouvelle, [a] […]
lors des magnifiques journées de pillage dites ‘Sacco-Vanzetti’ semblé répondre à l’attente qui
fut la mienne, en se désignant vraiment comme un des grands points stratégiques que je cherche
en matière de désordre” (OC I : 748). The good news of the surrealists is thus not the promise of
salvation through divine intervention, but rather that of liberation through violent uprising.
In addition, Breton borrows from religious notions to conceptualize the very act of
writing. As Stamos Metzidakis and Violaine White explain in their co-authored study of the
concept of grace in surrealist collaborations, Breton uses religious language both to diminish the
authority of the poet and to sanctify the creative act of writing: “On s’aperçoit dans les textes
théoriques du surréalisme que la profanation de l’auteur est en fait conjointe […] à une
sacralisation des pratiques d’écriture. […] [L]es manifestes décrivent l’automatisme au moyen
d’un vocabulaire religieux : les pratiques d’écriture surréalistes ont pour but de mettre le sujet
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‘dans un état de grâce avec le hasard’” (69). Surrealism’s emphasis on automatism and
collaboration serves to disturb traditional notions of the author, but in doing so it also brings the
movement closer to religious conceptions of authorship. The Book of Revelation, for example,
takes pains to minimize the role of its own author, introducing him in the prologue as “John, who
testifies to everything he saw—that is, the word of God and the testimony of Jesus Christ” (Rev.
1:1-2). John of Patmos thus claims to do nothing more than to transcribe what comes to him from
a higher power. Breton similarly undermines the role of the author by claiming that the
surrealists aim to be nothing more than recording devices: “Mais nous, qui ne nous sommes
livrés à aucun travail de filtration, qui nous sommes faits dans nos œuvres les sourds réceptacles
de tant d’échos, les modestes appareils enregistreurs qui ne s’hypnotisent pas sur le dessin qu’ils
tracent nous servons peut-être encore une plus noble cause” (OC I : 330). It is because of
Breton’s insistence on the non-intervention of the artist that Champigny claims that “la valeur du
langage surréaliste tient à ce qu’on a affaire à une parole révélée” (21). This surrealist endeavor
to transform the poet into a passive recipient of revelation is what allows us to approach some
surrealist texts as apocalyptic prophecies. Crucially, however, the surrealists do not pretend to
transcribe the word of God, but instead that of the unconscious mind. In the pages that follow,
we will explore the ways in which certain surrealist works not only parodically appropriate
apocalyptic themes, but also conform in both form and function to John Collins’ definition of the
apocalyptic genre. In particular, we will examine Breton’s manifestoes and Robert Desnos’
Livres de prophéties to see how they function as apocalyptic prophecies in a modern, secular
context.
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The Revelations of Breton and Desnos

From the earliest years of the surrealist movement, apocalyptic themes can be found in
the pages of its works. In Breton and Soupault’s proto-surrealist Champs magnétiques (1920),
for example, we find this line evoking the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah: “Si seulement
mes amis n’avaient pas été changés en statues de sel” (Breton OC I:94). We also find several
apocalyptic elements in the poem “N’a jamais eu de commencement,” which warns that “Il va
falloir se mettre à l’abri” before going on to depict the following scene: “Nuage de sauterelles
sédiment / Il y a des pays entiers construits sur les carcasses des arêtes / Tout a la couleur du
rubis sept fois” (Breton OC I:94). Beyond the fishbones which are generally evocative of death
and decay, these lines contain the specifically Johannine elements of a swarm of locusts and a
multiplication by seven. Notably, the book’s final poem ends in abrupt and total destruction:
“Une sphere détruit tout.” The collection then comes to a close with a page ominously
announcing “LA FIN DE TOUT” (Breton OC I: 103-4). Nevertheless, the manifestoes are
undoubtedly the part of Breton’s œuvre that best fits within the genre of apocalypse, even if these
texts sometimes lack the destructive imagery found in many other surrealist works.
As Collins explains in the definition of the apocalyptic genre, for a text to be considered
an apocalypse, the account of the revelation must be within a narrative framework. Breton’s first
Manifeste contains several disjointed elements, ranging from poetry to composition guidelines;
only a few of them could be considered narrative in form. However, a crucial portion of the
manifesto is dedicated to recounting the story of Breton’s first surrealist experiences:
Un soir donc, avant de m’endormir, je perçus, nettement articulée au point qu’il
était impossible d’y changer un mot, […] une assez bizarre phrase qui me
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parvenait sans porter trace des événements auxquels […] je me trouvais mêlé à
cet instant-là, phrase qui me parut insistante, phrase oserai-je dire qui cognait à la
vitre. J’en pris rapidement notion et me disposais à passer outre quand son
caractère organique me retint. En vérité cette phrase m’étonnait ; je ne l’ai
malheureusement pas retenue jusqu’à ce jour, c’était quelque chose comme : ‘Il y
a un homme coupé en deux par la fenêtre’ mais elle ne pouvait souffrir
d’équivoque, accompagnée qu’elle était de la faible représentation visuelle d’un
homme marchant et tronçonné à mi-hauteur par une fenêtre perpendiculaire à
l’axe de son corps. (OC I : 324-5)
This sentence that knocks at the window, so to speak, brings us to an important point of
comparison with the genre of “apocalypse.” Collins insists that the revelation of an apocalypse
must be communicated by an otherworldly being.
In Breton’s first manifesto, this otherworldly being is described as the “voix surréaliste,”
and it is identified with the oracular voice venerated by the ancients: “La piété des hommes ne
me trompe pas. La voix surréaliste qui secouait Cumes, Dodone et Delphes n’est autre chose que
celle qui me dicte mes discours les moins courroucés” (Manifestes 57-8). Many of the surrealists
evoked this idea of poetic language entering the mind as if from an outside entity, although each
poet uses a slightly different metaphor. Robert Desnos spoke of a “souffle” that brought
prophecies to him: “Je n’ai absolument pas contrôlé mes prophéties. J’ai écrit ce que ce soufflé
inconnu qui me transporte m’a dicté” (“prophéties” 52). In his Histoire d’un blanc (1927),
Soupault described how his first poem came to him like the buzzing of an insect:
Un jour, dans un lit d’hôpital à Paris, je voyais la neige tomber. Je ne sais
pourquoi une phrase tourna dans ma tête. Elle faisait un bruit d’insecte. Elle
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insistait. Quelle sale mouche ! Cela dura deux jours. Je pris un crayon et je
l’écrivis. Alors quelque chose que je ne reconnus pas éclata.
Une série de phrases irrésistibles coulaient de mon crayon comme des gouttes de
sueur. C’était un poème. (83-4)
The language used by the surrealists to describe their poetic inspiration is strikingly similar to
that used by John of Patmos: “On the Lord’s Day I was in the Spirit, and I heard behind me a
loud voice like a trumpet, which said: ‘Write on a scroll what you see and send it to the seven
churches’” (Rev. 1.10-11). Of course, in the surrealists’ materialist, Freudian framework, the
origin of these strange words is not the supernatural (or, at least, it is certainly not divine), but
rather the unconscious. Nevertheless, the unconscious often plays the role in surrealism that the
supernatural plays in apocalyptic religion. As Katharine Conley explains in her exploration of
surrealism’s “ghostliness”:
[W]ith their appropriation of spiritualist automatism the young surrealists
transformed the ghosts that practitioners of spiritualism sought to conjure into
ephemeral forces within the unconscious mind. The psychic forces they sought to
understand were like metaphorical versions of the ghosts of spiritualism […]
Their embrace of automatism signaled a desire to explore the fundamentally
ghostly experience of opening oneself up to whatever might be hidden within the
psyche […] (3)
The surrealist obsession with prophecy and revelation, like the group’s fascination with ghosts, is
animated by the movement’s desire to summon perceivable experiences that could reveal the
hidden depths of the unconscious.
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Further, and more importantly, according to Collins’ definition, an apocalypse must
present the revelation of a transcendent reality that involves a future salvation and evokes
another world. Breton’s first manifesto implores its readers to seek out a new, absolute reality :
“Je crois à la résolution future de ces deux états, en apparence si contradictoires, qui sont le rêve
et la réalité, en une sorte de réalité absolue, de surréalité” (Manifestes 24). Crucially, this
culmination, which Breton refers to as the surrealist revolution or simply the Revolution, will
take place at an undefined point in the future. While Breton himself would likely reject the idea
that surreality is “transcendent” in the proper sense of the term, there can be no doubt that the
absolute reality he describes goes well beyond reality as traditionally perceived. Indeed, Breton
emphasizes that he is not interested in this world as we know it. The closing words of the
Manifeste du surréalisme are “C’est vivre et cesser de vivre qui sont des solutions imaginaires.
L’existence est ailleurs.” (OC I : 346). This notion is only reinforced in his second manifesto :
“Que pourraient bien attendre de l’expérience surréaliste ceux qui gardent quelque souci de la
place qu’ils occuperont dans le monde” (Breton OC I : 782). Moreover, while Breton would
certainly avoid the Christian vocabulary of salvation, his envisioned future is intended to be a
kind of deliverance from the evils of Western civilization and tradition.
While, in his first manifesto, Breton describes surrealism as a “guerre d’indépendance à
laquelle je me fais gloire de participer” (OC I : 346), he is even more explicitly antiestablishment in his second manifesto :
[S]i nous ne trouvons pas assez de mots pour flétrir la bassesse de la pensée
occidentale, […] comment veut-on que nous manifestions quelque tendresse, que
même nous usions de tolérance à l’égard d’un appareil de conservation sociale,
quel qu’il soit ? Ce serait le seul délire vraiment inacceptable de notre part. Tout
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est à faire, tous les moyens doivent être bons à employer pour ruiner les idées de
famille, de patrie, de religion. (OC I : 785; Breton’s emphasis)
Even as Breton’s manifestoes express, with increasing urgency, a need to demolish the pillars of
society, Breton conceives of this destruction as a necessary step required to deliver the public to
his idealized state of “surreality.” This is in keeping with David Bromley’s assertions about the
creative destruction envisioned by apocalyptic religion: “Catastrophe may be imminent, but the
apocalypse is a cataclysm with meaning, one that has as its final purpose not destruction but
creation” (34-5). It is also important to note that even when apocalypses evoke horrifying
imagery and predict catastrophic events (as they often do), their intended effect is typically to
inspire the members of the public, not merely terrify them. Elaine Pagels stresses, for example,
that for all of its horrors, The Book of Revelation, was meant to offer reassurance to its readers:
As John tells how the chaotic events of the world are finally set right by divine
judgement, those who engage his visions often see them offering meaning—moral
meaning—in times of suffering or apparently random catastrophe. Many poets,
artists, and preachers who engage these prophesies claim to have found in them
the promise, famously repeated by Martin Luther King Jr. that ‘the arc of the
moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.’ […] [John’s] final vision
suggests that even after the worst we can imagine has happened, we may find the
astonishing gift of new life. (175)
Perhaps the surrealists found a similar comfort in their visions of destruction and revolution.
Through their apocalyptic musings, the surrealists could find not only the promise that the
injustices and mediocrities of the present would one day be abolished, but also the hope that
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something meaningful might emerge from the devastation that they foresaw in the inevitable
outbreak of the Second World War.
However, it is important to note that, in his first manifesto, Breton initially claims not to
believe in the prophetic power of surrealism: “Certes, je ne crois pas à la vertu prophétique de la
parole surréaliste” (OC I : 344). Interestingly, this sentiment of non-belief is immediately
undermined by a footnote that undercuts this denial. In the footnote, he expresses his regret for
not following the surrealist voice when it seemed to implore him to go to the town of Béthune:
Toutefois, TOUTEFOIS… Il faudrait en avoir le cœur net. Aujourd’hui 8 juin
1924, vers une heure, la voix me soufflait : ‘Béthune, Béthune.’ Qu’était-ce à
dire ? Je ne connais pas Béthune et ne me fais qu’une faible idée de la situation de
ce point sur la carte de France, Béthune n’évoque rien pour moi, pas même une
scène des Trois Mousquetaires. J’aurais dû partir pour Béthune, où m’attendait
peut-être quelque chose ; ç’eût été trop simple. (OC I:344)
Breton seems certain that this repeated word held some significance. In Les Vases communicants
(1932), he revisits the incident:
J’ai eu le tort, jadis, au cours du premier Manifeste du surréalisme, de donner une
interprétation par trop lyrique du mot Béthune qui m’était revenu avec insistance à
l’esprit sans que je parvinsse à lui accorder de détermination spéciale. Je pense
aujourd’hui que j’avais mal cherché. Toujours est-il qu’en aucun cas cela ne
devait m’engager à me rendre à Béthune (et le fait est que je ne m’y suis pas
rendu). (OC II: 174)
Breton rejects his initial interpretation of this voice, not because of a deepened skepticism toward
prophecy, but because he had not pushed himself hard enough to find a deeper meaning. Though
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he never discovers why the word Béthune haunted him, we might hypothesize an unconscious
connection to the 12th century trouvère and crusader Conon de Béthune, who wrote about his
calling to re-conquer the holy land.4 The possession of Jerusalem was considered crucial for
many Christians of the time, because they believed that it was an essential step in setting the
stage for the apocalypse as described by John of Patmos.5 Like Conon de Béthune, Breton used
his writing to articulate his desire to stage an apocalypse of his own.
Indeed, if in his first manifesto Breton rejects the prophetic potential of the surrealist
voice, it is perhaps because he believes that divination would be beneath the dignity of such a
formidable force: “Mon temps ne doit pas être le sien, pourquoi m’aiderait-elle à résoudre le
problème enfantin de ma destinée ?” (OC I : 345; Breton’s emphasis). This is in keeping with
Bromley’s claim that apocalypticism distinguishes itself from other prophetic methods primarily
by being more uncompromising and ambitious: “Apocalypticism simply extends [the prophetic]
process. Its assertions – that the organizing logic of the dominant social order is so antithetical to
transcendent purpose that unilateral intervention is mandated [...] – mount a challenge to the
established social order that is direct, total, and on highest authority” (37). One could argue that
Breton’s surrealism is apocalyptic in the sense that, like apocalyptic religion, it is based on a
future overthrowing of the established order and the installation of a new, more complete reality
for humanity. As Maurice Blanchot observes, for the surrealists “la poésie est connaissance et

4

It is interesting to note that Conon de Béthune played an instrumental role in the fourth crusade,

in which the crusaders failed to reach Jerusalem, diverting their attentions to conquering
Constantinople. The fourth crusade thus served to divide and weaken Christendom.
5

See Jay Rubenstein, Armies of Heaven: The First Crusade and the Quest for Apocalypse.
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manifestation du destin de l’homme dans son ensemble” (“Surréalisme” 102). Furthermore,
apocalypticism and surrealism distinguish themselves from other revolutionary movements in
that they emphasize the role of revelation. Indeed, this distinctive element of revelation helped
preserve the intellectual independence of the surrealist movement as it moved to join forces with
other far-left groups and ultimately the Communist Party. Citing a series of letters exchanged by
Paul Éluard and Breton in 1925, Étienne-Alain Hubert describes a “conviction qu’il convient,
sans renier l’action politique, de conserver au surréalisme sa spécificité. Évoquer la voyance,
n’est-ce pas afficher la volonté de ‘rester surréaliste’ [?]” (Breton OC I :1693). Hubert notes that
in 1925, the surrealists developed an increased interest in both politics and the occult.
1925 was also the year that Robert Desnos penned his apocalyptic Livres de prophéties,
which would not be published until decades after his death. No surrealist demonstrated more
affinity for the occult than Desnos. Mary Ann Caws observes that his fascination with occult
practices began at an early age: “he grew up in the old Saint-Martin quarter of Paris, a quarter
haunted by memories of alchemists and magicians; Nicolas Flamel and Gérard de Nerval were
his heroes” (Surrealist Voice 7). Desnos was famous among the surrealists for his capacity to
“channel” the surrealist voice by entering into a trance. In Nadja, Breton describes the oracular
ability that Desnos demonstrated during a series of séances in 1922 :
Je revois maintenant Robert Desnos à l’époque que ceux d’entre nous qui l’ont
connue appellent l’époque des sommeils. Il ‘dort’, mais il écrit, il parle. […]
Desnos continue à voir ce que je ne vois pas, ce que je ne vois qu’au fur et à
mesure qu’il me le montre. […] Qui n’a pas vu son crayon poser sur le papier,
sans la moindre hésitation et avec une rapidité prodigieuse, ces étonnantes
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équations poétiques, […] ne peut se faire une idée de tout ce que cela engageait
alors, de la valeur absolue d’oracle que cela prenait. (OC I : 661)6
In the text of Nadja, Breton also inserts a photograph of Desnos in one of his trances:

Fig. 1. “Je revois maintenant Robert Desnos…” (Breton OC I : 662)7

6

Before Nadja, Breton had also described these séances in his Pas perdus (1924). Unfortunately,

Breton’s accounts of the séances make little mention of the vital role that his first wife, Simone
Kahn, played in the proceedings. Kahn was often responsible for prompting Desnos with
questions, asking him for clarification when necessary and transcribing his answers.
7

In the concentration camps of Theresienstadt, medical student Joseph Stuna, who had read

Nadja, recognized Desnos thanks to these photographs. Stuna recited for Desnos the poet’s
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Breton’s juxtaposition of these two photographs, one with Desnos’ eyes closed, and another with
them open, capture the liminal state that Desnos was able to attain in his trances. Not quite
awake and not quite asleep, Desnos achieves through these trances a version of Breton’s goal for
surrealism: a synthesis of dream and reality.
In his Livres de prophéties, Desnos attempts to utilize this oracular ability to record a
series of apocalyptic prophecies. It is worth taking a closer look at this work, especially since it
has received virtually no attention from critics. Interestingly, Desnos’ text, like Breton’s
Manifeste, conforms to Collins’ definition of an apocalypse. First, it is a narrative account of a
revelation communicated by an otherworldly being. Admittedly, the narrative framework of
Desnos’ Livres de prophéties is limited. Desnos does however open his text with a “notice”
indicating the circumstances in which he “received” the prophecies. Desnos gives the date of his
revelation, July 29, 1925, and introduces us to the otherworldly mediator, referred to simply as
“le souffle,” which brings him all the information that he records: “J’ai décidé d’obéir au souffle
prohétique. Il est venu” (39). In addition, Desnos refers to a transcendental reality which seems
to ignore the bounds of time and mortality: “Aujourd’hui, Passé ou Futur pour moi c’est présent
et je nie la mort” (52). Indeed, the opening line of the text emphasizes this temporal
transcendence: “Croire en l’Éternité, d’abord en l’Éternité” (39). While the Livres de prophéties
does at times announce humanity’s fate in grandiose terms, the prophecies collected in Desnos’
text touch on a wide range of topics, ranging from the destruction of entire cities to the fate of his
friends’ marriages.

famous “dernier poème,” which was, in reality, a re-translation of an earlier poem. (Caws,
“Poetry” 251)

40

The first book, which is the most classically “apocalyptic” of the three, contains a series
of illustrated prophecies concerning historical events to come. The second book contains
prophecies concerning Desnos’ friends and collaborators, most of whom also belonged to the
surrealist movement. His predictions for Breton were probably the most accurate of this second
book, anticipating in vague terms the emotional turmoil that would dominate his life in the early
1930’s. As Mark Polizzotti notes: “Oddly, nearly all of these prophecies came true, more or less”
(245). Notably, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, Desnos predicts that he and Breton would part ways
in 1929, as they in fact did. Sadly, Desnos’ prophesized reunion with Breton in 1949 could not
take place due to the death of the former in a Nazi concentration camp in 1945. The third and
final book is a short sequence of predictions about the author’s life, which—while grim—do not
accurately anticipate the horrors that would await him. The first book is perhaps the most
interesting for a 21st-century public, since it describes how various apocalyptic disasters would
befall the world over the course of the 20th century. With the benefit of hindsight, some of these
prophecies seem to predict major historical events.
Desnos’ description of the year 1936, for example, anticipates the hopelessness that many
felt during that year in response to the Civil War in Spain and Stalin’s Great Purge in Russia:
“Solliciter du ciel le secours ou la Providence ou la chance sera inutile en 1936. Alors ceux qui
déserteront trouveront les routes semées des limaces de la trahison” (41). Several predictions
seem to coincide with the events of World War II. Desnos’ claim that “1941 unira les cimetières”
might be seen as referring to the tragic events of December 1941, which led the formerly
reluctant United States to join the allied powers (43). Desnos also cites 1943 as a particularly
painful year for France, which in fact it would be due to the German occupation that had
expanded to the entirety of metropolitan France in November of the preceding year: “Quant à toi
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peu m’importe de qualifier le début de ton agonie en 1943 ô France rêve qui dura trop
longtemps. Mon pays, vieux cauchemar !” (40) In addition, Desnos makes predictions that
almost seem to predict the use of atomic weapons: “On préparera dès lors (1944) des armes
sanglantes” (41) ; “la reine des cités de l’est Nagasaki visitée par le feu et le fer en fusion” (45).8
In spite of these coincidences, it is important to note that the overwhelming majority of Desnos’
prophecies did not come true. He predicts with no less certainty, for example, the complete
destruction of the city of Naples: “Tremble Naples, grain de sable au bord d’une mer sanglante.
Avant que deux ans aient passé le 1930e tu ne seras plus même grain de sable mais souvenir de
catastrophes et de crimes” (40). If I raise the subject of the accuracy of Desnos’ predictions, it is
not to evaluate his ability as a soothsayer, but rather to emphasize that he (and, to a certain
extent, his surrealist comrades as well) had a certain prescience in seeing through the fog of postwar insouciance to recognize the signs of another global catastrophe on the horizon. In the mid1920’s, a decade typically associated with care-free optimism, the surrealists enthusiastically
embraced pessimism, and sadly their grim vision of the future would prove to be largely correct.

8

We must note, however, that Desnos implies that the destruction of Nagasaki would take place

in 1991. Desnos’ text also includes an interesting prediction about the fate of Russia : "Russie
ton destin est blanc comme neige et pour gagner au change tu perdras jusqu’à ton nom des
steppes mongoliques aux frontières polonaise[s] / 1985" (44). 1985 was, of course, the year that
the Soviet Union’s final leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, would take office and begin a series of
reforms that would indirectly lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the years that followed.
This course of events did indeed lead to the Russian state losing its former name (becoming
thereafter the Russian Federation) as well as many of its territories, including Poland.

42

The same summer that Desnos composed his Livres de prophéties, Breton expressed a
particular admiration for seers, addressing them in his “Lettre aux voyantes.” In this letter,
Breton insists that seers possess an awe-inspiring power, and that his sole criticism of them is
that their passivity has allowed them to accept a role in society that is beneath their dignity, that
of mere fortune-tellers:
À quoi pensez-vous, la voilà bien, la prochaine éruption du Vésuve ! On me dit
que vous avez offert vos services pour faire aboutir certaines recherches policières
mais ce n’est pas possible : il y a eu usurpation ou c’est faux. Je ne suis pas dupe
de ce que les journaux impriment parfois, au sujet de révélations que vous auriez
consenti à faire à un de leurs rédacteurs : on vous calomnie sûrement. Mais cette
passivité, toutes femmes que vous êtes, il en est temps, je vous adjure de vous en
départir. On envahira vos demeures à la veille de la catastrophe heureuse. (OC I :
911)
Furthermore, Breton compares the situation of the poet to that of the seer, explaining that their
struggles are similar, as is their obligation to use their gifts to bring truth to the world:
Nous avons vu les poètes aussi se dérober par dédain à la lutte et voici pourtant
qu’ils se ressaisissent, au nom même de cette parcelle de voyance, à peine
différente de la vôtre, qu’ils ont. Assez de vérités particulières, assez de lueurs
splendides gardées dans des anneaux ! Nous sommes à la recherche, nous sommes
sur la trace d’une vérité morale dont le moins qu’on en puisse dire est qu’elle
nous interdit d’agir avec circonspection. (OC I : 911)
The comparison between seers and poets is reinforced by Breton’s insistence that the accuracy of
the seer’s predictions for the future is indifferent, since she creates this future in the moment by
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conjuring an image of it: “ce qui est dit sera, par le seul vertu du langage” (OC I : 910, Breton’s
emphasis). Breton gives a personal example. A seer once told him with certainty that he would,
in 1931, embark upon a political career in China. Despite the improbability of this prediction,
Breton does not hesitate to believe, because the mere image of the prophecy had already
transported him there: “Pour rien au monde je ne voudrais résister à la tentation que vous m’avez
donnée, disons: de m’attendre en Chine. Car aussi bien grâce à vous j’y suis déjà. Il vous
appartient, Mesdames, de nous faire confondre le fait accomplissable et le fait accompli” (OC I :
909). It is perhaps for this reason that, in his later novel Nadja (1928), Breton affirms his
absolute faith in his personal fortune-teller, Madame Sacco, “qui ne s’est jamais trompée à mon
sujet” (Breton OC I: 693).
Breton’s “Lettre aux voyantes” ends by calling upon seers to assist in the surrealists’
battle against the priests: “Donnez-nous des pierres, des pierres brillantes, pour chasser les
infâmes prêtres” (OC I : 911). While the surrealists have always shown animosity toward
religion, they reserved a special hatred for priests. Breton, for example, expresses a profound
admiration for the work of Edward Young, but he only reluctantly adds his name to his first
manifesto’s list of surrealist heroes because he cannot forgive the author’s clerical career: “LES
NUITS d’Young sont surréalistes d’un bout à l’autre; c’est malheureusement un prêtre qui parle,
un mauvais prêtre, sans doute, mais un prêtre” (OC I : 329). In an early issue of La Révolution
surréaliste, the surrealists also proudly displayed a photograph (which they had painstakingly
staged) depicting Benjamin Péret insulting a priest in public:
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Fig. 2. “Notre collaborateur Benjamin Péret injuriant un prêtre” (Péret, “Poèmes” 13)

The surrealists’ anticlericalism, coupled with their fascination with prophecy, brings us to
another interesting point of comparison between the movement and apocalyptic religion. In
Bromley’s study of apocalypticism, he makes an important distinction between prophetic and
priestly religion:
I pursue this line of analysis by distinguishing between two distinctive methods
for building religious authorization, priestly and prophetic. Through the first,
religion attains its power by creating continuity between the transcendent realm
and the phenomenal world. Positing fundamental congruence between the two
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domains creates authorization for the existing structure of social relations, thereby
energizing and orienting groups and individuals by aligning them closely with the
ultimate ordering of the cosmos. Through the second, religion achieves power by
creating discontinuity between the two domains. The incongruence between the
two realms energizes and orients individuals and groups in the direction of
contesting the legitimacy of the existing social order and distancing themselves
from it. (Bromley 33-4)
While Breton repeatedly declares his hatred for religion, it is more precise to say that he opposed
organized, priestly religion. In leading the surrealist movement, Breton seems to have deployed
strategies very similar to those Bromley ascribes to the prophetic method (of which, according to
Bromley, apocalypticism is the most extreme form).
As we have seen, in his first manifesto, Breton speaks of a need to reconcile the world of
dreams with the waking world. The surrealists are united by a shared disaffection with their
everyday experience of reality, but they find refuge in the realm of dreams. In an unpublished
fragment from 1930, surrealist Valentine Hugo poignantly describes the agony of the real and the
solace of reverie:
Parfois je songe à une vie impossible sans doute—pure—transparente et riche
d’illusions comme le diamant—à une vie qui serait comme un grand feu dévorant
purifiant tout sur son passage et qui ne s’éteindrait jamais—oui c’est bien moi qui
rêve à tout cela—moi qui voit [sic] tout de suite la fissure dans le mur
d’apparence solide, la tache sordide sur l’étoffe somptueuse, qui entends le son
faussé dans la limpidité des cloches et qui sens l’odeur immonde de tout ce qui
doit retourner au fumier dans les plus suaves tromperies de parfums. C’est parce
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que le réel m’atteint violemment et me blesse que je suis toujours perdue dans des
songeries presque ininterrompues. (qtd. in Cauvin 191)
Hugo dreams of a future state of surreality, which would burn away the remnants of the old
world, but for her it seems tragically out of reach. This transformation of lived experience would
necessitate a radical social transformation. Breton insists that such a transformation is possible,
but only through a revolution, and probably a violent one. This belief is particularly clear in
Breton’s second manifesto, which contains the following passage, articulating what he feels
should be a surrealist dogma:
C’est même du bouillonnement écœurant de ces représentations vides de sens que
naît et s’entretient le désir de passer outre à l’insuffisante, à l’absurde distinction
du beau et du laid, du vrai et du faux, du bien et du mal. Et, comme c’est du degré
de résistance que cette idée de choix rencontre dépend l’envol plus ou moins sûr
de l’esprit vers un monde enfin habitable, on conçoit que le surréalisme n’ait pas
craint de se faire un dogme de la révolte absolue, de l’insoumission totale, du
sabotage en règle, et qu’il n’attende encore rien que de la violence. L’acte
surréaliste le plus simple consiste, revolvers aux poings, à descendre dans la rue et
à tirer au hasard, tant qu’on peut, dans la foule. (Manifestes 74)
In a footnote following this deliberately provocative passage, Breton hastens to shield himself
from criticism by explaining that he would not actually recommend this course of action. Even in
his calls to arms, Breton seems to be engaging in a kind of prophecy, rather than strategically
organizing an effective resistance. He attempts, first and foremost, to conjure a vision of
revolution : “l’idée de Révolution tend à faire arriver le jour de cette Révolution” (Manifestes
86). Merely by spreading the idea of revolution, Breton hopes to will it into being. This notion
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mirrors the opening of Rimbaud’s poem “Après le Déluge,” in which the apocalyptic events
unfold as a result of the “idée du Déluge,” rather than the flood itself (Rimbaud OC 289).
A more sophisticated theory of prophecy would emerge, however, in Breton’s later work.
Indeed, decades later, in La Clé des champs (1953), Breton would explain that retrospection only
further highlights the prophetic nature of surrealism:
Or, il se peut que le surréalisme, en ouvrant certaines portes que la pensée
rationaliste se flattait d’avoir définitivement condamnées, nous ait mis en mesure
d’opérer de-ci de-là quelque incursion dans l’avenir, à condition d’ignorer sur le
moment même que c’est dans l’avenir que nous pénétrons, de ne nous en
apercevoir et de ne pouvoir le rendre patent qu’a posteriori. (OC III : 742;
Breton’s emphasis)
The key example that Breton cites is the famous “nuit du tournesol,” which he first recounted in
L’Amour fou (1932). The central anecdote of the book revolves around Breton’s first encounter
with the woman who would become his second wife, Jacqueline Lamba. Breton claims that the
circumstances of this chance encounter were described, in detail, in a poem, entitled
“Tournesol,” which he had written a full decade earlier. This experience led Breton to formulate
a kind of retrospective theory of prophecy (which he termed “hasard objectif”), in which the
meaning of a premonition is only fully elucidated through its later fulfillment. As Breton
explains in L’Amour fou, surrealist visions or voices, however much they might seem to escape
human understanding, can be interpreted and ultimately demystified by retrospective selfanalysis:
[L]’auto-analyse est, à elle seule, dans bien des cas, capable d’épuiser le contenu
des rêves et […] cette analyse, pour peu qu’elle soit assez poussée, ne laisse de
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côté aucun résidu qui permette d’attribuer à l’activité onirique un caractère
transcendantal. Par contre, il me semble avoir obliqué trop vite lorsqu’il s’est agi
pour moi de faire saisir que, pareillement, l’auto-analyse pouvait parfois épuiser
le contenu des événements réels, au point de les faire dépendre entièrement de
l’activité antérieure la moins dirigée de l’esprit. (OC II : 733)
Employing a Freudian framework, Breton thus brings together the interpretation of dreams,
prophecies and poetry into a single theory of self-analysis. As Roger Bellin explains in his
analysis of prophecy in the work of Breton: “A prophecy or premonition, then, would remain
unexhausted, apparently bearing a transcendental, inexplicable residue, until its fulfillment; then
its interpretation could be completed. On this account, the retrospective vantage of a ‘future
necessity’ is a requisite for complete interpretation” (11). While Breton’s presentation of these
ideas is certainly novel, this kind of prophetic structure is not wholly unprecedented. Patrick Née
suggests that Breton, whether consciously or not, may have drawn inspiration from biblical
exegesis in developing his theory of prophecy: “[L]e modèle de déchiffrement liant une seconde
strate temporelle à une première […] relevait de la longue pratique de l’allégorèse médiévale, où
l’Ancien Testament valait comme préfigure du Nouveau ; battement allégorique entre deux pôles
retirés à la chronologie d’une histoire pour mettre en perspective un temps de la Révélation”
(Née 135). Née asserts that this prophetic structure gives Breton a double role: he is both prophet
and messiah. In the case of the “nuit du tournesol,” Breton is, according to Née “à la fois la voix
prophétique du poème automatique d’aout 1923 et l’acteur-scripteur messianique du récit publié
en juin 1935” (136). Thus Breton’s writing ostensibly prefigures its eventual manifestation
through its author’s actions, serving as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy.
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However, as Bellin emphasizes, even within Breton’s framework of interpretive time, the
future that would enable the interpretation of a premonition can be delayed indefinitely : “The
‘love’ of Mad Love [L’Amour fou] persists exactly in its inexhaustibility to any present; its future
remains incomplete in order that its love will also remain infinite.” (Bellin 14). Indeed, even in
his rigorous analysis of his poem “Tournesol,” Breton must admit that the meaning of the fourth
and fifth lines of the poem, which concern a certain “flacon de sels,” remained elusive to him:
Le ‘flacon de sels’ dont il est question, est d’ailleurs, à ce jour, le seul élément du
poème qui ait déjoué ma patience, ma constance interprétative. Je demeure encore
aujourd’hui très hostile à ces quatrième et cinquième vers qui ont été presque pour
tout dans la défaveur où j’ai tenu longtemps ce ‘Tournesol’. Je n’en ai pas moins,
comme on verra plus loin, trop de raisons d’admettre que ce qui se dégage de
l’analyse le plus lentement est le plus simple et ce à quoi il faut accorder le plus
de prix pour ne pas penser qu’il s’agit là d’une donnée essentielle, qui me
deviendra transparente quelque jour. (Breton OC II : 726)
Breton holds onto the notion that some undefined moment in the future will reveal the truth of
these lines to him, but in the meantime, this remaining element of mystery prevents the poem
from being completely “exhausted.” Furthermore, even if Breton imagines writing as a kind of
self-fulfilling prophecy, there is no way of knowing when the prophesized event will come to
pass nor even necessarily what exactly the event will be, since its meaning only becomes
apparent a posteriori. To cite an example from Shakespeare (who, according to Breton, could
pass as surrealist “dans ses meilleurs jours”) : Just as the weird sisters’ warning to Macbeth about
Birnam Wood only makes sense to him after Macduff’s surprise attack, the prophetic meaning of
Breton’s “Tournesol” only reveals itself after the unwittingly prefigured events have already
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come to pass (OC I : 329).9 In this way, Bretonian prophecy offers no guidance or agency in
advance, only clarity in retrospect.
This passive structure of prefiguration within Breton’s surrealism explains perhaps why
the surrealist group experienced so many schisms based on the issue of politics. Indeed, in his
essay on surrealism, Benjamin expressed concern about Breton’s fascination with fortune-telling
precisely because he feared it would lead to passivity in the revolutionary domain. Turning
Breton’s own words against him, Benjamin scolds the poet for not taking a more active role in
the revolution: “Now I concede that the breakneck career of Surrealism […] may have taken it
[…] into the humid backroom of spiritualism. But I am not pleased to hear it cautiously tapping
on the window-panes to inquire about its future” (Benjamin 228). Breton and his surrealist group
had a complicated relationship with political activism. On the one hand, Breton believed in the
idea of revolutionary action, and therefore could not support the largely apolitical stance of
surrealists like Artaud. On the other hand, Breton chafed at the idea of following a methodically
planned path to revolution (just as he rejected the idea of developing any “futures techniques
surréalistes,” outside of automatism), and his attempts to participate in concrete political action
were frequently abortive (Breton OC I : 344). As we will see in the third chapter, Breton’s
hesitancy to fully subscribe to other revolutionary programs (namely that of the Parti
communiste français) led surrealists such as Aragon to leave Breton’s group in favor of further
involvement with communist organizations. While Breton remained committed to the idea of
revolution, he evoked this idea in increasingly abstract terms over the course of his career.

9

Breton alludes to this same scene from Macbeth in “La Lampe dans l’horloge,” albeit in a

different context (OC III : 777).
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Indeed, while Blanchot’s essay “Réflexions sur le surréalisme” praises the movement for its
ability to inspire revolt, it also stresses that surrealism’s commitment to the communist cause is,
at least in part, the result of a need to ground itself in something concrete to avoid disintegrating
due to its ethereal nature: “Plus il devient inutile, plus il a besoin d’une fin qui fasse de cette
inutilité quelque chose d’utilisable. C’est sa gratuité qui rend inévitable sa mise ‘au service de la
révolution’” (101). Despite its pretentions, for Blanchot, surrealism needs the communist
revolution more than communism needs the surrealists.
Nevertheless, Breton’s faith in the communist revolution does not seem completely
unshakable. In his “Légitime défense” (1926), for example, Breton explains that despite his
enthusiasm for the possibility of a communist revolution, he remains unconvinced that
communism alone can solve the fundamental problems of existence : “Il est en nous des lacunes
que tout l’espoir que nous mettons dans le triomphe du communisme ne comble pas ; l’homme
n’est-il pas irréductiblement un ennemi pour l’homme, l’ennui ne finira-t-il pas qu’avec le
monde ?” (OC II : 283). Moreover, in Les Vases communicants, he specifies that his notion of
revolution would not be restrained by political reality:
Je ne me lasserai pas d’opposer à l’impérieuse nécessité actuelle, qui est de
changer les bases sociales par trop chancelantes et vermoulues du vieux monde,
cette autre nécessité non moins impérieuse qui est de ne pas voir dans la
Révolution à venir une fin, qui de toute évidence serait en même temps celle de
l’histoire. La fin ne saurait être pour moi que la connaissance de la destination
éternelle de l’homme, de l’homme en général, que la Révolution seule pourra
rendre pleinement à cette destination. Toute autre manière d’en juger, de quelque
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prétendu souci des réalités politiques qu’elle se targue, me semble fausse,
paralysante et, du strict point de vue révolutionnaire, défaitiste. (OC II: 202-3)
Though Breton’s uncompromising vision of revolution seems to doom his ambitions to failure,
he prides himself in striving for the unreasonable: “je crois […] à la joie surréaliste pure de
l’homme qui, averti de l’échec successif de tous les autres, ne se tient pas pour battu, part d’où il
veut et, par tout autre chemin qu’un chemin raisonnable, parvient où il peut” (Manifestes 59,
Breton’s emphasis). Indeed, as Anna Balakian notes, Breton celebrates the notion of failure, as
long as it comes from striving for the impossible:
[Breton] views himself as subversive on all counts. The esprit frondeur character
of his rebellion in the midst of moral, social, and cultural patterns that give a
semblance of harmony and unity to European civilization is doomed to failure
[…]. But failure is—and always will be—for Breton an element of exaltation.
Failure simply means that the goal is unrealizable. […] [I]f the goal were
attainable, it would not be acceptable [.] (Magus 71)
Nevertheless, it seems that, just as Breton’s uncompromising idea of revolution is one without an
end, the true beginning of this “Révolution à venir” (like Mallarmé’s Livre à venir) is also placed
on an infinitely receding horizon. If Breton’s poem “Tournesol” could only become fully
comprehensible after manifesting itself in reality to the poet’s own surprise, the structure of
Bretonian prophecy seems paradoxically constrained to reveal the true revolutionary path only at
the end of an endless revolution.
Breton’s desired but seemingly unachievable revolution, like his “inexhaustible” poetry,
recalls what Jacques Lacan referred to as “l’indestructabilité du désir inconscient” (Écrits 518).
According to Lacan, desire emerges from a lack that can never be truly overcome. Further, while
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Breton asserts that the act of envisioning the revolution brings this desired end closer to reality,
Lacanian psychoanalysis suggests that, on the contrary, such fantasies often serve to preserve,
not satisfy, our desires: “Disons que le fantasme, dans son usage fondamental, est ce par quoi le
sujet se soutient au niveau de son désir évanouissant, évanouissant pour autant que la satisfaction
même de la demande lui dérobe son objet” (Écrits 637). For Lacan, desire endures by guarding
against complete satisfaction : “[l]e désir est une défense, défense d’outre-passer une limite dans
la jouissance” (Écrits 825). To provide an example of this phenomenon, Lacan cites the case of
the butcher’s wife from Sigmund Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams (a favorite book of
Breton’s): “Prenez l’expérience de la belle bouchère. Elle aime le caviar, seulement elle n’en
veut pas. C’est pour ça qu’elle le désire” (Séminaire XI 220). Similarly, Breton’s desire for
apocalypse is coupled with a great deal of hesitation in the face of its actual manifestation.
Nowhere is this hesitation more evident than in Breton’s reaction to the apocalyptic
events of the Second World War. As we have seen, even well before the war, many anticipated
an apocalyptic event on the horizon. Breton, in his preface to the 1946 edition of the second
manifesto, attributes that text’s dark tone to the feeling of dread that dominated the decade
leading up to the inevitable outbreak of the war: “C’est bien autour de 1930 que les esprits déliés
s’avertissent du retour prochain, inéluctable de la catastrophe mondiale” (Manifestes 63). In
“Devant le rideau” (1947), Breton cites further examples of his prescience about the coming war,
dating back as far as the 1920’s. Breton highlights, for example, this passage from Le Trésor des
jésuites (1929), a play that he co-authored with Louis Aragon: “Que nous réserve 1940 ? 1939 a
été désastreux. Vingt et un ans déjà depuis ce qu’on appelait si drôlement la Grande Guerre !
Faut-il regretter les chevaleresques combats des tranchées ou leur préférer les peu glorieuses
exterminations immobiles d’aujourd’hui ?” (Breton OC I : 1007). Breton claims to have
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anticipated the importance of the year 1939 as far back as 1925, when, in his “Lettre aux
voyantes,” he makes the following cryptic pronouncement: “Il y a des gens qui prétendent que la
guerre leur a appris quelque chose; ils sont tout de même moins avancé que moi, qui sais ce que
me réserve l’année 1939" (Breton OC I : 910). Nevertheless, despite his ostensible anticipation
of the war, and his apparent enthusiasm for violence (which we saw in the Second manifeste),
Breton fled France in 1942, fearing the very real possibility of his imprisonment or even death.10
Breton, while in exile, penned his Prolégomènes à un troisième manifeste du surréalisme
ou non (1942). Although this tentative manifesto is more measured in tone than the previous one,
it nevertheless anticipates a radical social transformation on the horizon. Breton inserts a “petit
intermède prophétique” into the text, which opens with the following scene dramatically
announcing the imminent arrival of a new order of liberty:
Il va venir tout à l’heure des équilibristes dans des justaucorps pailletés d’une
couleur inconnue, la seule à ce jour qui absorbe à la fois les rayons du soleil et de
la lune. Cette couleur s’appellera la liberté et le ciel claquera de toutes ses
oriflammes bleues et noires car un vent pour la première fois pleinement propice
se sera levé et ceux qui sont là comprendront qu’ils viennent de mettre à la voile
et que tous les prétendus voyages précédents n’étaient qu’un leurre. (OC III : 8)
When the apocalypse had finally arrived at his doorstep, Breton recoiled, preferring to seek
refuge and continuing to prophesy. Breton writes as if the apocalypse must come imminently but
must always come tomorrow. Indeed, as we saw in Breton’s reflections on the prospect of
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Desnos, in another eerily accurate prophecy, seems to predict Breton’s flight from the Nazis.

See Breton’s “Entrée des mediums.”
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nuclear devastation in “La Lampe dans l’horloge,” he lost interest in the end of the world when it
seemed likely to occur at any moment.
Desnos, on the other hand, gained a reputation for being willing to act in the present by
serving as a journalist for the Resistance. One story of his time in the concentration camps is
illustrative of this willingness to act, even through prophecy. Mary Ann Caws writes, for
example, that Desnos had gained a reputation for “riposting—to the psychological torture of the
German declarations that all the prisoners were soon to die—by telling a cheerful fortune from
the hand of each prisoner” (Surrealist Voice 10). Susan Griffin recounts one such anecdote, as
told by Odette Meyers:
Leaving the barracks, the mood is somber; everyone knows the truck is headed for
the gas chambers. And when the truck arrives no one can speak at all; even the
guards fall silent. But this silence is soon interrupted by an energetic man, who
jumps into the line and grabs one of the condemned. Improbable as it is, Odette
told me, Desnos reads the man’s palm. Oh, he says, I see you have a very long
lifeline. And you are going to have three children. He is exuberant. And his
excitement is contagious.
First one man, then another, offers up his hand, and the prediction is for longevity,
more children, abundant joy.
As Desnos reads more palms, not only does the mood of the prisoners change but
that of the guards too. […] They are […] so disoriented by this sudden change of
mood among those they are about to kill that they are unable to go through with
the executions. (411; Griffin’s emphasis)
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Despite the apocalyptic pessimism of Desnos’ earlier prophecies, he showed himself capable of
embracing hope, even in the face of an impossible situation. In so doing (at least, according to
the story), he used the performance of divination to save the lives of the prisoners on the truck. In
this sense, Desnos was another surrealist who attempted to postpone the apocalypse.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have seen how the surrealist movement fits into a larger, centuries-long
literary trend of utilizing apocalyptic themes and methods as a kind of “profane illumination” to
undermine traditional religion. Moreover, we have also seen that a common feature of many of
the surrealist and proto-surrealist apocalypses is that they are ultimately postponed.
Lautréamont’s Maldoror defeats the Creator, but not definitively. Apollinaire allays fears of a
Malthusian catastrophe in Les Mamelles de Tirésias by giving the play a happy ending. Breton’s
prophesied revolution is placed on an infinitely receding horizon. While Meyers’ story suggests
that Desnos was, in at least one instance, able to wield non-conformist hope as a weapon of
resistance, the surrealists’ apocalyptic postponement typically led to a certain revolutionary
passivity, especially in the case of Breton. While the desire for an apocalyptic revolution shines
through the pages of Breton’s writing, his commitment to a retrospective structure of prophecy
made it difficult for him to piece together a concrete path to his envisioned future. In a way,
Breton was destined from the beginning, as are so many apocalyptic believers, to wait for an
Armageddon that never came to pass. It is easy, then, to understand the disenchantment with
Breton felt by the many members of the surrealist movement who hoped to find in it a path to the
radical social transformation they impatiently awaited. The various approaches undertaken by the
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so-called “dissident surrealists” (i.e. those that left or refused to join Breton’s “official” group)
will be an important point of discussion in the chapters that follow.
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Chapter 2
Starved for Purpose at the End of History:
Surrealism and Apocalyptic Eschatology
In the first chapter we explored surrealism’s relationship to the first branch of apocalyptic
studies, the literary genre of apocalyptic prophecy. In this second chapter we will tackle the
second branch, apocalyptic eschatology. In the Oxford Handbook of Eschatology, Jerry Walls
defines eschatology as follows: “The word ‘eschatology’ comes from the Greek word eschatos,
which means ‘last.’ Eschatology is thus the study of the final end of things, the ultimate
resolution of the entire creation. [… E]schatology is obviously cosmic in scope, but it is
important to add that the field typically distinguishes between issues of personal and cosmic
eschatology” (4). In other words, if the first chapter was dedicated to the literary genre of
“apocalypse,” through which the end is revealed, this second chapter tackles the theory of the
apocalypse. As Walls highlights, this question can be approached in two very different ways:
cosmic eschatology tackles the destiny of humanity as a collective, while personal eschatology
concerns the fate of individual souls. Frank Kermode claims that the tendency of Western culture
has been to shift emphasis away from cosmic to personal eschatology:
Karl Popper, in a biting phrase, once called historicism the ‘substitution of
historical prophecy for conscience.’ But of modern eschatology one can say that it
has done exactly the opposite, and substituted conscience, or something subtler,
for historical prophecy. […] Granted that the End becomes a predicament of the
individual, we may look back at these historical patterns with envy, but without
any sense that they can ever again be useful except as fictions patiently explained.

59

Death and election are individual matters and become so early enough in the
story. The disconfirmation of the primary eschatological predictions threw the
emphasis on personal death as well as on to the sacraments; (26-7)
As predictions were disconfirmed time and time again, interpretations of apocalyptic prophecy
became more and more abstract and attention turned increasingly toward the fate of the
individual soul. As we will see, however, the surrealists broke with this trajectory and returned to
a preoccupation with cosmic eschatology.
Indeed, by looking at the theories of Russian-born philosopher Alexandre Kojève we will
tease out two distinct, surrealist approaches to cosmic eschatology. On the one hand, surrealists
like Breton viewed the apocalypse as the culmination of history and of humanity’s destiny.
These surrealists hoped that one day the surrealist and/or communist revolution would transform
life and make it worth living. Georges Bataille, on the other hand, became less optimistic about
the transformative power of revolution, and was more fascinated by the notion of annihilation,
which paved the way for a more contemporary view of the apocalypse as a form of total loss.
One could also argue that one of Bataille’s early texts, L’Anus solaire, shows the tension
between these two different conceptions of eschatology. Though some critics have described
Bataille’s work as a rejection of eschatology, we will see that not only does his early work
demonstrate a certain tendency toward Marxist eschatology, but also his later rejection of the
Hegelian dialectic paves the way for a nihilistic eschatology of annihilation.
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Kojève and the End of History

For the intellectual left of interwar Paris, the most important “eschatological” theory was
undoubtedly that of Kojève, who became famous for his assertion that humanity had reached the
end of history. This idea was most notably presented during his enormously influential lecture
series Introduction à la lecture de Hegel (1933-1939), which centered on his Marxist
interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Several critics have drawn parallels between
Kojève’s theories and eschatology. Most notably, Jacques Derrida responded to Francis
Fukuyama’s revival of interest in Kojève by remarking that “Cette fin de l’Histoire est
essentiellement une eschatologie chrétienne” (Spectres 60). However, despite the similarities
between this “end of history” and certain religious visions of the apocalypse, Kojève’s theories
are rooted in a strictly materialist, Marxist worldview.
Kojève interprets Hegel’s Phenomenology as an outline of human history. Humanity
begins with the emergence of self-consciousness, which separates human beings from the
animals: “L’homme est Conscience de soi. Il est conscient de soi, conscient de sa réalité et de sa
dignité humaines, et c’est en ceci qu’il diffère essentiellement de l’animal, qui ne dépasse pas le
niveau du simple Sentiment de soi” (11). For Kojève the birth of humanity is also the birth of
history, which he defines as humanity’s quest for absolute understanding: “Le but de l’Histoire,
son terme final, — c’est ‘le Concept absolu’, c’est-à-dire la ‘Science’” (Kojève 440). The
mechanism by which humanity progresses toward this goal is the dialectic. In Kojève’s
interpretation of the dialectic, desire pushes humans to action, which is always a negation of
something that came before. As Kojève puts it: “toute action est négatrice’” (12). It is important
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to note, however, that negation is not simply annihilation. Indeed, the dialectic preserves the
negated element, albeit in altered form. Kojève explains:
[L]’action négatrice n’est pas purement destructive. Car si l’action qui naît du
Désir détruit, pour le satisfaire, une réalité objective, elle crée à sa place, dans et
par cette destruction même, une réalité subjective. L’être qui mange, par exemple,
crée et maintient sa propre réalité par la suppression de la réalité autre que la
sienne, par la transformation d’une réalité autre en réalité sienne, par
l’‘assimilation’, l’intériorisation’ d’une réalité ‘étrangère’, ‘extérieure’. D’une
manière générale, le Moi du Désir est un vide qui ne reçoit un contenu positif réel
que par l’action négatrice qui satisfait le Désir en détruisant, transformant et
‘assimilant’ le non-Moi désiré. (12)
The term used by Hegel to describe this process of simultaneous preservation and negation is
Aufhebung, often translated in English as sublation: “‘To sublate’ has a twofold meaning in the
language : on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause
to cease, to put an end to” (Science of Logic 107). Thus, in a sense, nothing is ever truly lost in
the Hegelian dialectic, merely transformed.
The central drama in Kojève’s lecture series is the desire of each human being to be
desired, that is, the desire for recognition:
Désirer le Désir d’un autre c’est donc en dernière analyse désirer que la valeur
que je suis ou que je ‘représente’ soit la valeur désirée par cet autre : je veux qu’il
‘reconnaisse’ ma valeur comme sa valeur, je veux qu’il me ‘reconnaisse’ comme
une valeur autonome. Autrement dit, tout Désir humain, anthropogène, générateur
de la Conscience de soi, de la réalité humaine, est, en fin de compte, fonction du
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désir de la ‘reconnaissance’. Et le risque de la vie par lequel ‘s’avère’ la réalité
humaine est un risque en fonction d’un tel Désir. Parler de l’‘origine’ de la
Conscience de soi, c’est donc nécessairement parler d’une lutte à mort en vue de
la ‘reconnaissance’. (Kojève 14)
According to Kojève, this desire for recognition leads to the life-and-death struggle between
humans in a dynamic called the master-slave dialectic. The “Master” dominates the “Slave” in a
doomed attempt to gain recognition. Kojève emphasizes the political dimension of the Hegelian
dialectic by drawing particular attention to this concept from Hegel’s Phenomenology. Further,
he underscores the Slave’s eventual triumph over the Master: “tout travail servile réalise non pas
la volonté du Maître, mais celle—inconsciente d’abord—de l’Esclave, qui—finalement—réussit
là, où le Maître—nécessairement—échoue. C’est donc bien la Conscience d’abord dépendante,
servante et servile qui réalise et révèle en fin de compte l’idéal de la Conscience-de-soi
autonome, et qui est ainsi sa ‘vérité’” (Kojève 34). The Slave’s triumph leads to the end of
history in the form of a universal political framework in which all people are recognized as
essentially equal. In Kojève’s Marxist worldview, this new, post-historical condition is implicitly
communism, but the core of the idea was ostensibly revealed to Hegel as early as 1806, after
Napoleon’s victory at the Battle of Jena. Completing his Phenomenology in the shadow of that
great battle, Hegel was inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution and by the notion of a
universal, Napoleonic code. For Kojève, the “Science” that served as the goal of the entirety of
human history was none other than the content of Hegel’s Phenomenology. Thus, in a sense,
history had already ended in 1806. The world is simply catching up to that fact.
And yet, Kojève seems ambivalent about the post-historical condition. Indeed, the final
lecture in Kojève’s series on Hegel concludes on a rather somber note:
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[Hegel dit] dans une de ses lettres que ce savoir lui a coûté cher. Il parle d’une
période de dépression totale qu’il a vécue entre la 25e et la 30e année de sa vie :
d’une ‘Hypochondrie’ qui allait […] ‘jusqu’à la paralysie de toutes ses forces’ et
qui provenait précisément du fait qu’il ne pouvait pas accepter l’abandon
nécessaire de l’Individualité, c’est-à-dire en fait de l’humanité, qu’exige l’idée du
Savoir absolu. Mais, finalement, il a surmonté cette ‘Hypochondrie’. Et, devenant
un Sage par cette acceptation dernière de la mort, il a publié, peu d’années après,
la Ire Partie du ‘Système de la Science’, intitulé, ‘Science de la Phénoménologie
de l’Esprit’, où il se réconcilie définitivement avec tout ce qui est et a été, en
déclarant qu’il n’y aura jamais plus rien de nouveau sur terre. (Kojève 443)
The full realization of “the Science” thus seems somewhat bittersweet. According to Kojève, the
end of history also leads to the dissolution of individual identity and the end of humanity as we
know it. As Jeff Love notes: “The vaunted irony of Kojève takes on a monstrous quality here
when the final end of history, the true point of final emancipation for the toiling, oppressed
human being, seems to be indistinguishable from suicide” (176-7). Homo sapiens will survive,
but historically significant action will no longer be possible and the human condition will cease
to exist.
That said, the conditions of life that Kojève imagines for our post-human bodies seem
almost utopian. As Kojève remarks in a note in the published version of his lecture series:
La disparition de l’Homme à la fin de l’Histoire n’est donc pas une catastrophe
cosmique : le Monde naturel reste ce qu’il est de toute éternité. Et ce n’est donc
pas non plus une catastrophe biologique : l’Homme reste en vie en tant qu’animal
qui est en accord avec la Nature ou l’Être donné. […] En fait, la fin du Temps
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humain ou de l’Histoire, c’est-à-dire l’anéantissement définitif de l’Homme
proprement dit ou de l’Individu libre et historique, signifie tout simplement la
cessation de l’Action au sens fort du terme. Ce qui veut dire pratiquement : — la
disparition des guerres et des révolutions sanglantes. Et encore la disparition de la
Philosophie ; car l’Homme ne changeant plus essentiellement lui-même, il n’y a
plus de raison de changer les principes (vrais) qui sont à la base de sa
connaissance du Monde et de soi. Mais tout le reste peut se maintenir
indéfiniment ; l’art, l’amour, le jeu, etc., etc. ; bref, tout ce qui rend l’Homme
heureux. (434-435 n. 1)
Thus, for Kojève, the Hegelian account of history is essentially circular, but not necessarily
cyclical. Once history comes to a close by bringing humanity back to its origins, the process does
not need to start again. Humanity separated itself from the animals by developing selfconsciousness. From this self-consciousness emerged the desire for recognition, which drives the
engine of history. At the end of history, however, everyone is universally recognized, meaning
that the “problem” of self-consciousness is resolved, and humanity can return to a basically
animalistic state. In this sense, we can see a parallel between Kojève’s Marxist eschatology and
Christian eschatology. Just as the Bible promises that history will conclude with a paradise
similar to the original, lost paradise of Eden, 11 Kojève promises a kind of post-historical utopia
at the moment when humanity returns to its original animality.

11

Biblical scholar Hermann Gunkel identified this eschatological perspective as “Endzeit gleich

Urzeit,” or an end like the beginning.
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The Post-Historical, Post-Human Animal

Kojève’s image of the end of humanity may, however, seem paradoxical, since he insists
that the condition of post-humanity is characterized by pursuits that are often seen as uniquely
human, notably art. Indeed, Bataille devoted extensive attention to the cave paintings of Lascaux
precisely because he saw these early examples of art as the birth of humanity. Kojève explains in
another note that Homo sapiens will continue to engage in activities that distinguish them from
other animals, but in the post-historical condition the significance of these actions will be
different than it is now:
Si l’Homme re-devient un animal, ses arts, ses amours et ses jeux doivent euxaussi re-devenir purement ‘naturels’. Il faudrait donc admettre, qu’après la fin de
l’Histoire, les hommes construiraient leurs édifices et leurs ouvrages d’art comme
les oiseaux construisent leurs nids et les araignées tissent leurs toiles,
exécuteraient des concerts musicaux à l’instar des grenouilles et des cigales,
joueraient comme jouent les jeunes animaux et s’adonneraient à l’amour comme
le font les bêtes adultes. (436)
Thus, the post-historical Homo sapiens will continue to exhibit unique behaviors such as the
production of art, but the ontological status of the species will be indistinguishable from that of
other animals. They will live in a natural state of contentment, free from the strife of historical
evolution: “Il faudrait dire que les animaux post-historiques de l’espèce Homo sapiens (qui
vivront dans l’abondance et en pleine sécurité) seront content en fonction de leur comportement
artistique, érotique et ludique, vu que, par définition, ils s’en contenteront” (Kojève 436).
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Breton, an attendee of Kojève’s lectures and an enthusiastic Hegelian, similarly questions the
superiority of humanity in his “Prolégomènes à un troisième manifeste du surréalisme ou non”
(1942), which he closes by dreaming of forms of life that would transcend the human condition :
“L’homme n’est peut-être pas le centre, le point de mire de l’univers. On peut se laisser aller à
croire qu’il existe au-dessus de lui, dans l’échelle animale, des êtres dont le comportement lui est
aussi étranger que le sien peut l’être à l’éphémère ou à la baleine” (OC III : 14). Effie Rentzou
argues that the surrealist movement is characterized by this desire to recontextualize our
understanding of the human: “the Surrealists attempted to provide a non-anthropocentric view of
the human by breaking the chains of humanist tradition, by inviting the ‘barbarian’ outsider
inside” (70). The post-human condition promised by Kojève’s end of history fits well with this
surrealist brand of anti-humanism.
This surrealist fascination with the post-historical condition of the post-human animal is
perhaps best captured visually in Max Ernst’s masterpiece Europe after the Rain II:

Fig. 3. Max Ernst. Europe after the Rain II. 1940-42.
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Created in the early years of the Second World War, Ernst’s piece confronts us with a vision of
the Europe that would emerge after the “rain” of that bloody conflict. This is consistent with
Breton’s characterization of Ernst’s work as at once insightful of present conditions and
prophetic of future events: “je tiens l’œuvre de Max Ernst pour grosse de faits appelés à se
produire sur le plan réel : qui plus est, je crois qu’elle préfigure dans leur ordre les faits qui se
produiront” (OC IV: 542). In Europe after the rain II, we see a post-apocalyptic landscape in
which life endures, but in a completely different, alien form. Human civilization has left only the
faintest traces in the form of the statuary and pillars which are consumed by strange coral-like
formations. The earth’s surface is covered by this bizarre flora, which seems to merge with a
woman who turns her back to the viewer. Next to her stands a man with the head of a bird. Just
as Kojève theorized a post-historical world in which Homo sapiens rejoins its animal origins,
Ernst depicts a devastated, post-war Europe in which life persists by leaving humanity behind.
Yet, as in Kojève, this abandonment of humanity is also a kind of return to an earlier stage of
history. The bird-headed man in Ernst’s painting wears a toga and appears to be brandishing a
spear, evoking a more ancient way of life. The woman with her back to the viewer is dressed in
decidedly more modern clothing, but her dress is in the process of being stripped away as she
merges with the landscape, shedding the trappings of civilization to survive in this new world.
In this way, Ernst’s vision of the post-apocalypse is perfectly in keeping with Bataille’s
assertion that surrealism is defined by a desire to return humanity to its natural or “primitive”
origins: “[I]l me semble très clair et très net que dans le sens du surréalisme, sinon dans sa
définition précise, la quête de la vie de l’homme primitif a représenté la partie principale, la plus
vivante et la plus décisive” (OC VII : 382). In the following sections of this chapter we will
examine Bataille’s work in order to better understand surrealist eschatology and the different
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visions of the end that emerged in the movement. Although Rezette has already written on
apocalyptic themes in Bataille, she comments primarily on how he, like John of Patmos, fulfills
the role of an apocalyptic visionary, vividly depicting the future horror and agony of death: “S’il
existe une communauté de croyance entre l'auteur présumé de l’Apocalypse: Jean, et Georges
Bataille, elle consiste en l'imagination de ce que peut être ce déchirement du corps, véritable sens
du dévoilement : celui du tragique et dernier instant. Comme l’Apocalypse pour le croyant, cet
instant fait partie de notre quotidien et se produit sans cesse” (Rezette 312). In our study, we will
tread new ground by focusing primarily on Bataille’s role as a theorist of the apocalypse, and
especially on the contrast between his annihilationist view of the end and Breton’s revolutionary
eschatology. Notably, we will take a close look at one of Bataille’s lesser known texts, L’Anus
solaire, which receives little more than a passing reference in Rezette’s dissertation.

L’Anus solaire : Parodic Dialectics and Volcanic Eschatology

At first, Bataille might seem a strange choice for a discussion of surrealist eschatology,
since several critics have interpreted Bataille’s work as a rejection of eschatology. Derrida
claims, for example, that “L’athéologie de Bataille est aussi une a-téléologie et une
aneschatologie” (L’Écriture et la différence 398). In addition, Jean-Michel Besnier claims that
one of the key features of Bataille’s politics is a “rejection of the Hegelian-Marxist eschatology
which portends the ineluctable end of History” (Besnier 179). Indeed, many have commented on
Bataille’s rejection of Hegelianism in general, and especially the concept of Aufhebung. Michael
Lewis explains “Is it possible to think the end of thought? […] This is to wonder, once again, if
one can think beyond the Hegelian Aufhebung or sublation, a task which […] we have come to
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associate with the work of Georges Bataille” (Lewis 265). We will see, however, that, while
Bataille does struggle with the concept of the end of history, eschatological themes nevertheless
remain an important aspect of his writing throughout his career.
In 1927, years before attending Kojève’s lectures, Bataille wrote L’Anus solaire, which
evokes the apocalyptic destruction of the supposedly inevitable communist revolution: “Ceux en
qui s’accumule la force d’éruption sont nécessairement situés en bas. Les ouvriers communistes
apparaissent aux bourgeois aussi laids et aussi sales que les parties sexuelles et velues ou parties
basses : tôt ou tard il en résultera une éruption scandaleuse au cours de laquelle les têtes asexuées
et nobles des bourgeois seront tranchées” (OC I : 85-86). This fetishized account of violent
insurrection is perfectly in line with Breton’s associations between apocalypse and revolution,
which we studied in depth in the first chapter. In addition to volcanic destruction, L’Anus solaire
explores a number of other topics: parody, language, and sexuality. Bataille opens L’Anus solaire
with two key assertions. First, Bataille claims that the world itself is parodic in structure: “Il est
clair que le monde est purement parodique, c’est-à-dire que chaque chose qu’on regarde est la
parodie d’une autre, ou encore la même chose sous une forme décevante” (OC I : 81). Second,
Bataille insists that the structure of language is inherently erotic, and that words and ideas are
joined through a kind of linguistic copulation: “le copule des termes n’est pas moins irritant que
celui des corps. Et quand je m’écrie : JE SUIS LE SOLEIL, il en résulte une érection intégrale,
car le verbe être est le véhicule de la frénésie amoureuse” (OC I : 81).12 The common element in
these two assertions is the idea that all things are linked in the mind, no matter how apparently

12

Curiously, Bataille renders copule as masculine, even though the word is feminine in French.

See Hawley, p. 180 n. 2.
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opposite they are: “tout serait visiblement lié si l’on découvrait d’un seul regard dans sa totalité
le tracé laissé par un fil d’Ariane, conduisant la pensée dans son propre labyrinth” (OC I : 81).
This logic of drawing together opposites culminates in the text’s concluding metaphor which
elucidates the meaning of the title: “L’anneau solaire est l’anus intact de son corps à dix-huit ans
auquel rien d’aussi aveuglant ne peut être comparé à l’exception du soleil, bien que l’anus soit la
nuit” (OC I : 86). The final lines of L’Anus solaire bring together the sun, the night, and the anus,
all three of which the eyes struggle to see, albeit for different reasons.
This drawing together of disparate images recalls Breton’s fascination with coincidentia
oppositorum, or the unity of opposites. Breton believed that one of the strengths of the surrealist
aesthetic was its ability to overcome any contradiction between opposites, resulting in a
dialectical synthesis in which both supposedly incompatible elements can coexist. As Breton
explains in Les Vases communicants:
Comparer deux objets aussi éloignés que possible l’un de l’autre ou, par toute
autre méthode, les mettre en présence d’une manière brusque et saisissante,
demeure la tâche la plus haute à laquelle la poésie puisse prétendre. En cela doit
tendre de plus en plus à s’exercer son pouvoir inégalable, unique, qui est de faire
apparaître l’unité concrète des deux termes mis en rapport et de communiquer à
chacun d’eux, quel qu’il soit, une vigueur qui lui manquait tant qu’il était pris
isolément. Ce qu’il s’agit de briser, c’est l’opposition toute formelle de ces deux
termes ; ce dont il s’agit d’avoir raison, c’est de leur apparente disproportion qui
ne tend qu’à l’idée imparfaite, infantile qu’on se fait de la nature, de l’extériorité
du temps et de l’espace. Plus l’élément de dissemblance immédiate paraît fort,
plus il doit être surmonté et nié. (OC II : 181)
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Indeed, Leslie Boldt-Irons reads L’Anus solaire as a rejection of Breton’s desire to transcend
contradiction: “Bataille, on the contrary, seeks the scandal, the collision of high and low, of anus
and sun that will break not the opposition of the two terms but the integrity of the viewer. His
solar anus is a deliberate refusal to ‘purify’ thought and restore it to the ‘path of total
comprehension.’” (366). In addition, Boldt-Irons claims that L’Anus solaire is a parody of Hegel,
representing Bataille’s rejection of the circular nature of the Hegelian dialectic:
In ‘The Solar Anus,’ Bataille in effect exposes the vulnerability of Hegel’s ‘wellclosed circle’ to its own circular thought by depicting a ‘mobile center.’ This
mobile center could be seen to parody Hegel’s description of a universal center
which is posited by the ego as it contemplates Nature’s (and the sun’s) adequation
with its Notion […] Bataille […] uses parody to undermine circular (and, by
implication, dialectical) movement as a sole and primary principle, for he
suggests that rotation is continuously undone and transformed into sexual
movement. (360)
This connection between the sun and universality is only reinforced by the association between
the former and the anus in Bataille’s text. In his cultural analysis of the anus, Jonathan Allan
highlights how the anus is a potentially more universal erotic signifier than, say, the phallus:
“Since we all have an anus, it seems to me that this ‘private part’ contains a utopian potential for
a theory of sexuality, gender, sex, desire, and pleasure that is inherently inclusive. The anus is
not exclusive, like the penis or the vagina, to one sex, to one type of body” (Allan 27). The
blinding, absolute, universal truth of the Hegelian dialectic is thus substituted for the banal
obscenity of the anus.
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While it is true that Bataille had serious reservations about Hegel, one could argue that
L’Anus solaire nevertheless presents a dialectical vision of the world which is not wholly
incompatible with Hegelian principles. Bataille’s conception of the world as parodic is similar to
the Hegelian Aufhebung, which simultaneously negates and preserves. A parody is a critique or
“negation” of something that simultaneously preserves elements of its target through imitation.
As Simon Dentith notes in his essay on parody:
[P]arody has the paradoxical effect of preserving the very text that it seeks to
destroy […] This can have some odd effects, even running counter to the apparent
intentions of the parodist. Thus the classic parody of Don Quixote […] preserves
the very chivalric romances that it attacks—with the unexpected result that for
much of its history the novel has been read as a celebration of misplaced idealism
rather than a satire of it. (36)
Similarly, one could argue that Bataille, in parodying surrealism, created a surrealist text and in
parodying Hegel, he reproduced a component of the Hegelian dialectic. More importantly, this
dialectical conception of parody is essential to understand the role of religion in surrealism. The
surrealist movement was a kind of parody of religion, which means that it also preserved certain
elements of religious thinking.
To return to our discussion of eschatology, L’Anus solaire culminates in the eroticized,
volcanic destruction that erupts from “le Jésuve”:
Le globe terrestre est couvert de volcans qui lui servent d’anus.
Bien que ce globe ne mange rien, il rejette parfois au-dehors le contenu de ses
entrailles.
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Ce contenu jaillit avec fracas et retombe en ruisselant sur les pentes du Jésuve,
répandant partout la mort et la terreur. […]
La terre se branle parfois avec frénésie et tous s’écroule à sa surface.
Le Jésuve est ainsi l’image du mouvement érotique donnant par effraction aux
idées contenues dans l’esprit la force d’une éruption scandaleuse. (OC I : 85-86)
This “Jésuve” can be interpreted as, among other things, a fusion of the salvation of Jesus, and
the wrath of Vesuvius. While critics have made the connection between Jesus and the “Jésuve,”
this aspect of the text has received surprisingly little attention. Daniel Hawley, for example,
relegates his observation to a single line, preferring to emphasize instead the connection with the
“je” of the text: “Le mot Jésuve qui semble être forgé de Je et de Vésuve en passant par Jésus
signale la nature divine du moi-écrivant qui est comme consumé dans l’érupion scandaleuse de
ses idées” (178). While Hawley’s association of the Jésuve with creative eruption is certainly a
valid interpretation, the religious implications of the term deserve more attention. Indeed,
Bataille’s later text titled “Le Jésuve” opens with a discussion of animal sacrifice, which only
serves to reinforce the religious importance of the term. In Christian iconography, the death of
Jesus (often referred to as the “lamb”) is sometimes imagined as the ultimate animal sacrifice. Of
course, the Jésuve also clearly evokes Vesuvius (Vésuve in French) to describe the volcanic
destruction. One could argue that Vesuvius is a vision of apocalyptic destruction which is
perfectly in line with the Hegelian Aufhebung. Just as the Aufhebung both negates and preserves,
Vesuvius simultaneously destroyed and petrified the city of Pompeii, leaving it at once
devastated and perfectly intact for thousands of years. It would seem, therefore, that Bataille’s
supposed theoretical opposition to both Hegelianism and eschatology had not been fully
developed by 1927, when he composed L’Anus solaire.
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Indeed, Allan Stoekl argues that Bataille’s opposition to Hegel is somewhat overstated:
“It should be remembered that at no time in the later 1930s—or after, for that matter—did
Bataille deny or refuse Kojève’s Marxist Hegel” (xxiii). As Stoekl elaborates, even Bataille’s
attempts to overcome Hegelianism tend to preserve a certain dialectical structure of thinking:
“To what extent has the dialectic not been subverted in any way by Bataille, to what extent, in
paying lip service to the limitlessness of this destructive tendency that constitutes man, does
Bataille simply establish a new ‘need’ that must in turn be recognized (at the end of history) and
satisfied in order to guarantee the stability of society?” (xviii). Moreover, Stoekl explains that the
crux of Bataille’s critique of dialectical thinking consists in pushing its logic as far as it can
possibly go, embracing rather than rejecting the end:
[T]he temporal movement toward erect, properly adjusted, rational man is one
with the dialectical movement toward Absolute Spirit. But what happens when
this movement is not simply denied—as Breton would have Bataille deny, as
contradictory, his own ability to reason—but pushed as far as it can go? The
answer is that at the end of reason, at the end of man at the end of the Cartesian
pineal gland (the supposed seat of consciousness) there is only orgasm and a
simultaneous fall, a simultaneous death. Death and perversion do not take place in
splendid isolation; instead, they are at the endpoint of the human. (xii)
Nick Land echoes this reading of Bataille’s work when he identifies the concept of the end the
key to all of Bataille’s theories: “[Bataille’s] thinking is not without a frightening simplicity. It is
perhaps even reducible to one question: what is an end?” (134). Despite his issues with
Hegelian-Marxist eschatology (which we will discuss in greater depth later in this chapter),
Bataille’s emphasis on the end makes him a good choice for a study of surrealist eschatology.
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The Eschatology of ‘le Mal’

One concept that is particularly important for surrealist eschatology is evil, or “le mal.”
While the two thinkers certainly had their differences, both Breton and Bataille seem to agree
that “le mal” is the engine of history, which is essentially an extension of the Hegelian idea that
negativity drives dialectical progression. In Bataille’s Erotisme, he develops a dialectic based on
this notion, in which transgression pushes things forward. He defines eroticism broadly, such that
it encompasses not only sexuality, but also violence, religion and even poetry. According to
Bataille, the erotic impulse emerges from our desire as discontinuous beings (that is, distinct
individuals) to recover some form of continuous existence. As Bataille explains: “A la base, il y
a des passages du continu au discontinu ou du discontinu au continu. Nous sommes des êtres
discontinus, individus mourant isolément dans une aventure inintelligible, mais nous avons la
nostalgie de la continuité perdue. Nous supportons mal la situation qui nous rive à l’individualité
périssable que nous sommes” (OC X : 21). Bataille claims that humans seek out this continuity
in a variety of ways. Sexual union is one way in which people attempt to suspend their feeling of
discontinuity. This desire for continuity can be seen, for example, in L’Anus solaire:
Un homme placé au milieu des autres est irrité de savoir pourquoi il n’est pas l’un
des autres.
Couché dans un lit auprès d’une fille qu’il aime, il oublie qu’il ne sait pas
pourquoi il est lui au lieu d’être le corps qu’il touche.
Sans rien en savoir, il souffre à cause de l’obscurité de l’intelligence
qui l’empêche de crier qu’il est lui-même la fille qui oublie sa présence en
s’agitant dans ses bras. (OC I : 82)
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Death (and by extension violence) is also inherently fascinating in this context, since it
represents the inevitable dissolution of our existence as discontinuous individuals. However, for
the sake of productivity, society imposes taboos to control sexuality and violence. But these
taboos can be transgressed (and indeed, as we shall see, such transgression is sometimes actively
prescribed), providing potential avenues for seeking continuity, and by extension, pleasure.
Bataille provides nudity as an example of such a transgression. By removing clothing, an
individual can remove a barrier between their body and the view of others, thereby losing a part
of their discontinuity from them. Nevertheless, the potential impact of such an action depends
entirely on the context: in a situation or culture in which nudity is expected, no transgression has
occurred and therefore it is not a cause for excitement.
It must be noted, however, that the phenomena that correspond to Bataille’s eroticism are
not exclusively sexual. He claims his ideas could equally be applied to poetry, for example: “La
poésie mène au même point que chaque forme de l’érotisme, à la confusion des objets distincts.
Elle nous mène à l’éternité, elle nous mène à la mort, et par la mort, à la continuité” (OC X: 30).
Indeed, in Bataille’s own poetry we see an erotic combination of images of death, sexuality and
even of apocalyptic destruction: “en attendant le désastre / où la lumière s’éteindra / je serai doux
dans ton cœur / comme le froid de la mort” (Bataille III : 96). We see a similar fusion of images
in André Masson’s illustrations for the 1931 edition of L’Anus solaire:
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Fig. 4. André Masson. Illustration from L’Anus solaire. 1931. (5)

In this drawing, for example, Masson depicts animal bodies writhing while a cataclysmic storm
rages in the background. While this illustration has no clear, direct connection to the specific
content of L’Anus solaire, Masson creates a sense of continuity in part through the piece’s
ambiguity. Masson’s frantic linework not only makes it unclear where one animal begins and
another ends but also leaves us guessing at how exactly they are interacting with each other: how
much of the drawing’s freneticism can we attribute to erotic passion and how much can we read
as violence? Whatever the reading, the most important thing to note is the sense in which
individual, discontinuous identity gives way to erotic continuity.
For Bataille, eroticism is also inextricably linked with ‘le mal,’ which all of humanity
secretly craves: “L’homme a soif du mal, de l’élément coupable mais n’ose (ou ne peut) lui
donner son âme, emprunte la voie oblique, la névrose, le rire, etc.” (OC III : 42). Breton
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celebrated Lautréamont’s revelation that “le mal” was the “force motrice du développement
historique,” moving society to a condition where no further transgression is permitted, because
no taboos are left in place (Breton OC II : 987). In this way, the surrealist celebration of
transgression is its own kind of eschatology. One vision of this type of apocalypse can be seen in
Luis Buñuel’s film L’Âge d’or (1930), which concludes with a reference to Sade’s Les Cent vingt
journées de Sodome. When the four libertines emerge from the Château de Silling, we see that
the role of the Duc de Blangis, the principal organizer of the murderous debauchery of Sade’s
novel, is seemingly filled by none other than Jesus Christ:

Fig. 5. Luis Buñuel. L’Âge d’or. 1930.

Buñuel’s film thus depicts a perverse second coming of Christ in which Jesus returns not to pass
judgement and install the kingdom of God on earth, but rather to indulge in unrestrained cruelty.
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Similarly, Bataille explains that he conceived of Lord Auch, the pseudonym he used in
publishing his first novel L’Histoire de l’oeil (1928), as an image of God seeking consolation in
the sadistic pleasures depicted in the narrative : “Le nom de Lord Auch se rapporte à l’habitude
d’un de mes amis : irrité, il ne disait plus ‘aux chiottes !’, abrégeait, disait ‘aux ch’’. Lord en
anglais veut dire Dieu (dans les textes saints) : Lord Auch est Dieu se soulageant” (OC III : 59).
Both Bataille and Buñuel thus conceptualize God as a world-weary sadist who can only find
comfort in violating the most fundamental of taboos. This parodic conception of God
corresponds to a somewhat pessimistic view of the apocalypse: The chaos of the end of the world
may open up radically new experiences in a condition of unbridled liberty, but it offers
absolutely no hope of messianic salvation.

The Open Wound at the End of History

While Bataille does appreciate Sadean transgression, he describes it as a kind of
consolation, rather than as a utopic condition at the end of history. In a 1937 letter to Kojève,
Bataille claims that he is willing to grant that, as Kojève argues, history is already at an end:
“J’admets (comme une supposition vraisemblable) que dès maintenant l’histoire est achevée (au
dénouement près). Je me représente différemment les choses (je n’attribue pas grande
importance à la différence entre le fascisme et le communisme ; d’autre part, il ne me paraît
nullement impossible que, dans un temps très éloigné, tout recommence)” (Lettres 131). Bataille
admits that he feels at least as much dread about the end of history as he does excitement.
Specifically, Bataille is troubled by the overabundance of what he calls the “négativité sans
emploi,” which persists, even at the end of history:
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Quoi qu’il en soit, mon expérience, vécue avec beaucoup de souci, m’a conduit à
penser que je n’avais plus rien ‘à faire’. (J’étais mal disposé à l’accepter, et,
comme vous l’avez vu, ne me suis résigné qu’après m’être efforcé.)
Si l’action (le ‘faire’) est—comme dit Hegel—la négativité, la question se pose
alors de savoir si la négativité de qui n’a ‘plus rien à faire’ disparaît ou subsiste à
l’état de ‘négativité sans emploi’ : personnellement, je ne puis décider que dans
un sens, étant moi-même exactement comme cette ‘négativité sans emploi’ (je ne
pourrais me définir de façon plus précise). Je veux bien que Hegel ait prévu cette
possibilité : du moins ne l’a-t-il pas située à l’issue des processus qu’il décrits
[sic]. J’imagine que ma vie—ou son avortement, mieux encore, la blessure
ouverte qu’est ma vie—à elle seule constitue la réfutation du système fermé de
Hegel. (Lettres 131-2)
Kojève depicts desire as the driving force behind history, but when history comes to a close,
what happens to that desire? For Kojève, the most important desire will be satisfied when all
people are recognized. But, in positing the problem of this “négativité sans emploi,” Bataille
essentially asks the question: what if, as Lacanian psychoanalysis would have it, desire is
infinite, and does not recede at the end of history? What do the post-human subjects do with their
desire when there is, by definition, nothing left to do? Although Bataille refers to this “homme de
la négativité reconnue" in the third person, he leaves no doubt about the fact that he is describing
his own feelings: “J’ai parlé ici de l’homme de la ‘négativité reconnue’ comme s’il ne s’agissait
pas uniquement de moi. Je tiens à ajouter en effet que je ne me sens rigoureusement isolé que
dans la mesure où j’ai pris entièrement conscience de ce qui m’arrive” (Lettres 135). Bataille
explains that, in confronting the end of history, he does not feel like Kojève’s post-human
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animal, but rather like a beast caught in a trap: “Ce que j’en dis vous engage à penser qu’un
malheur arrive, et c’est tout : me trouvant devant vous, je n’ai pas d’autre justification de moimême que celle d’une bête criant le pied dans un piège” (Lettres 132). In addition, we see that
Bataille’s confidence in the coming communist insurrection has faded, since he claims to see no
difference between a fascist or a communist post-history. In the published version of this letter,
Bataille adds this note: “Peut-être à tort, à tort à tout le moins en ce qui touchait les vingt ans qui
devaient suivre, [Kojève] imaginait proche la solution révolutionnaire du communisme” (Lettres
131 n. 2). Indeed, Bataille’s earlier revolutionary fervor fades in the later 1930s and especially in
the 1940s. As Nick Land observes: “The chronological tendency of Bataille’s writings is one of
demilitarization, with the ardour for insurrectionary war that typifies his early polemics being
rapidly phased out of his text from the early 1940s onwards” (151). Nevertheless, Bataille finds
some comfort in the post-historical condition by discovering something new to do:
Loin de s’arrêter dans cette investigation, il trouve une satisfaction totale dans le
fait de devenir l’homme de la ‘négativité reconnue’ et il n’a plus de cesse dans
l’effort qu’il commence pour la reconnaître jusqu’au bout. […] Ainsi, il met en
jeu les représentations les plus chargées de valeur émotive, telle que destruction
physique ou obscénité érotique, objet du rire, de l’excitation physique, de la peur
et des larmes ; mais en même temps que ces représentations l’intoxiquent, il les
dépouille de la gangue dans laquelle elles avaient été dérobées à la contemplation
et les situe objectivement dans le déchaînement du temps contre tout immuable. Il
comprend alors que c’est sa chance et non sa malchance qui l’a fait entrer dans un
monde où il n’y avait plus rien à faire et ce qu’il est devenu malgré lui se propose
maintenant à la reconnaissance des autres, car il ne peut être l’homme de la
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‘négativité reconnue’ que dans la mesure où il se fait reconnaître comme tel. Il
retrouve ainsi, de nouveau, quelque chose ‘à faire’ dans un monde où du point de
vue de l’action rien ne se fait plus. Et ce qu’il a ‘à faire’ c’est donner à la part
d’existence libérée du faire sa satisfaction : il s’agit bien d’utilisation des loisirs.
(Lettres 134)
Bataille explains that art and religion would be the natural places to turn for this satisfaction, but
he finds that these endeavors are often ill-equipped to handle the infinite expanse of negativity
that remains at the end of history, when nothing remains to negate. Only the most emotionally
charged representations could offer any consolation.

Base Materialism and Icarian Idealism

Bataille explains that he finds solace in embracing the most shocking and disturbing
images, which perhaps explains his fascination with apocalyptic imagery. He writes, for
example, that the medieval manuscript L’Apocalypse de Saint-Sever contains horrifying images
which are nevertheless beneficial for mental hygiene:
En effet, dans les plus sauvages chansons de geste et, de la même façon, dans des
manuscrits tels que l’Apocalypse de Saint-Sever, l’horreur n’entraîne aucune
complaisance pathologique et joue uniquement le rôle du fumier dans la
croissance végétale, fumier d'odeur suffocante sans doute, mais salubre à la
plante. Rien n’est plus tranquille, en effet—ni plus vivace—que la béatitude,
même sénile, exprimée par la plupart des figures reproduites ici. Il n’y a pas lieu
de s’étonner d’ailleurs de la valeur bienfaisante des faits sales ou sanglants : dans
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ce sens, il est facile de constater, encore de nos jours, l’optimisme physique et
l’ardeur au travail qui caractérise les tueurs à l’abattoir et, en général, tous les
professionnels de la boucherie. (OC I : 167)
However, Breton takes issue with Bataille’s fascination with blood and gore. Despite his avantgarde sensibility, Breton still seeks beauty (albeit convulsive beauty) in artistic endeavor. As
such, Breton mocks Bataille’s macabre “Apocalypse” article in the Second manifeste:
Lui qui, durant les heures du jour, promène sur de vieux et parfois charmants
manuscrits des doigts prudents de bibliothécaire (on sait qu’il exerce cette
profession à la Bibliothèque nationale), se repaît la nuit des immondices dont, à
son image, il voudrait les voir chargés : témoin cette Apocalypse de Saint-Sever à
laquelle il consacré un article dans le numéro 2 de Documents, article qui est le
type parfait du faux témoignage. Qu’on veuille bien se reporter, par exemple, à la
planche du ‘Déluge’ reproduite dans ce numéro, et qu’on me dise si
objectivement un sentiment jovial et inattendu apparaît avec la chèvre qui figure
au bas de la page et avec le corbeau dont le bec est plongé dans la viande (ici M.
Bataille s’exalte) d’une tête humaine. (OC I : 826)
The image in question is an illustration of the biblical flood from the medieval manuscript:
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Fig. 6. “Déluge.” Apocalypse de Saint-Sever. (Bataille OC I: planche vii)

The “sentiment jovial inattendu” that Bataille reads in the figures of the goat and the crow is
typical of the surprising reactions provoked by the radical disorder of apocalyptic destruction:
“Cette inconséquence est ici le signe de l’extrême désordre des réactions humaines libres. Il ne
s’agit pas, en effet, d’un contraste calculé, mais d’une expression immédiate des métamorphoses
inintelligibles—d’autant plus significatives—qui sont le résultat de certaines inclinations fatales”
(OC I : 169). The unexpected joviality of these animals during the flood is not unlike the surprise
felt by the “l’homme de la négativité reconnue” to discover that “c’est sa chance et non sa
malchance qui l’a fait entrer dans un monde où il n’y avait plus rien à faire” (Lettres 134). The
horror of apocalyptic destruction at least offers the consolation of freedom and discovery. In a
way, for Bataille, true revelation takes place at the end, not merely in anticipation of it: “Pour
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que l’homme à la fin se révèle à lui-même il devrait mourir, mais il lui faudrait le faire en
vivant—en se regardant cesser d’être. […] Ainsi faudrait-il, à tout prix, que l’homme vive au
moment où il meurt vraiment, ou qu’il vive avec l’impression de mourir vraiment. Cette
difficulté annonce la nécessité du spectacle, ou généralement de la représentation” (qtd. in
Écriture et la différence 378-9). According to Bataille, fixating on the spectacle of death and
destruction is thus an attempt by humanity to catch a glimpse of this revelatory end without
paying the ultimate price. We will return to this inverted structure of revelation in our fourth
chapter, where we will find similar reflections on the nature of secular apocalypse in the work of
Soupault and Artaud.
For Breton, however, this kind of fixation with the macabre is revelatory only of
Bataille’s strange preoccupations. Breton argues that Bataille is afflicted by psychasthenia and
that he is merely projecting morbid interpretations onto the objects of his study. Bataille retorts
that Breton is guilty of his own biases, notably that he filters his perceptions through his “icarian
idealism”:
Politiquement l’aigle s’identifie à l’impérialisme, c’est-à-dire avec un libre
développement du pouvoir autoritaire particulier, triomphant de tous les obstacles.
Et métaphysiquement l’aigle s’identifie à l’idée […] L’idéalisme révolutionnaire
tend à faire de la révolution un aigle au-dessus des aigles, un suraigle abattant les
impérialismes autoritaires, une idée aussi radieuse qu’un adolescent s’emparant
éloquemment du pouvoir au bénéfice d’une illumination utopique. […] Cependant
ramenée à l’action souterraine des faits économiques la révolution ‘vieille taupe’
creuse des galeries dans un sol décomposé et répugnant pour le nez délicat des
utopistes. (OC II : 96)
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Bataille defends his own philosophy of “base materialism,” claiming that any materialist
philosophy that emphasizes abstract concepts is simply idealism by another name: “La plupart
des matérialistes, bien qu’ils aient voulu éliminer toute entité spirituelle, sont arrivés à décrire un
ordre de choses que des rapports hiérarchiques caractérisent comme spécifiquement idéaliste”
(OC I : 179). The opposition between the celestial ideal and terrestrial matter can be seen in
Bataille’s work as early as L’Anus solaire: “Désastres, les révolutions et les volcans ne font pas
l’amour avec les astres. / Les déflagrations érotiques révolutionnaires et volcaniques sont en
antagonisme avec le ciel” (OC I : 86). Breton would likely reject this association with Icarus and
the sun, but his fascination with both light and synthesis are apparent. The title of his Clair de
terre (1923), for example, suggests a fixation on a synthesis between heaven and earth.
Moreover, in the conclusion of his Second manifeste, Breton uplifts the idea as the only form of
defense against the baseness of the world: “Qu’il [l’homme] use, au mépris de toutes les
prohibitions, de l’arme vengeresse de l’idée contre la bestialité de tous les êtres et de toutes les
choses et qu’un jour, vaincu—mais vaincu seulement si le monde est monde—il accueille la
décharge de ses tristes fusils comme un feu de salve” (OC I : 828 ; Breton’s emphasis). In this
conclusion to Breton’s manifesto, we see a kind of apocalyptic resignation. Humanity will
engage in the noble battle between idea and bestiality (divorced from the nobility that
characterizes his description of the “animal” in his later “progélomènes”), but it is destined to be
defeated and can do nothing but welcome its destruction. However, Breton inserts a small beacon
of hope: “mais vaincu seulement si le monde est monde.” The implication of this qualification is
that humanity is doomed within this world, but if the world could be something other than itself,
then it might have a fighting chance. This assertion brings us back to Breton’s attempt to always
find “l’un dans l’autre,” that is to see a thing’s opposite within itself without contradiction.
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Further, Breton celebrates “la lumière de l’apocalypse” in the work of Victor Brauner (Breton
OC IV: 499). Although Breton does not name this painting specifically, we can easily imagine
that he had in mind Brauner’s 1932 painting Hypergenèse de la réapparition:

Fig. 7. Victor Brauner. Hypergenèse de la réapparition. 1932.

In Brauner’s painting we see a crowd of people lifted to the heavens, toward a bright light. Even
those that try to resist cannot avoid being drawn toward the light, because the earth itself is
pulled up with them. This painting can therefore be read as a synthesis between heaven and
88

earth, which evokes the conclusion of the biblical apocalypse in which the kingdom of heaven is
definitively installed upon earth. We might say that if Breton was drawn to the blinding light of
Hegel’s “absolute idea,” Bataille was haunted by the equally unfathomable darkness of the
negativity that would remain at the end of history.

Bataille and the “Thirst for Annihilation”

In his 1932 article “Critique des fondements de la dialectique hégélienne” (which he coauthored with Raymond Queneau), Bataille highlights what he considers to be one of the
weaknesses of the Hegelian dialectic, the fact that it is not based in observation of material
reality: “Même s’il avait fait abstraction de ses préjugés idéalistes, rien n’aurait semblé plus
déraisonnable à Hegel que de chercher les fondements de l’objectivité des lois dialectiques dans
l’étude de la nature. Cette tentative doit en effet aboutir à faire reposer la construction dialectique
sur sa partie la plus faible, aboutir au paradoxe du colosse aux pieds d’argile” (Bataille I : 27980). Here, Bataille and Queneau evoke the Old Testament apocalypse of Daniel, comparing
Hegel’s opinion of inferential reasoning to Daniel’s vision of Babylon’s doom. Bataille and
Queneau explain, however, that Engels attempted, but failed, to remedy this perceived lack of
scientific rigor by basing his dialectic in observable, material reality, rather than mere
abstraction. Bataille’s later theorizing of a system of “general economy” would serve as a kind of
continuation of this same project. The core of his theory of general economy was first presented
in his 1933 essay “La Notion de dépense,” which was greatly expanded and published in his
book La Part Maudite (1949). Bataille envisions economy in the broadest possible terms,
incorporating celestial bodies and social practices alike. The core concept in Bataille’s system is
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the expenditure, rather than the accumulation, of wealth and/or energy. Indeed, he opens La Part
maudite by asserting that all life on earth is possible thanks to solar radiation, which from the
sun’s perspective is merely wasted surplus energy: “Vous n’êtes, et vous devez le savoir, qu’une
explosion d’énergie” (OC VII : 15). This focus on solar energy as the sun’s waste sheds further
light on the eponymous metaphor of L’Anus solaire; the precious sunlight on which we depend
for life is nothing but waste, a kind of solar excrement.
For Bataille, loss is the ultimate goal of the universe. Anything gained through loss (such
as the life made possible by excess solar energy) is purely incidental and only feeds into new
systems of loss:
[L]’acquisition a pour ‘fin’ la part de perte qu’elle rend possible. Il serait
maladroit de s’attarder aux explications utilitaires des pertes. Il est vrai que la
perte a le sens de la vie, qu’elle est féconde le plus souvent, quand les systèmes
d’enrichissement fermé stérilisent. Mais cette fécondité due à des pertes n’en est
pas la ‘fin’. Elle est elle-même justifiée—elle doit trouver sa ‘fin’—dans les
nouvelles pertes qu’elle rend possibles. La vie des hommes a lieu comme l’éclat
des étoiles : en profondeur, elle n’a pas d’autre fin que cet éclat, sa gloire en est le
sens dernier. (OC VII : 202)
In his eponymous essay, Land describes Bataille’s infatuation with loss as a “thirst for
annihilation.” Stoekl similarly highlights the importance of destruction in Bataille’s theories:
“Production in Bataille’s view is clearly subordinate and posterior to destruction: people create
in order to expend, and if they retain things they have produced, it is only to allow themselves to
continue living, and thus destroying” (xvii). Moreover, unlike the Hegelian Aufhebung, Bataille’s
concept of total loss does not preserve what is lost, nor does it pretend to replace the removed
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element. As Stoekl explains: “The fall of one system is not stabilized, is not replaced with the
elevation of another; the fall in Bataille’s allegory is a kind of incessant or repetitious process.
Thus filth does not ‘replace’ God; there is no new system of values, no new hierarchy” (xiv).
Lewis argues that this insistence on total loss as the ultimate end of everything corresponds to the
conceptualization of the apocalypse as total annihilation, which became dominant after the
Second World War.
While it is true that Bataille’s theory of loss is best articulated in his post-war writings,
the themes of destruction and annihilation play an important role in the period immediately
preceding the Second World War. For example, his 1939 text “La Pratique de la joie devant la
mort” describes the universe as a perpetual process of annihilation :
JE SUIS la joie devant la mort.
La profondeur du ciel, l’espace perdu est joie devant la mort : tout est
profondément fêlé.
Je me représente que la terre tourne vertigineusement dans le ciel.
Je me représente le ciel lui-même glissant, tournant et se perdant.
Le soleil, comparable à un alcool, tournant et éclatant à perdre la respiration.
La profondeur du ciel comme une débauche de lumière glacée se perdant.
Tout ce qui existe se détruisant, se consumant et mourant, chaque instant ne se
produisant que dans l’anéantissement de celui qui précède et n’existant lui-même
que blessé à mort.
Moi-même me détruisant et me consumant sans cesse en moi-même dans une
grande fête de sang.
Je me représente l’instant glacé de ma propre mort. (OC I : 555-6)
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Destruction is the fundamental mechanism of the universe and the speaker anticipates the
ultimate revelation of this truth : death. In addition, Bataille’s poetry from the Second World
War depicts an enthusiastic embrace of cataclysmic destruction: “dans un bol de gin / une nuit de
fête / les étoiles tombent du ciel / je lampe la foudre à longs traits / je vais rire aux éclats / la
foudre dans le cœur” (OC III : 82). Furthermore, Bataille equates the process of writing with
destruction, rather than creation:
Le seul moyen de racheter la faute d’écrire est d’anéantir ce qui est écrit. Mais
cela ne peut être fait que par l’auteur ; la destruction laissant l’essentiel intact, je
puis, néanmoins, à l’affirmation lier si étroitement la négation que ma plume
efface à mesure ce qu’elle avança. Elle opère alors, en un mot, ce que
généralement opère le ‘temps’—qui, de ses édifices multipliés, ne laisse subsister
que les traces de la mort. Je crois que le secret de la littérature est là, et qu’un livre
n’est beau qu’habilement paré de l’indifférence des ruines. Il faudrait, sinon, crier
si fort que nul n’imaginerait la survie de qui s’égosilla si naïvement. (Bataille III :
336).
Bataille’s emphasis on annihilation separates him from Hegelian thinkers like Breton, for whom
negation is less a process of erasure than a process of preservation, transformation and even
elevation. Jacques Derrida claims that Bataille’s theory of general economy is not only a
refutation of Hegel, but of teleological thinking in general:
Non que la phénoménologie de l’esprit soit ainsi renversée, qui procédait dans
l’horizon du savoir absolu ou selon la circularité du Logos. Au lieu d’être
simplement renversée, elle est comprise : non pas comprise par la compréhension
connaissante mais inscrite, avec ses horizons de savoir et ses figures de sens, dans
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l’ouverture de l’économie générale. Celle-ci les plie à se rapporter non pas au
fondement mais au sans-fond de la dépense, non pas au telos du sens mais à la
destruction indéfinie de la valeur. L’athéologie de Bataille est aussi une atéléologie et une aneschatologie. (L’Écriture et la différence 398)
One might argue, however, that in rejecting the teleological eschatology, Bataille’s
“aneschatology” could instead be viewed as a different, more nihilistic eschatology, albeit one
centered around a very different conception of the end. Land distinguishes between two different
senses of the term end: “Humans like to have two ends, and to keep them as distinct as possible;
blessing telos and cursing terminus” (134). Telos is associated with destiny and purpose, whereas
terminus simply describes the finite nature of things, divorced from any appeal to greater
meaning. One might argue that the trend in the development of Bataille’s thinking is to place
greater emphasis on the latter, more nihilistic sense of an “end” and less and less on the former.
If, in Kojève’s Hegelian-Marxist framework, history has a meaning and humanity has a destiny,
in Bataille’s nihilistic framework, humanity’s eventual end is completely meaningless. Because
of its emphasis on irrecuperable loss, we might call Bataille’s perspective annihilationist, a term
which, in Christian eschatology, refers to the idea that souls are not necessarily immortal and that
at least some souls will be definitively destroyed at the end of time.
Bataille’s annihilationist philosophy therefore leads to a very different vision of the
apocalypse than those furnished by the likes of John of Patmos or André Breton. In this view, the
end of humanity is not necessarily linked to the birth of something new, but rather a total,
irrecuperable loss. This conception of humanity’s end became terrifyingly pertinent when the
Cold War made the possibility of human extinction very real. As Bataille remarks in a talk that
he gave in 1955 on the Lascaux cave paintings:
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Il est devenu banal aujourd’hui de parler de l’extinction éventuelle de la vie
humaine. Les dernières expériences atomiques ont rendu sensible la perspective
de radiations envahissant l’atmosphère et créant des conditions où généralement
la vie ne pourrait plus se développer. […] Je n’ai pas l’intention aujourd’hui de
vous parler de notre mort éventuelle, je voudrais au contraire vous parler de notre
naissance. Je suis seulement frappé du fait que la lumière se fasse sur notre
naissance, au moment même où la perspective de la mort nous apparaît. (Bataille
IX : 331)
From the perspective of the 1950s, it seemed that the end of humanity would not coincide with a
new, post-human utopia in which humanity rejoined the animals, but rather the extinction of all
life, both human and animal. Indeed, Lewis claims that Bataille’s theories help us grapple with
concepts such as the inevitable heat death of the universe:
Bataille directs our thinking to the cosmos, a cosmos in which we may think of
the death of the sun and the incineration of the earth and its archives in the context
of a profusion of suns, in a process of general explosion and extinction. We
should read the death of the sun and the countless supernovae currently
illuminating the darkest corners of the universe as necessary moments of waste,
sacrifices of accursed planets which have reached the limits of their growth and
must in one final orgiastic moment of brilliance pass into darkness. (Lewis 274)
This nihilistic vision of humanity’s end was, of course, rejected by Breton, who ceased to wish
for the end of the world when, in the wake of nuclear devastation, he came to fear that its true
form would be that of pure annihilation. But the trajectory of Bataille’s thought is, in many ways,
parallel to broader intellectual trends. In the post-war economy of consumerism, he theorized a
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general economy of waste, and in a cold-war atmosphere of nuclear dread, he grimly awaited
humanity’s total self-sacrifice.
We can now distinguish between two separate surrealist eschatologies. Both visions of
the end involve destruction, but its significance is different in each case. On the one hand, the
revolutionary eschatology of figures like Breton envisioned the apocalypse as a transformation,
leading to a new, more perfect reality. The annihilationist eschatology that we find in Bataille’s
writings from the 1930’s forward imagines an end that does not necessarily lead to anything. Of
course, Surrealist visions of total annihilation are not limited to Bataille alone. Paintings by Dalí,
such as La mel és més dolça que la sang13 (which Bataille included in an issue of Documents)
depict death and decay on a scale that leaves little hope of survival:

Fig. 8. Salvador Dalí. La mel és més dolça que la sang. 1927. (Bataille OC I: planche xiii)
13

Interestingly, Bataille renders the title of this piece as Le sang est plus doux que le miel, even

though the proper French translation should be Le Miel est plus doux que le sang. Unfortunately,
we have relatively few details about this painting and its current location is unknown.
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The carcasses that litter the foreground show us that neither humans nor animals have been
spared. Even the shadow of a human figure seems to be in the process of decaying, suggesting
that the destruction will be total, annihilating even the faintest traces of those who have passed.
The haunting loneliness of Giorgio de Chirico’s paintings is similarly evocative of
annihilation. While de Chirico was not technically part of the surrealist movement, his paintings
were enormously influential on the movement’s aesthetic. Breton writes extensively about his
work in Le Surréalisme et la peinture. In particular, Breton highlights the absence of living
beings in many of de Chirico’s paintings. Breton traces the development of his work through the
period of the First World War:
La fixation de lieux éternels où l’objet n’est plus retenu qu’en fonction de sa vie
symbolique et énigmatique (époque des arcades et des tours) qui tendent à devenir
des lieux hantés (revenants et présages) assigne rapidement à l’homme une
structure qui exclut tout caractère individuel, le ramène à une armature et à un
masque (époque des mannequins). Puis cette structure elle-même se dérobe :
l’être vivant, disparu, n’est plus évoqué que par des objets inanimés en rapport
avec son rôle (de roi, de général, de marin, etc.). Enfin ces objets eux-mêmes,
entrant en composition avec des instruments de mesure et n’entretenant plus avec
la vie humaine de relation manifeste que par l’intermédiaire de l’aliment de
longue conservation qu’est le biscuit sec, le grand cycle chirichien se clôt par
l’époque dite des ‘intérieurs métaphysiques’. (Breton IV: 422-425)
According to Breton, the tendency in this period of de Chirico’s work is for the traces of
humanity to fade more and more. In an early painting, such as La Tour rouge, human figures are
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absent, but the traces of humanity are still perfectly intact. As Breton would put it, the piece is at
least “haunted” by the human:

Fig. 9. Giorgio de Chirico. La Tour rouge. 1913.

Paul Éluard highlights the characteristic loneliness of the artist’s paintings in his poem “Giorgio
de Chirico”:
Le souvenir de ceux qui parlaient sans savoir,
Maîtres de ma faiblesse et je suis à leur place
Avec des yeux d’amour et des mains trop fidèles
Pour dépeupler un monde dont je suis absent. (Éluard 100)
The human beings in the poem seem to be reduced to mere traces, persisting only in memory,
and even the speaker seems to lack a real presence in the world. Indeed, Éluard gives more
agency to the architecture of de Chirico’s paintings that he does to the poem’s speaker:
97

Un mur dénonce un autre mur
Et l’ombre me défend de mon ombre peureuse.
O tour de mon amour autour de mon amour,
Tous les murs filaient blanc autour de mon silence. (Éluard 100)
The speaker’s silence is emphasized, and even his shadow is erased by the shadow of the
buildings that tower over him. Breton argues that this theme of the erasure of humanity is even
more prevalent in de Chirico’s “metaphysical” paintings, such as Interno metafisico con biscotti:

Fig. 10. Giorgio de Chirico. Interno metafisico con biscotti. 1916.

The objects in de Chirico’s paintings take on a life of their own, increasingly divorced from their
normal functions in human lives. The connections of the objects to human existence in tenuous,
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challenging the viewer to imagine a world that has left humanity behind. During the Second
World War, de Chirico would tackle the apocalypse much more explicitly in his illustrations for
the book L’Apocalisse. But these illustrations are much more traditional, showing an end filled
with hope and religious purpose:

Fig. 11. Giorgio de de Chirico. Frontispiece of L’Apocalisse. 1941.

If de Chirico’s earlier work was characterized by the absence of humanity, this illustration shows
a celebration of the human. God and His angels come to Earth in anthropomorphic form. Even
the sun wears a human face. Thus, if the trend in Bataille’s work was to move toward more and
more nihilistic visions of the end, de Chirico’s trajectory was the opposite. Whatever the
evolutions in their individual thinking, a common thread for both Bataille and de Chirico (as well
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as the surrealist movement as a whole) in the period from the First to the Second World War is a
fixation on the end.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have traced the eschatology of the surrealist movement with particular
attention paid to the work of Georges Bataille. In Bataille’s early writings, such as L’Anus
solaire, we see a revolutionary, teleological eschatology, which is in line with Kojève’s theories
as well as with Breton’s vision of an apocalyptic, surrealist revolution. This teleological
eschatology envisions the transformational destruction erupting from an inevitable communist
uprising as the glorious, final chapter of human history which will pave the way to a posthistorical utopia. In Bataille’s later work, we encounter the beginnings of an annihilationist
eschatology, which conceives of destruction as a form of expenditure in the general economy of
the universe and which nothing can hope to survive. As Bataille became more pessimistic about
the communist revolution, he came to conceive of the end increasingly in terms of loss and
annihilation, rather than transcendent evolution. However, we must be careful not to
overgeneralize by linking pessimism with a rejection of a revolutionary view of the apocalypse.
In the following chapter, we will study the theories of Pierre Naville, who attempted to use
apocalyptic pessimism as the organizing principle of a political action.
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Chapter 3
The War against Hope:
Surrealism, Pessimism, and Apocalypticism
This chapter will explore the surrealist movement through the lens of the third and final
branch of apocalyptic studies: the organization of apocalyptic religious groups. Of particular
interest are the points of comparison between the social structure of apocalyptic religious groups
and the ways that the surrealist movement organized itself, particularly when entering the
political arena. As such, this chapter focuses primarily on the politics of surrealists such as Louis
Aragon and Benjamin Péret, who were committed to pursuing a material revolution through
direct engagement and a commitment to communism. Pierre Naville praises the “grande verve
apocalyptique” in the poetry of fellow surrealist Benjamin Péret, who travelled the globe as a
communist agitator and revolutionary (Le Temps du surréel 176). As for Aragon, even before
joining the communist party, his work demonstrated a keen interest in material, socio-economic
factors. The narrator of Aragon’s Le Paysan de Paris scrambles to capture the unique urbanity of
Paris’s “passages” before they are forever erased by the city’s modernization efforts in a kind of
capitalist apocalypse. It is interesting to note that even among the surrealists committed to the
communist cause, pessimism was still pervasive, and support for the optimism of Stalinist Russia
became a subject of debate for the surrealists. Indeed, Michael Löwy highlights the
“revolutionary pessimism” of Pierre Naville, who believed that a starkly negative outlook, when
coupled with action, could help the revolutionary cause: “Naville believed pessimism was the
greatest virtue of Surrealism in the current situation” (Löwy 48-50). Thus, for surrealists like
Naville, pessimism was not a reason to abandon the revolution. On the contrary, it constituted an
essential component of any serious effort to effect change.
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In a pair of essays published between 1926 and 1927, and later collected under the title
La Révolution et les intellectuels, Naville cemented his position as a key figure in the history of
surrealism by exposing what he saw as the contradictions in the political thinking of the
movement. Naville’s attempt to propel surrealism into the realm of political activism led to a
major rift between the movement’s communist and its apolitical members. I will argue, however,
that Naville also inadvertently proposed an additional antinomy between the insistence on
coordination with the Communist Party and a commitment to revolutionary pessimism. Naville
intended to organize the surrealists’ characteristic pessimism to allow it to contribute to the
proletarian revolution. This organization proved impossible, however, due to the multiple
schisms within both surrealism and the much broader, worldwide communist movement. As we
will see, the surrealists would eventually be forced to choose either to organize around Stalinist
optimism (which was a condition of party affiliation) or to maintain their pessimism by operating
largely outside of party politics. Before looking at these political disagreements, we should first
examine the parallels between surrealism and apocalypticism.

Surrealism and Apocalyptic Groups

While surrealism is not a religion in the strict sense of the term, the movement (and
especially Breton’s “official” surrealist group) shares a striking number of characteristics with
apocalyptic religious groups, as defined by biblical scholar Robert R. Wilson. Wilson outlines
four central traits common to all apocalyptic religions. The first of these traits is related to the
belief in forces beyond the immediately perceptible: “Practitioners of apocalyptic religion
believe that reality extends beyond the visible world to include a supernatural world of some sort
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populated by powers that have a direct impact on life in this world” (Wilson 58). While the
surrealists do not necessarily believe in the supernatural (indeed, they were almost universally
atheist), the entire movement is built around the belief in the power of the unconscious. And
while the unconscious is invisible to those living fully awake, so to speak, in the everyday
world—dominated, theoretically at least, by rationality–the surrealists believed that it
nevertheless exerts a powerful influence on our lives, pushing us towards the objects of our
desire. In the first Manifeste Breton describes the essential force behind surrealism as a “rayon
invisible,” acting upon the world in ways which are not immediately apparent (Breton OC I :
346). Thus, in a manner of speaking, the unconscious plays the role in surrealism that the
supernatural plays in apocalyptic religion.
Another of Wilson’s criteria underscores the profound dissatisfaction that apocalyptic
religious groups feel with the current state of the world: “Members of apocalyptic religious
groups experience a sharp disjuncture between the role they feel they are to play in the cosmos
and daily life as they actually experience it. Their view of their self-identity is at odds with their
actual lives in the world” (Wilson 58). The most obvious way in which surrealists experienced
disjuncture in the world was in the seemingly insurmountable dominance of capitalist rationalism
and conservative politics. Despite fancying themselves revolutionary vanguard of a new political
and intellectual order, it was difficult for them to ignore their inability to influence meaningfully
the politics of their time. As Mark Mazower observes, in the interwar period, political prospects
for partisans of the Left were particularly abysmal in the western European democracies: “With
the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, one government after another moved rightwards. The
trend seemed inexorable. […] By the 1930s, parliaments seemed to be going the way of kings.
The Left had been vanquished or forced onto the defensive nearly everywhere west of the Soviet
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Union, and all the key political debates were taking place on the Right” (4). Whenever the Left
did manage to gain political power (as it did in France from 1936-38 with the Front populaire),
they inevitably disappointed the surrealists with compromise and inaction. As we will see, this
led many surrealists to adopt a position of political pessimism.
Wilson’s next trait of apocalyptic religions emphasizes the importance of working as a
group. Apocalyptic religion is typically not a solipsistic phenomenon; it can only thrive within a
certain kind of social dynamic. As Wilson explains: “Practitioners of apocalyptic religion think
of themselves as a group that has been specially selected by God to play a key role in the running
of the world. Apocalyptic religion is therefore not in the first instance a matter of individual
belief but a group phenomenon which requires the social support of the group in order to
flourish” (Wilson 58). Of course, the surrealists did not believe that they were chosen by God.
Yet the movement organized around Breton was indeed conceived as a group effort from its
inception. Breton also exerted an obsessive amount of control over which “chosen ones” the
official group recruited, and which members were allowed to remain. Even in the work of those
who lost faith in Breton’s surrealist revolution and left his group, apocalypticism remained a
common thread, and there remained a need to belong to a group working toward a greater cause.
Bataille, for example, who had always operated outside of Breton’s core surrealist group,
organized a secret society connected to his journal Acéphale, the title of which derived from the
Greek for headless, which emphasized the group’s desire to subvert reason. This journal served
as the public mouthpiece for his otherwise very private group, which participated in quasireligious rituals. Therefore, the social dynamic seems to have been an essential component of
many of the surrealists’ activities, regardless of the particular camp in which they found
themselves.
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Wilson’s fourth characteristic of apocalyptic religion focuses, finally, on the call to
collective action. Members of an apocalyptic group usually organize not only because they share
a set of beliefs, but because they also have a shared mission to carry out:
[T]he group believes that the world it experiences is not the real world or that
there will soon be a reversal of the group’s fortunes, either in this world or in
some supra-historical world to come. This belief is usually expressed in the form
of some sort of programme designed to explain how the great reversal is to take
place. It is a peculiar feature of such apocalyptic programmes that they cannot be
discovered through the exercise of the intellect. […] The notion that some action
is required on the part of the group seems to be important in maintaining group
cohesion, for it allows the group to do something constructive while awaiting the
end, which is often notoriously slow in coming. (Wilson 58-9)
From the very beginning of his Premier manifeste du surréalisme, Breton makes it clear that the
“real” world is not what interests him: “Tant va la croyance à la vie, à ce que la vie a de plus
précaire, la vie réelle s’entend, qu’à la fin cette croyance se perd” (OC I : 311; Breton’s
emphasis). Breton’s apocalyptic program (if we can call it such) is to bring about a so-called
surrealist revolution which would allow for a synthesis of the unconscious and the “real” world:
“Je crois à la résolution future de ces deux états, en apparence si contradictoires, que sont le rêve
et la réalité, en une sorte de réalité absolue, de surréalité” (OC I : 319; Breton’s emphasis). The
surrealists, like many apocalyptic believers, felt that their visions of humanity’s future, posthistorical condition imparted a responsibility to share their message and to do their part to bring
humanity closer to its future state.
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While the drive to act did help somewhat to focus the activities of the surrealist
movement, it also divided the group based on the different shapes that members felt that action
should take. The main source of debate was what role (if any) the surrealist movement should
play within the greater communist movement. Some, like Naville, argued that without
coordinating with the Third International (also known as the Communist International or
Commintern), the surrealists’ revolutionary activities would be wasted effort. Others, like
Artaud, argued that the hierarchical, regimented order of Soviet-style communism was precisely
the kind of restrictive social structure that surrealism was meant to oppose. Given the similarities
we have already established between surrealism and apocalyptic religion, the debate recalls
Bromley’s distinction between priestly (institutional) and prophetic (typically anti-intuitional)
religion, which we explored in our first chapter. Although Breton formally joined the Parti
communiste français in 1927 and urged others to do the same, several (former) surrealists
continued to oppose the communist party for many of the same reasons they opposed the clergy.
Comparisons between communist parties and the church are, of course, far from novel. A
common refrain from those skeptical about communism is that it constitutes a “secular religion.”
Interestingly, however, drawing connections between communist and religious social structures
was not the unique domain of communism’s critics. Kenneth Burke, a contemporary of the
surrealists who was largely skeptical of their movement, compares communism to religion
favorably in his 1934 essay “My Approach to Communism.”14 As he explains: “[Communism’s]
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For more on Burke’s attitude toward surrealism, see his criticisms of the movement in his

1942 essay “War and Cultural Life” and his contribution to the volume Surrealism Pro and Con
(1973).
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humane emphasis allies it to the religious rationalization in one notable particular: it is a doctrine
aimed at the regularizing of human coöperation on the basis of the productive and distributive
problems brought about by science and commerce since the close of feudalism” (Burke 20).
Burke hopes that communism will be able to recreate certain aspects of the social structures of
medieval Europe, when the church was able to use its institutional power to provide for the needs
of the entire community:
Though aware that the word ‘mediaevalism’ is in disrepute at present […] I
should suggest that Communism aims at a kind of ‘industrial mediaevalism.’ […]
[A]s I understand the Marxian references to a ‘new equilibrium,’ they have to do
with the stabilizing effects that should follow from an adequate system of
communal ownership, such as seems to have prevailed partially during the middle
ages for the period when the church properties were available for the service of
the congregation as a whole [.] (Burke 20)
For Burke, one of the chief advantages of a communist regime is the cultural stability that
accompanies it. He asserts that artists create their best work when operating within a clear and
unwavering aesthetic framework: “The language of art thrives best when there is a maximum of
stability in our ways of livelihood and in the nature of our expectations. […] Under a stable
environment, a corresponding stability of moral and esthetic values can arise and permeate the
group—and it is this ‘superstructure’ of values which the artist draws upon in constructing an
effective work of art” (Burke 20). While Burke’s perspective does not necessarily represent the
mainstream of communist doctrine at the time, his remarks do lend credence to those in the
1930s who saw parallels between communist and religious thought. Moreover, Burke’s
expressed desire for stable aesthetic standards is also in line with the Third International’s
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position, which issued increasingly stringent guidelines for artists to follow in order to remain
consistent with the prescribed aesthetic of socialist realism. Needless to say, this emphasis on
aesthetic stability was anathema to the avant-garde sensibilities of many surrealists.
After his embrace of communism, many of Breton’s critics (including several of his
former collaborators) argued that his style of leadership was closer to that of a pope than that of a
true revolutionary. In his highly critical article on Breton, “Papologie d’André Breton” (which
appeared in the 1930 anti-Breton pamphlet Un Cadavre) Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes accuses
the so-called pope of surrealism of despicable behavior (namely the defamation of his former
friends and collaborators) undertaken with the cynical ambition of gaining power by ingratiating
himself with members of the communist movement:
Les révélations touchant par exemple Naville ou Masson ont le caractère des
chantages quotidiens exercés par les journaux vendus à la police. La méthode et le
ton sont absolument les mêmes. Pour les autres appréciations sur d'anciens amis,
chers parce que l‘inspecteur Breton espérait qu'ignorant sa qualité ils le
nommeraient président d’un Soviet local des Grands Hommes, elles ne dépassent
pas les ignominies ordinaires des habitués de commissariat, ni les coups de pied
en vache. (Ribemont-Dessaignes 124)
In addition to its connection with police, Ribemont-Dessaignes’ reference to commissariats also
draws a parallel between the clergy and the Soviet government, since a commissariat is an
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administrative entity in both the Soviet Union and the Roman Catholic Church.15 The
Commissariat de Terre Sainte, for example, is operated by the Franciscan order. This association
reinforced by the fact that Ribemont-Dessaignes repeatedly addresses Breton as “frère,” as one
would address a Franciscan friar, but not “père” or “Saint-Père,” as one would address a priest or
pope.
In truth, however, the satirical illustration that appeared next to Ribemont-Dessaignes’
article served as an even more cutting critique:

Fig. 12. First page of the Pamphlet Un Cadavre. 1930.
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Ribemont-Dessaignes is no stranger to apocalyptic themes himself. See, for example, his 1929

poem “La Faim du monde.”
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Breton is mockingly depicted as a Christ-like martyr, topped with a bloody crown of thorns. The
image is captioned with a quote from Breton’s first Manifeste, with the added label of “Autoprophétie” :
Ce monde dans lequel je subis ce que je subis (n'y allez pas voir), ce monde
moderne, enfin, diable! que voulez-vous que j’y fasse ? La voix surréaliste se taira
peut-être, je n’en suis plus à compter mes disparitions. Je n’entrerai plus, si peu
que ce soit, dans le décompte merveilleux de mes années et de mes jours. Je serai
comme Nijinsky, qu'on conduisit l’an dernier aux Ballets russes et qui ne comprit
pas à quel spectacle il assistait. (Breton OC I : 345)
The pairing of this quote with the Christian imagery in the accompanying, doctored photograph
mocks the status of martyr which Breton seems to claim for himself (“Ce monde dans lequel je
subis ce que je subis”). Further, the added descriptor of “auto-phophétie” serves to deride Breton
as a prophet who has suffered the effects of his own self-fulfilling prophecy. In the quoted
passage from the first Manifeste, Breton predicts that when and if the “surrealist voice” leaves
him, he would be rendered as unaware of his surroundings as the famous dancer Vaslav
Nijinsky, who suffered from debilitating schizophrenia. The contributors to Un Cadavre
obviously felt that Breton had already reached that point by 1930. Breton’s supposed
cluelessness is further highlighted by the choice of a photo in which his eyes are closed. While
the pamphlet mocks Breton by calling him both pope and prophet, the latter is the more accurate
label. Although Breton would no doubt resent the comparison, his consistently anti-institutional
stance place him closer to the biblical Jesus—an anti-clerical, apocalyptic prophet—than the
holder of an ecclesiastical office, such as the pope.
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In our first chapter we explored how Breton’s manifestoes can be read as apocalyptic
revelations. Here it is worth considering the ways in which Breton, like many prophets, acted as
a charismatic leader. According to Lorne Dawson, charismatic leadership is an important
element of many apocalyptic religions: “Throughout history the relevance of apocalyptic lore to
this world has been tied to the appearance of such a religious leader with charismatic authority”
(152). Many have commented on Breton’s charisma, and some critics have also explicitly
referred to Breton as a charismatic leader. Pascal Durand, for example, highlights how Breton
acted as a charismatic leader while imposing authoritarian measures within his group (notably
his “excommunications” of other members) to preserve his vision of surrealism:
A mesure que se déploie le procès d’émergence du surréalisme, son unité
émotionnelle se précarise, se lézarde ; la fiction égalitaire, se trouve démentie par
des manœuvres de pouvoir dévoilant d’insoupçonnés rapports de forces. Breton
adhère alors à son statut de leader charismatique, point focal du groupe,
mainteneur, contre vents et marées contraires, de sa cohésion et ses exigences. Au
mythe qui n’était rien d’autre, en somme, que l’expression de l’immobilité
fascinée du groupe devant son image inventée, se substituent des mesures
autoritaires d’‘excommunication’. (Durand 46)
As we have seen, Breton’s infamous excommunications of other surrealists (including none less
than the co-founder of the movement, Philippe Soupault) have led many, including his
contemporaries, to derisively name him the pope of surrealism. Durand is correct, however, to
see that his role within the group was that of a charismatic leader, even if he does not further
explore the significance of this role. While a pope derives authority from tradition and from the
institutional infrastructure of the church, charismatic leaders maintain their position of authority
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by virtue of their abilities alone. Dawson claims that charismatic authority, unlike other forms of
authority (namely traditional and rational-legal authority), derives its legitimacy by operating
outside of societal institutions: “A crucial feature of charismatic leadership is that it is noninstitutional or even anti-institutional” (154). Just as charismatic religious leaders maintain their
status thanks to their followers’ belief in their supernatural ability to channel the divine, Breton
was able to dominate his surrealist group thanks to the members’ admiration of his prowess as a
poet, aesthete and oracle. It goes without saying that Breton had no legal authority to determine
who was and was not a surrealist; he was only able to carry out his excommunications with the
implicit consent of the other members who chose to stay by his side. It is not surprising, then,
that Breton’s involvement with the PCF was relatively short-lived. The institutional nature of the
party was anathema to the charismatic influence he was able to wield within his relatively closeknit circle.
Nevertheless, communism was initially attractive to the surrealist group because it
promised a means to convert the members’ desire for revolutionary change into action. As we
have seen, Wilson argues that such a plan of action is often vital for preserving the integrity of an
apocalyptic group. Without some means of impacting the outside world, surrealism risked
sinking into solipsistic isolation. For this reason, despite their resolutely non-conformist attitude,
the surrealists did sometimes take measures to ensure that their message would reach outsiders.
As Kristen Strom explains, while the surrealists prided themselves on their radical views and
flaunted literary and artistic convention, the cover designs of their periodical, La Révolution
surréaliste were actually relatively conservative. Strom asserts that the conventional formatting
of such unconventional content was motivated by a desire to reach a wider audience:
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While the surrealist journal may indeed be relatively uninteresting from an
aesthetic point of view, I would maintain that its significance lies in potential
insights into surrealist strategies for producing or infiltrating culture. Indeed, the
apparent conservatism of the journal’s cover would make an unsuspecting viewer
less likely to categorically dismiss the journal on the basis of visual incoherence. I
would contend, therefore, that the surrealists may have used design as a tool to
strategically position themselves in order to more effectively participate in and
diversify cultural discourse. (Strom 43)
The ability of the surrealists’ journal to shock the sensibilities of the reader would have been
compromised if they could not convince anyone to open the cover, just as their revolutionary
ambitions would have been fruitless if they had insisted on shouting into the void rather than
forming coalitions.
Breton was careful, however, to avoid courting too much attention from the outside
world. In his extremely controversial Second manifeste, Breton demonstrates a keen desire to
avoid external influence upon the direction of the movement. This leads him to demand that the
public be shut out at all costs:
L’approbation du public est à fuir par-dessus tout. Il faut absolument empêcher le
public d’entrer si l’on veut éviter la confusion. J’ajoute qu’il faut le tenir exaspéré
à la porte par un système de défis et de provocations.
JE DEMANDE L’OCCULTATION PROFONDE, VÉRITABLE DU
SURRÉALISME.
Je proclame, en cette matière, le droit à l’absolue sévérité. Pas de concessions au
monde et pas de grâce. (OC I : 821-2)
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This seemingly paranoid impulse to close surrealism off from the public might seem paradoxical
when compared with earlier efforts to reach a wider audience. However, this kind of vacillation
is typical of charismatic leadership. As Dawson explains: “Charismatic leaders are caught on the
horns of a dilemma. They may wish to exercise ever greater control over an ever greater number
of individuals and projects, but their continued charisma hinges on maintaining a delicate
balance between exposure and secrecy” (155). Breton (and the surrealist movement as a whole)
needed to walk a fine line: if surrealism became either too obscure or too mainstream, it risked
losing its specificity and its influence. This tension between openness and “occultation” within
the surrealist movement came to a head during two key episodes, both involving the movement’s
relationship with communism: the so-called Naville crisis, in which several members left
Breton’s group due to their reservations about joining the Communist Party, and the Aragon
affair, after which Aragon felt he could no longer remain because of his commitment to
communism. Taking a closer look at these events will give us a better understanding of the
nuances of surrealism’s political situation as well as the impact politics had on how the
movement operated as a kind of apocalyptic group.

The Naville Crisis and the “Organization of Pessimism”

In 1926, Naville published an essay titled “La Révolution et les intellectuels : Que
peuvent faire les surréalistes.” In the essay, Naville encourages the surrealists to abandon their
vaguely anarchist stance and to commit firmly to Marxism, and more specifically, to the Third
International. He further expresses concern for what he perceived as a contradiction between
surrealism’s ambition, which was ostensibly to effect radical social change, and its praxis, which
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involved turning the mind’s eye further inward toward the unconscious, with little connection to
the real social conditions of the outside world. Naville argues that, if the surrealists truly want to
bring about their envisioned revolution, they must, first and foremost, support the revolution of
the proletariat by committing themselves to collective action over individual psychology.
According to Naville, the surrealist goal of demolishing bourgeois culture would only be
possible after overthrowing the bourgeoisie itself. Naville’s essay was enormously influential for
the surrealist movement, and the debate it sparked on the role of politics provoked the departure
from the movement of several members who were not interested in joining the Communist Party,
including Antonin Artaud and Philippe Soupault. Nevertheless, Breton and several other notable
surrealists, including Aragon, Péret and Éluard, did follow Naville’s advice by joining the PCF
in 1927.
That same year, Naville published another influential essay titled “Mieux et moins bien,”
in which he develops his philosophy of revolutionary pessimism. He asserts that revolutionary
intellectuals must commit to the cause of Marxism, while maintaining a rigorously pessimistic
outlook: “Notre victoire n’est pas venue et ne viendra jamais. Nous subissons d’avance cette
peine” (Révolution 56-7). Among the essay’s closing lines, we find the following grim
pronouncements: “Les germes monstrueux d’une époque future étouffent les larves du passé.
Pour la première fois quelques âmes n’ont pas été vendues au Diable, car nous lui en avons
gracieusement fait cadeau. Pessimiste ? Qu’importe. Partout où l’homme a passé pousse le blé,
mais partout où le blé pousse passe la faux, etc. ” (Révolution 62). Naville’s choice of words is
significant. The iconographic connections with “la faux” (or scythe) rather than “la faucille” (or
sickle), clearly designates the triumph of death, rather than communism. This pessimistic outlook
toward the movement’s political possibilities serves as another parallel between surrealism and
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apocalyptic religion. Biblical scholar Paul Hanson argues that political pessimism is at the root
of the Judeo-Christian apocalyptic tradition:
Apocalyptic we define as the disclosure (usually esoteric in nature) to the elect of
the prophetic vision of Yahweh's sovereignty (including his future dealings with
his people, the inner secrets of the cosmos, etc.) which vision the visionaries have
ceased to translate into the terms of plain history, real politics and human
instrumentality because of a pessimistic view of reality growing out of the bleak
post-Exilic conditions in which the visionary group found itself, conditions
seeming unsuitable to them as a context for the envisioned restoration of
Yahweh’s people. (35)
According to Hanson, many post-exilic Jews could not see a realistic path forward to the
conditions that were promised by prophecy. As Wilson would put it, they experienced a
disjuncture between the role that they were meant to play and the life that they actually led. In
their pessimism, they interpreted their prophecies in ways that were less and less moored to the
conditions of the real world. The prophecy would only be fulfilled by supernatural means.
Similarly, the interwar surrealists adopted a largely pessimistic stance toward the politics of their
era, imagining a future where it would be possible to escape the disappointing limitations of
reality. Of course, as we saw in our first chapter, just as the post-exilic apocalyptic believers
could not see a real, political path to their destined future, Breton’s group had no concrete path
forward to their envisioned, surrealist revolution.
Although they might be pessimistic toward their political options, as Wilson highlights in
his criteria, apocalyptic believers tend to feel an obligation to act as a group to prepare the terrain
for the supernatural reversal to come. By the same token, Naville argues that surrealism’s
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pessimism must be organized and put to work in anticipation of some undefined, future call to
action. As he explains:
Il faut organiser le pessimisme ; ou plutôt, puisqu’il ne s’agit que d’obtempérer à
un appel, il faut le laisser s’organiser dans la direction du prochain appel. Mais
pour quelle poursuite il faut l’organiser maintenant, c’est une question qui ne se
posera que plus tard, et encore ne se posera-t-elle que pour ceux qui nous auront
suivi jusque’là, c’est-à-dire pour quelques rares personnes subissant des tentations
toujours diverses. (Révolution 50-1)
Naville does not fail to recognize the apparent absurdity of this corollary to his earlier call to
action, since most would naturally associate pessimism with discouragement rather than a
motivation to collaborate. Nevertheless, he insists upon the importance of a pessimistic outlook :
“L’organisation du pessimisme est vraiment un des ‘mots d’ordre’ les plus étranges auquel
puisse obéir un homme conscient. C’est cependant celui que nous réclamons de lui voir suivre”
(Révolution 49). Naville hastens to distinguish between useful pessimism and outright abandon,
the latter of which is counter-productive for the revolution.
According to Naville, pessimism, in the proper sense, can be of great service to the
revolution, because it guards against the passivity that results from an over-zealous belief in the
inevitability of success. Indeed, Naville’s essay repeatedly criticizes Pierre Drieu la Rochelle
(who would later reveal himself to be a fascist) primarily because of his optimism: “Son
optimisme lui permet encore de s’en remettre à l’insouciance” (Révolution 47). Vehemently
opposing the naïveté of humanistic optimism, Naville describes his pessimism as a kind of
eternal vigilance necessitated by a fundamental mistrust of others. As he explains : “Nous
parlons des raisons que peut se donner tout homme conscient de ne pas se confier, surtout
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moralement, à ses contemporains, de ne pas attendre la lumière de leur obscurité naturelle”
(Révolution 38-9). In this view, pessimist revolutionaries are always ready to act, because they
cannot rely on others to do what is necessary.
While Naville’s theories of revolutionary pessimism are rarely mentioned today,
contemporary critics have made similar arguments about the perils of an optimistic over-reliance
on the ostensible inevitability of capitalism’s demise. As Axel Honneth explains:
The assumption of a revolutionary subject longing to realize the ideals of
socialism in capitalism is nearly always accompanied by the historicophilosophical assumption that capitalist relations will necessarily dissolve in the
near future. The problem with this premise […] was not that it spurred on
investigations into the self-destructive forces of capitalism, but that its conception
of a clear developmental process abrogated any experimental treatment of
historical processes and potentials. (Honneth 42)
The certainty with which early socialists implemented their interpretations of Marxist theory
foreclosed certain possibilities for revolutionary intervention. Impersonal theorizing on the
machinations of history—and especially its ostensibly ineluctable conclusion—risked
disconnecting the socialists of the period from the day-to-day realities of social transformation.
Indeed, Honneth claims that the Marxist notion of revolutionary determinism provoked serious
theoretical and motivational difficulties for the historical left:
The problem with this determinist conception of historical progress is not only
that it encouraged a kind of political complacency [Attentismus] soon to become a
matter of major discussion within the movement; rather, many of the early
twentieth-century debates between social democrats and communists over how to
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interpret Marx’s claims about the inevitability of historical progress and about
whether this notion should be replaced with an ethic of transformational action
bear witness to the confusion caused by the historical-philosophical determinism
of socialist pioneers. (Honneth 46)
This early-twentieth-century debate on revolutionary inevitability is precisely the arena into
which Naville steps when he argues for the utility of pessimism instead.
Though Naville defends the usefulness of revolutionary pessimism, he also presents it as
a defense against the evils of compromise : “ce même pessimisme permettra la recherche de
moyens extrêmes pour échapper aux nullités et aux déconvenues d’une époque de compromis,
comme le sont presque toutes les époques” (39). Indeed, the surrealists prided themselves on
their absolute refusal of compromise. In his 1932 book, Les Vases communicants, Breton asserts
that his ambitions for the revolution would not be constrained by political reality. For him, the
revolution must strive to reach nothing less than the eternal destiny of all humankind, and he
would accept no substitutes : “Toute autre manière d’en juger, de quelque prétendu souci des
réalités politiques qu’elle se targue, me semble fausse, paralysante et, du strict point de vue
révolutionnaire, défaitiste” (OC II : 202-3). While this uncompromising vision of revolution
might seem unattainable, it is important to note that Breton made a habit of striving for the
unreasonable. Indeed, as Anna Balakian notes, Breton celebrates the notion of failure, as long as
it comes from attempting the impossible: “failure is—and always will be—for Breton an element
of exaltation. Failure simply means that the goal is unrealizable. […] [I]f the goal were
attainable, it would not be acceptable” (Magus71). In this sense, the surrealists’ pessimistic
declarations of their inevitable failure express a desire for their reach to always exceed their
grasp.
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Although Naville did eventually succeed in bringing several key members of the
movement to the Marxist cause, the relationship between surrealism and the communist party
was at best uneasy, especially in the early years, when they traded barbs with other far-left
publications. In 1925, the surrealists improved their rapport with the editors of the communist
periodical Clarté, brought together initially by their shared disgust at France’s actions in the
Moroccan war. Nevertheless, the surrealists refused to formally combine efforts with Clarté in
the proposed review La Guerre civile, preferring instead to continue publishing their own journal
La Révolution surréaliste. Frustrated with surrealism, Naville left Breton’s group to join the
editorial staff of Clarté. Naville asserted that surrealism could not reconcile the two incompatible
attitudes it tried to maintain simultaneously. He claimed that one of the forces in the surrealist
movement was a so-called “metaphysical attitude,” which Naville described as a “spéculation
théorique sur les données de l’expérience interne et d’une certaine expérience des objets et
événements extérieurs” (Révolution 104). This perspective held that the liberation of the mind
must precede any political revolution. The metaphysical attitude is juxtaposed to a “dialectical
attitude,” which he claimed was concerned with the “progression de l’esprit calquée sur le
sentiment qu’il a de lui-même” (Révolution 104). This latter perspective would suggest, on the
contrary, that there can be no hope of true liberation for the mind until a political revolution takes
place.
Naville presented the potential for surrealist activism as a dichotomy between active
political engagement and detached artistic experimentation. If this assessment were correct, it
would seriously undermine the surrealists’ conception of their own project, limiting it to either a
mere artistic movement or another cog in the communist political machine. This bifurcation
would be devastating for a movement that was as opposed to artistic and literary establishment as
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it was to traditional party politics. Breton struggled to hold onto all of surrealism’s contradictory
parts. Ironically, it was this attempt to keep the movement intact that ultimately broke it apart. As
Robert Short notes: “Breton’s efforts to make Surrealism an effective revolutionary force while
maintaining its independence by steering a course between the Scylla of assimilation into the art
world and the Charybdis of absorption by the communist party, caused casualties on the left of
the group as well as on the right” (15). As the communist movement fractured, Breton turned
away from the Stalinism of the PCF and embraced Trotskyism, as did Naville, despite his earlier
enthusiasm for the party. The surrealist fascination with Trotsky eventually culminated in
Breton’s visiting him in Mexico where the two co-authored the 1938 manifesto Pour un art
révolutionnaire indépendent, which argued that individual artistic freedom was compatible with
(and indispensable to) the goals of the revolution:
[P]our la création intellectuelle [la révolution] doit dès le début même établir et
assurer un régime anarchiste de liberté individuelle. […] [L]’artiste ne peut servir
la lutte émancipatrice que s’il s’est pénétré subjectivement de son contenu social
et individuel, que s’il en a fait passer le sens et le drame dans ses nerfs et que s’il
cherche librement à donner une incarnation artistique à son monde intérieur.
(Breton OC I: 687-8)
Thus, while Naville had urged the surrealists to leave behind their anarchistic tendencies and
their focus on individual psychology, Breton eventually reaffirmed the importance of both. He
did not, however, leave behind pessimism altogether. Löwy claims that Breton’s pessimism is at
least partially responsible for his admiration of Trotsky: “c’est le pessimisme de Breton qui l’a
attiré vers Trotski, qu’il considérait comme un personage exceptionnel, voué à un destin injuste
par un rassemblement d’individus lâches et médiocres” (65). Indeed, while Trotsky did espouse a
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certain revolutionary optimism, it is easy to see why his theories were more attractive than
Stalin’s for pessimistic thinkers. The core Trotskyist principle of permanent revolution, for
example, was based on his pessimism about the ability of individual socialist states to resist
pressure from global capitalism. Although Naville intended to harnass the surrealists’ pessimistic
outlook for the Third International, their pessimism would ultimately be turned against it.

The Apocalyptic Scatology of Benjamin Péret

Péret was as committed as any of the surrealists to the goal of staging the material
revolution. He was jailed several times for his political activism and fought on the side of the
republicans in the Spanish Civil War. In spite of his revolutionary fervor, his work is frequently
bleak in tone. Beginning with his earliest, proto-surrealist work, Péret’s poetry often meditates
on the theme of apocalyptic destruction. The poem “Chaufferie mélancolique” (1921), for
example, evokes the revelation of an imminent catastrophe:
Je rêve à toutes les étoiles
et elles en font autant
Il n’y a pas de temps à perdre
tout cela va éclater
Nous sommes perdus
nous sommes perclus
Soupirer ou regarder
pas du tout je ne rêve plus et je m’en vais
Nous ne sommes pas perdus (Péret OC I : 21)
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While the poem does conclude with a reversal of its earlier alarmism, it is not without a cost. The
speaker of the poem is only able to find calm by leaving the dreaming state: “je ne rêve plus et je
m’en vais.” When compared with the speaker’s earlier ability to commune with the entire
cosmos through dreams, the poem’s matter-of-fact conclusion seems to suggest that the speaker
has found reassurance at the cost of abandoning imagination. Thus for Péret, contemplation of
future doom seems to be linked with creative fecundity.
A key way in which Péret explores this theme of fatality over the years is through
depictions of post-apocalyptic landscapes, often featuring iconic monuments in ruins. Consider,
for example, this excerpt from his Immortelle maladie (1924) :
Montrez-moi le savant amoureux de la femme-cyclope
que j’en fasse mon égal
Après pourra venir l’ère des fleurs galantes
des squelettes patriotiques
et des catastrophes sans importance
je m’en fous
J’irai près des pyramides
qui ne sont que des colliers de martyrs
destinés à disparaître avec leurs propriétaires
et le souvenir de leurs ridicules
et je danserai devant ces fameuses pyramides
jusqu’à ce qu’elles disparaissent (OC I : 39)
The poem suggests that the ultimate destiny of human civilization is to deteriorate and disappear.
The speaker does not seem dismayed by this eventuality, claiming to be indifferent to the future
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catastrophes, which are ultimately “sans importance.” If anything, the poem connects the idea of
civilization’s ephemerality with joy, since the speaker imagines dancing before the ruins of the
millennia-old monuments.
Péret develops this idea even more explicitly in his later work. Notably, in his piece “La
Nature dévore le progrès et le dépasse” (1937), Péret presents his vision of nature as an
unrelenting force that humans can only temporarily keep at bay. He cites the example of
telegraph lines stretching through forests, which are inevitably overgrown and disrupted,
silencing the human voices that dared to force their way into nature’s domain:
[L’]homme est par-là. Il a percé un corridor dans la verdure et, tout au long de ce
corridor, a déroulé un fil télégraphique. Mais, vite, la forêt s’est lassée de pincer
cette corde qui ne rendait jamais qu’une voix d’homme et les plantes, mille
plantes plus zélées, plus ardentes les unes que les autres se sont empressées
d’étouffer cette voix sous leur baiser ; puis le silence est retombé sur la forêt
comme un parachute sauveur. […] Au loin de lents gratte-ciels d’arbres
s’édifieront pour signifier un défi impossible à relever. (OC VII : 39)
The piece closes with this image of trees on the horizon rising as skyscrapers in defiance of
humanity, reinforcing the idea that nature will eventually erase and eclipse the accomplishments
of human civilization. In his later piece, “Ruines : Ruine des ruines” (1939), Péret ties the
inevitability of civilization’s collapse to his view of history. Each stage of history destroys its
predecessor, just as it must one day be destroyed to make way for the succeeding stage. Péret
imagines how modern Europe will one day be destroyed, leaving its monuments in ruins, and
allowing its cities to return to nature:
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Le Versailles de la décrépitude féodale s’aplatit et rentre dans la terre d’où il
n’aurait jamais dû sortir, pour dégager l’horizon ponctué de donjons d’où l’amour
s’évadait par tous les mâchicoulis. Le monde, qui allait alors naître et a jeté
Versailles à la fosse commune, va bientôt disparaître à son tour. Quelles ruines
laissera-t-il à l’exaltation des poètes d’une autre ère ? Ni les églises qui n’ont
survécu au passé que comme complément des prisons, ni les banques sans
lesquelles les deux premières n’auraient pas subsisté ; mais peut-être retrouvera-ton un jour, alors que son souvenir sera effacé dans la mémoire des hommes, le
gigantesque fossile d’un animal unique, la tour Eiffel. Peut-être quelque grande
gare depuis longtemps désertée verra-t-elle ses rails recouverts de boutons d’or et
les lièvres, négligeant les terriers, y chercher un refuge dans un guichet abandonné
[.] (OC VII : 43)
Once again, the destruction of civilization is characterized by the natural beauty that it will
unleash. Today’s bustling train stations will become the tranquil homes of flowers and wildlife.
While the above excerpts from Péret perhaps typify what Naville celebrated as his
“grande verve apocalyptique,” they only illustrate Péret’s apocalyptic outlook toward humanity
in general. Much of his other poetry singles out the specific people and institutions that he holds
responsible for his negative outlook. His most politically incendiary poetry can be found in the
1936 collection he published shortly before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, Je ne mange
pas de ce pain-là. In this collection, he utilizes violent and sometimes scatological imagery to
convey his unbridled hatred for conservatism. Indeed, many of this collection’s poems are
comparable in tone and subject matter to Aragon’s “Front rouge.” In Péret’s “Macia désossé,”
for example, Péret addresses conservative Spaniards with violent, anti-clerical sadism: “Mais la
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Catalogne qui rôtit / les curés et les nones / après les avoir mariés /[…] / fera / des notes de
musique avec tes os / […] / et de tes couilles / un attrape-mouches perfectionné” (OC I: 274).
The image of Catalonia one day playing music with the bones of conservatives once again
evokes the association between the contemplation of future destruction and the flourishing of
creativity.
The collection ends, however, on a much more pessimistic (if no less hateful) note. The
final poem of Péret’s collection is “6 décembre,” which alludes to the debates that took place on
that date in the Chambre des députés on how best to disarm and dissolve paramilitary groups. In
“6 décembre” Péret uses the same revolting imagery found elsewhere in the collection. He
describes the Chambres des députés, for example, as teeming with maggots. But in this final
poem, he targets not only the conservatives, but also the leaders of the left, notably Léon Blum,
leader of the socialists, and Maurice Thorez, leader of the communists. In the poem’s last stanza,
Péret expresses his disillusionment with these leaders:
Et Blum se leva pour le baiser pourri sur la bouche pourrie
bousculé par Thorez pressé de l’imiter
cependant que dehors ceux qui les entretiennent se lamentaient
Encore une fois nous sommes trahis (I: 283)
As J. H. Matthews notes, in Péret’s poetry, “physical repugnance is linked with moral disgust”
(143). Blum and Thorez’s rotten kiss is emblematic of Péret’s contempt for their willingness to
indulge in the evils of compromise and reconciliation. Péret’s pessimism toward France’s leftist
government proved somewhat prophetic, since when the Spanish Civil War began later in 1936,
Blum’s Front Populaire hesitated and ultimately refused to aid the Spanish Republic, for fear that
the conflict might spill over into France.
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Not content to wait for the government to intervene, Péret traveled to Spain that year in
the hopes of joining the communist forces there, only to join the anarchist forces instead, due to
doctrinal differences. Nevertheless, despite his profound disaffection with many communist
institutions, Péret did not hesitate to heed the call when the moment for revolutionary action
arrived. His commitment to the revolutionary cause did nothing, however, to dampen his
characteristic political pessimism. Even in the aftermath of the liberation of France, Péret saw
only disaster on the horizon : “Ce qu’on a appelé la libération représente à peine le prologue de
la tragédie qui se prépare, où le surréalisme est destiné à jouer un rôle de premier plan” (Péret
OC VII : 213). For Péret, the war’s conclusion was no occasion to rest; a surrealist’s work is
never done, not until the end of the world itself.

Aragon, Before and After Communism

Among the surrealists who initially answered Naville’s call to action, none were as
enthusiastic as Aragon. After joining the PCF in 1927, he remained a member for the rest of his
life and served in the French Resistance during the Second World War. Aragon’s embrace of
communism is all the more remarkable when compared with his initially hostile stance toward
the Third International. Notably, he made his early skepticism about communism very clear
when, in 1925, he wrote to the communist periodical Clarté to defend his previous description of
the Soviet government as “Moscou la gâteuse”:
Il vous a plu de relever comme une incartade une phrase qui témoigne du peu de
goût que j’ai du gouvernement bolchévique et avec lui de tout le communisme…
Si vous me trouvez fermé à l’esprit politique et mieux, violemment hostile à cette
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déshonorante attitude pragmatique qui me permet d’accuser au moins de
modérantisme idéal ceux qui à la fin s’y résignent, c’est, vous n’en pouvez douter,
que j’ai toujours placé, que je place l’esprit de révolte bien au-delà de toute
politique… La révolution russe ? vous ne m’empêcherez pas de hausser les
épaules. A l’échelle des idées, c’est au plus une vague crise ministérielle. (qtd. in
Nadeau 101)
This was not a perspective that Aragon would hold for long, however. As Short notes: “Aragon
was soon writing with the conviction and facility of a lifelong Marxist. In articles such as ‘Le
Prolétariat de l’esprit’, he showed how capital could turn ideas themselves into commodities”
(8). This article appeared in Clarté only months after Aragon’s denouncement of communism
had appeared in the same journal. In spite of his initial reservations, Aragon clearly came to
share Naville’s belief that the only true revolution would be one rooted in Marxist theory, and
more specifically, one following the path set forward by the Third International.
In addition, Aragon’s 1926 book Le Paysan de Paris, contains some of the most potent
examples of the pessimism that Naville appreciated in the surrealist movement. The narrator of
Aragon’s Paysan de Paris wanders through the passages of Paris, plagued by apocalyptic visions
of the immanent destruction that the expansion of the Boulevard Haussmann would soon bring to
the neighborhood:
De ce carrefour sentimental, si je porte alternativement les yeux sur ce pays de
désordre et sur la grande galerie éclairée par mes instincts, à la vue de l’un ou
l’autre de ces trompe-l’œil, je n’éprouve pas le plus petit mouvement d’espoir. Je
sens frémir le sol et je me trouve soudain comme un marin à bord d’un château en
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ruine. Tout signifie un ravage. Tout se détruit sous ma contemplation. (Paysan
61-2)
This sentiment of hopelessness persists throughout the narrative. Notably, the narrator imagines
the future surrealist revolution as a doomed “bataille perdue d’avance” (OPC I: 190-1). The
narrator’s fascination with pessimism culminates in a lengthy contemplation of the word
“pessimisme” itself, which he finds inscribed on a blue accordion. The narrator plays the
accordion, observing the different forms of the word as the instrument expands and contracts:
Quand j’en rapproche les soufflets on ne voit plus que les consonnes :
PSSMSM
Je les écarte et voilà les I :
PSSIMISM
Les E :
PESSIMISME
Et ça gémit de gauche à droite :
ESSIMISME—PSSIMISME—PESIMISME
PESIMISME—PESSMISME—PESSIISME
PESSIMSME—PESSIMIME—PESSIMISE
PESSIMISM—PESSIMISME
PESSIMISME
(Paysan 62)
Aragon’s narrator not only dwells on his own pessimistic vision of the future, he examines the
very contours of pessimism itself, transforming this seemingly sterile concept into a source of
music. This celebration of pessimism was not appreciated by all, however. In Nadja, for
example, Breton relates his chance encounter with leftist thinker Fanny Beznos, who expressed
her distaste for the above scene in Aragon’s text: “Spontanément, elle nous parle même des
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surréalistes, et du Paysan de Paris de Louis Aragon qu’elle n’a pu lire jusqu’au bout, les
variations sur le mot Pessimisme l’ayant arrêtée. Dans tous ses propos passe une grande foi
révolutionnaire” (Nadja 64). Aragon’s glorification of pessimism seems to have been
incompatible with Beznos’ unshakable faith in the revolution.
Indeed, Aragon himself moved away from this pessimistic stance in later years as he
came to adopt the Stalinist aesthetic principles of the Third International, which were
characterized by an inflexibly optimistic attitude toward the future of the revolution. As Andrew
Sobanet observes: “He promoted the Soviet Union as a new dawn for all of humanity—with
Stalin as leader and guide” (209). As early as 1931, well before the official codification of
socialist realism, the influence of Stalinist optimism on Aragon’s work is evident in his
controversial poem “Front rouge.” Aragon no longer describes the revolution as a lost cause, but
rather as an unstoppable train rushing toward inevitable triumph:
Prolétaires de tous les pays unissez vos
voix appelez-les préparez-leur la
voie à ces libérateurs qui joindront aux vôtres
leurs armes Prolétaires de tous les pays
Voici la catastrophe apprivoisée
voici docile enfin la bondissante panthère
l’Histoire menée en laisse par la Troisième Internationale
Le train rouge s’ébranle et rien ne l’arrêtera (OPC I : 501)
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In this poem, Aragon still sees catastrophe on the horizon, but it has been tamed and made to
serve the interests of the revolution. History itself will be led by the leash by the Third
International.
The revolutionary optimism of “Front rouge” is typical of Aragon’s output after his split
with Breton’s group. Indeed, Anna Balakian claims that Aragon’s post-surrealist production is
characterized, above all, by hope:
With the post-surrealism of poets such as Aragon and Eluard French literature
may be nearing the twilight of the age of anxiety […] The surrealists, in the broad
sense of the word, are today the only artist group in whose work rings a clear note
of optimism. […] It is an optimism compatible with ‘voyance’, it is the point
beyond nihilism, which is perhaps the realization of the futility of nihilism. It is
the source of the vitality of post-surrealist poetry. (“Post-Surrealism” 102)
It must be noted, however, that Aragon’s ideological shift toward revolutionary optimism has
been interpreted very differently by commentators on surrealism, and many critics (especially
later ones) have not been as enthusiastic about it as Balakian. Some see Aragon’s evolution
toward Stalinism as a sign of intellectual dishonesty. Gérard Durozoi, for example, describes
Aragon as “le théoricien d’un ‘mentir-vrai’ qui joue de ses masques et multiplie les reflets,
comme pour échapper à la condamnation, plus morale encore que littéraire, que ne manquent pas
de prononcer à son égard les successives générations des surréalistes” (650). Roger Shattuck, on
the other hand, depicts Aragon more sympathetically, claiming he was grappling with “‘the
contradiction he carried within him’ –namely between dialectic materialism and surrealist
idealism” (“Love and Laughter” 18). Critics like Shattuck characterize Aragon’s motivations for
leaving surrealism as the result of a conflict between two contradictory, yet essentially surrealist
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ideological positions: a politically-oriented, Marxist, dialectical materialism and a less explicitly
political, Hegelian idealism. Early in the movement, while its ambitions were still nebulous
(defined more by what the members did not want the movement to be than by what it actually
was), it was easier for the surrealists to reconcile these different approaches. But as the
movement continued to evolve, the ideological contraditions became more difficult to ignore,
and Breton and Aragon ultimately found themselves on opposite ends of a divide.
In order to better understand the context of the poem, we must first discuss the
circumstances behind the so-called “Aragon affair,” in which “Front rouge” plays an integral
role. The scandal involved Aragon’s departure from Breton’s group in 1932 as a result of his
renewed commitment to the PCF following his return from a trip to the Soviet Union. In late
1930, Aragon traveled to Moscow with fellow surrealist Georges Sadoul. Aragon himself
remained evasive about the motivations behind his voyage, remarking simply: “On sait qu’à la
fin de 1930 Georges Sadoul et moi avons été en Russie. Nous avons été plus volontiers en Russie
qu’ailleurs, beaucoup plus volontiers, c’est tout ce que j’ai à dire des raisons de ce départ !” (qtd.
in Nadeau 202). In truth, his reasons for traveling to the Soviet Union were mostly personal.
Aragon’s romantic partner and future wife, Elsa Triolet, wanted to take him to see her sister in
Russia. Sadoul, who feared being imprisoned in France for sedition, asked Aragon to go and take
him along.
While in the Soviet Union, Sadoul and Aragon were invited to serve as French delegates
to the International Conference of Revolutionary Writers in Kharkov. During the proceedings of
the conference, the two authors were pressured by the other attendees into formally denouncing
key components of Bretonian surrealism, such as Freudianism and Trotskyism, and to retract
their support of the Second Manifeste du Surréalisme. Upon his return to Paris, Aragon

132

attempted to reassure Breton’s group of his continued commitment to their movement with texts
like “Aux intellectuels révolutionnaires.” However, it became increasingly clear to his surrealist
comrades that his commitment to the Third International was stronger. After he published the
violent poem “Front rouge” for Littérature de la Révolution mondiale in late 1931, Aragon was
charged with inciting murder. To demonstrate the supposedly seditious intent behind the poem,
the prosecution cited lines such as “Descendez les flics / Camarades / descendez les flics”
(Nadeau 287-288). Breton came to Aragon’s defense. While condemning the content of the
poem (to him, it was little more than propaganda), Breton defended Aragon’s rights as a poet to
express himself without fear of imprisonment. Yet Aragon, unable to accept Breton’s criticism of
the endorsed literature of the Third International, announced his formal withdrawal from
surrealism in L’Humanité in early 1932. Maurice Nadeau attributes Aragon’s commitment to
party communism to external pressures: “Aragon ne fait que suivre le courant qui porte de plus
en plus les intellectuels avancés de tous les pays vers l’U.R.S.S. ” (Nadeau 207). However, to
reduce Aragon’s communist sympathies to the influence of an intellectual trend is an overly
simplistic explanation. Upon closer examination it is clear that his political beliefs are not so
easily attributed to keeping up with the fashions of the time. The outcome of the Aragon affair
was the inevitable result of the gradual evolution of Aragon’s political, philosophical, and artistic
ideals, which eventually developed into a set of principles that put him at odds with Breton and
his followers.
One could argue that Aragon had always been more socially conscious than surrealists
like Breton. In “Passage de l’Opéra,” the first section of Le Paysan de Paris (published in 1926,
before he joined the PCF), Aragon describes the working class victims of the société
concessionaire des travaux du boulevard Haussmann, which offered meager compensation to the
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owners of the shops that would be demolished for the expansion of the boulevard. As Patrick
Feyler observes, the value of Paysan de Paris is as much journalistic as it is artistic:
Le Paysan de Paris se caractérise, dans l’évocation de deux quartiers de la
capitale, non seulement par la précision descriptive de nombreux passages mais
aussi par l’intention—au moins apparente—d’exploiter toute une documentation
historico-sociale. Aragon y paraît, plus d’une fois, vouloir se faire, tel les
Goncourt, ‘historien du présent’. (Feyler 199-200)
The apocalyptic backdrop of the book adds a sense of urgency to Aragon’s mission to document
the details of a unique piece of the urban landscape that would soon vanish forever. Aragon
records the struggles of the merchants of the Passage de l’Opéra, painting them in a sympathetic
light and describing “une effervescence légitime qui s’est emparée de tous les habitants de ce
lieu,” and exposes the corruption of a “justice borgne et lente” (Paysan 35). It is revealing to
compare the social dimension of the Paysan de Paris with Breton’s social commentary in Nadja
which reveals an equal level of disgust for the mechanisms of the capitalist economy but much
less sympathy for the individual, working-class victims of this system: “Ce n’est pas le martyre
qu’on subit qui crée cette liberté́ . Elle est [...] un désenchaînement perpétuel [...] Ces pas, les
supposez-vous capable de les faire ? En ont-ils le temps, seulement ? En ont-ils le cœur ? De
braves gens, disiez-vous, oui, braves comme ceux qui se sont fait tuer à la guerre, n’est-ce pas ?
[...] beaucoup de malheureux et quelques pauvres imbéciles” (Breton OC I : 687). Of course,
Aragon’s choice to support party communism over Bretonian surrealism was not only informed
by his social awareness; it was also the result of theoretical differences. Simon Watson Taylor
claims that some of Aragon’s disagreements with Breton were already evident in Le Paysan de
Paris. In particular, Taylor highlights how Aragon concludes his book with a rejection of
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Hegelianism (which was dear to Breton) in the final section titled “Le Songe du paysan” : “‘The
Peasant’s Dream’ may be seen as a ‘corrective’ to the preceding segment of the book... [it] not
only calls to a halt the idealism implicit in the first two parts of the book; it also represents the
opposite spirit of the automatism cherished by most of the early surrealists” (xi). Indeed, in his
memoir Je n’ai jamais appris à écrire, Aragon highlights how the conclusion of Paysan de Paris
marks his intellectual development:
C’est le roman de ce que je fus en ce temps-là. Où la description est réservée aux
lieux, et l’histoire est celle de l’évolution d’un esprit, à partir d’une conception
mythologique du monde, vers le matérialisme, qui ne sera point atteint aux
dernières pages du livre, mais seulement promis, dans la proclamation de l’échec
de la plus haute conception où l’homme avait pu s’avancer par la voie de
l’idéalisme, l’hégélianisme, l’idéalisme absolu. (Je n’ai jamais… 58-9)
In a way, Aragon’s Paysan de Paris could be interpreted as a kind of Bildungsroman for its
author. It follows his progression from the Hegelian idealism he espoused in his earlier works to
the beginnings of later infatuation with Marx’s dialectical materialism, which famously “stood
Hegel on his head” by emphasizing the material first and foremost. Like Bataille, Aragon
became disenchanted with Hegelianism’s lack of grounding in the material world. This reflection
means that the book can be seen as an apocalypse in several senses of the word: not only does it
presage the doom of a world that will be crushed by the evil of capitalism, it also offers the
revelation—however cryptic—of potential salvation through the embrace of a new, materialist
mythology.
Evidence of this intellectual evolution can be most easily seen in the strong focus on the
concrete over the abstract in “Le Songe du paysan.” In this portion of the book, Aragon explicitly

135

states his disdain for metaphysical idealism: “les idéalistes, je porte contre eux, l’esprit porte
contre eux” (Paysan 234). He also attempts to demonstrate that metaphysics and logic are
distinct entities: “la logique a pour objet la connaissance abstraite, et la métaphysique la
connaissance concrète” (Paysan 236). For this reason, he criticizes Hegel, dismissing his
Doctrine of Essence as “un intermédiaire inutile, qui lui permet de passer de la logique à la
métaphysique, alors qu’il les a primitivement mêlées. Il suffisait de maintenir leurs
individualités” (Paysan 236-7). He argues that “la folie est la prédominance de l’abstrait et du
général sur le concret et la poésie,” and that “Mon affaire est la métaphysique. Et non pas la
folie. Et non pas la raison” (Paysan 245-6). Therefore, he rejects Hegelian idealism, opting
instead for the poetic life, which—contrary to popular belief—involves pulling one’s head out of
the clouds and embracing the material and the concrete.
Short argues that the unfolding of the Aragon affair revealed more than a political or
philosophical conflict, but one that extended to the nature of artistic expression:
Ultimately, the differences between Breton on one side and Aragon and the
communists on the other were about the nature of communication. For Breton, a
writer’s ‘meaning’ lay in the words he wrote and the intention behind them; their
subversive value was latent within them. For Aragon, meaning lay solely in the
interpretation made by the reader or by the majority of society at any given time.
(17)
The potential stakes of this disagreement were high. On the one hand, Breton’s idealist
perspective holds that forming unwavering political commitments is not only unnecessary but
detrimental to the purity of one’s art, which must resist the exercise of instrumental reason at all
costs. Aragon’s materialist perspective, on the other hand, maintains that surrealist writing will
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be worthless until a political revolution takes place and puts in place the social conditions in
which such writing will be meaningful for the general public. Short contends that the two
authors’ beliefs about their art informed their politics, rather than vice versa: “Aragon concluded
that unswerving service to the revolution was the writer’s first duty not merely for the sake of his
ideals as a man but for the sake of the validity of his writing” (17). It makes sense to think of
writing, rather than politics, as the source of tension between Aragon and Breton if we consider
that what finally pushed Aragon to formally break with Breton was the latter’s ostensible defense
of “Front rouge” against legal action in the brochure “Misère de la poésie” (1932).
In arguing that Aragon could not be criminally charged for the contents of his poetry,
Breton makes a curious argument. He defends surrealist poetry against legal prosecution by
highlighting its automatic, unconscious character, while vehemently denying that “Front rouge”
qualifies as an automatic poem :
[D]ans le Manifeste du surréalisme, j’ai tenu, au nom de la conception poétique
que mes amis et moi nous avions, à dégager entièrement la responsabilité de
l’auteur pour le cas où seraient incriminés certains textes de caractère
‘automatique’ incontestable. […] Certes je ne prétends pas que le poème ‘Front
rouge’ réponde à la définition du texte ‘automatique’ (j’essaierai même plus loin
de montrer en quoi il en diffère), mais, par contre, j’estime que la position
poétique qui est déterminée à ce jour pour celle d’Aragon et qui se dégage des
douze ou quinze livres qu’il a écrits ne peut en aucune façon être sacrifiée à
l’agitation que d’aucuns trouvent opportun de mener autour d’un de ses poèmes
dont ils font exceptionnellement un modèle de pensée consciente. (OC II : 13)
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Breton argues that Aragon’s brief (and in Breton’s view regrettable) foray into the poetry of
conscious thought is not sufficient to reasonably expect a reader to take Aragon’s poem as a
literal call to action. He ultimately dismisses the poem as the forgettable result of Aragon’s trip
to the U.S.S.R.:
Force m’est donc, considérant aussi le tour de ce poème, sa référence continuelle
à des accidents particuliers, aux circonstances de la vie publique, me rappelant
enfin qu’il a été écrit lors du séjour d’Aragon en U.R.S.S., de le tenir non pour
une solution acceptable du problème poétique tel qu’il se pose de nos jours mais
pour un exercice à part, aussi captivant qu’on voudra mais sans lendemain parce
que poétiquement régressif, autrement dit pour un poème de circonstance. (OC II
: 20-21)
This description of “Front rouge” as a “poème de circonstance” amounts to Breton calling it
disposable. Breton does nevertheless defend Aragon’s rights by citing the surrealist principle of
rejecting authorial control and responsibility. These points are a not only a dubious legal
argument but also an egregious insult to Aragon, who was skeptical of strict literary automatism
and more than happy to accept full responsibility for whatever he wrote: “J’écris quelque chose,
de mon mieux, parfois très péniblement, et quand ça ne biche pas, je recommence, et je tiens
énormément à ce que je dis, et j’en réclame pleinement la responsabilité” (Traité 231). Breton
scolds Aragon for undergoing an intellectual shift, but one might well argue that “Front rouge”
represents much less of a shift than Breton (and many other critics for that matter) would claim.
Upon further examination, it is evident that the content of “Front rouge” is not so different from
what we find in Aragon’s earlier work. For example, consider this description of the surrealist
revolution from Le Paysan de Paris :
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Les jeunes gens s’adonneront éperdument à ce jeu sérieux et stérile. Il dénaturera
leur vie. Les Facultés seront désertes. On fermera les laboratoires. Il n’y aura plus
d’armée possible, plus de famille, plus de métiers. Alors, devant cette désaffection
croissante de la vie sociale, une grande conjuration se formera, de toutes les
forces dogmatiques et réalistes du monde, contre le fantôme des illusions. Elles
vaincront, ces puissances coalisées du pourquoi pas et du vivre quand même. Ce
sera la dernière croisade de l’esprit. Pour cette bataille perdue d’avance, je vous
engage donc aujourd’hui, cœurs aventureux et graves, peu soucieux de la victoire,
qui cherchez dans la nuit un abîme où vous jeter. Allons, le rôle est ouvert. Passez
au guichet que voici. (Aragon OPC I : 191)
Compare this passage to the following selections from “Front Rouge”:
À vous Jeunesses communistes
balayez les débris humains où s’attarde
l’araignée incantatoire du signe de croix
Volontaires de la construction du socialisme
chassez devant vous jadis comme un chien dangereux
Dressez-vous contre vos mères
Abandonnez la nuit la peste et la famille (Ocp I : 498) […]
Il faut que l’univers entende
une voix hurler la gloire de la dialectique matérialiste
qui marche sur ses pieds sur ses millions de pieds
chaussés de bottes militaires
sur ses pieds magnifiques comme la violence
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tendant sa multitude de bras armés
vers l’image du communisme vainqueur
Gloire à la dialectique matérialiste
et gloire à son incarnation
l’armée
rouge (Ocp I : 500)
These selections reveal striking parallels between two periods of Aragon’s production that are
supposedly so different. Each is a description of an imminent revolution and each features a
generation of rebellious youths and an overthrow of societal institutions. The key difference
between the two is the driving force behind each envisioned revolution each text’s confidence in
the possibility of success for the uprising it describes. On the one hand, the passage from Le
Paysan de Paris concerns the surrealist revolution and it seems condemned to an inevitable
defeat. On the other hand, “Front rouge,” depicts revolt as the ineluctable result of materialist
dialectics, and its triumph seems guaranteed. What had truly changed for Aragon was that he
believed that he had finally found a reason to be hopeful about the revolution.
Moreover, Aragon’s endorsement of an optimistic stance about the revolution’s goals is
not as inconsistent with his previous position as it might at first appear. While Naville believed
pessimism to be important primarily because of its revolutionary utility, Aragon’s famous
exploration of pessimism in Le Paysan de Paris emphasized the uselessness of pessimism. It is
important to note that the accordion that the narrator plays to produce the variations on the word
“pessimisme” belongs to a personification of the feeling of uselessness:
Le sentiment de l’inutilité est accroupi à côté de moi sur la première marche. Il est
habillé comme moi, mais avec plus de noblesse. Il ne porte pas de mouchoir. Il a
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une expression de l’infini sur le visage et entre ses mains il tient déplié un
accordéon bleu dont il ne joue jamais, sur lequel on lit: PESSIMISME. Passezmoi ce morceau d’azur, mon cher Sentiment de l’inutile, sa chanson plairait à mes
oreilles. (Paysan 62)
The scene concludes with the narrator compressing the accordion until the word “pessimisme”
disappears altogether:
L’onde aboutit sur cette grève avec un éclatement barbare. Et reprend le chemin
du retour.
PESSIMISME—PESSIMISM—PESSIMIS
PESSIMI—PESSIM—PESSI
PESS—PES—PE—P—p…, plus rien. (Paysan 63)
Pessimism is thus presented as a potential source of artistic inspiration, but one that can (and
perhaps must) be put away in order to move forward.
To return to our discussion of “Front rouge,” one could argue that what is most striking
about the controversial poem is in fact its consistency with Aragon’s previous positions.
Certainly, Aragon’s work evolved over the decades, especially as he focused more on the social
realist novel. Nevertheless, the artistic and ideological shift attributed to the Aragon affair is
frequently overstated. As we have seen by comparing “Front rouge” with an earlier description
of revolution, the tone and content of the poem are similar to what we find in writing from
Aragon’s surrealist period. While Breton criticizes the poem for not being automatic, we have
seen that Aragon had previously articulated his reservations about automatism and was prepared
to accept full responsibility for his writing. Finally, although “Front rouge” does mark the
beginning of a new period for Aragon by illustrating his new acceptance of Stalinist optimism,
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we have already seen that he had previously equated pessimism with uselessness, and therefore
could leave it behind with little regret. Aragon’s trajectory was thus essentially the opposite of
Péret’s. Whereas Péret remained steadfast in his political pessimism and (like Breton) ultimately
left the PCF behind, Aragon abandoned pessimism to embrace the PCF’s Stalinism, which he
saw as the only beacon of hope in the darkness of 1930s Europe.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have seen that the two essays collected in Pierre Naville’s La
Révolution et les intellectuels attempted to resolve the contradiction of surrealism’s metaphysics
and its politics, only to posit a new antinomy: a simultaneous commitment to revolutionary
pessimism and to the Third International, which later prescribed an aesthetic of uncompromising
optimism. Naville’s essay ultimately helped to destabilize the delicate balance that the movement
attempted to maintain between detachment and engagement, fracturing the movement into
multiple camps. Aragon would remain committed to the communist party, but he would have to
shed his initial pessimism toward the revolution. Breton and Péret, who held onto a certain
pessimism, could no longer remain active within the party. Even though Naville’s boldly
counter-intuitive program of revolutionary pessimism did not find a warm welcome in the PCF
through the activism of figures like Péret, it lived on in a certain way. That said, in spite of
Naville’s rejection of anarchism, Breton embraced it in his theories of art, and Péret was forced
to embrace it on the battlefield.
Although Naville’s program for surrealism was ultimately a failure, the problem seems to
have been his insistence on a specific type of organization, rather than the notion of
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revolutionary pessimism itself. A pessimistic outlook is perhaps simply incompatible with the
hierarchical power structure of an organization like the Third International. It is difficult for a
totalitarian regime to hold onto power while also insisting on the inevitable failure of its own
revolutionary project. So, despite Naville’s early protestations to the contrary, the mistrust and
vigilance demanded by his revolutionary pessimism seem to have been more compatible with the
more decentralized, horizontal power structures endorsed by anarchist movements.
In addition, though Naville’s theories of pessimism have received virtually no attention from
critics in recent years, they have remained pertinent. Numerous thinkers have expressed similar
sentiments over the past century. As Huey P. Newton famously wrote in his autobiography
Revolutionary Suicide (1973): “the first lesson a revolutionary must learn is that he is a doomed
man. Unless he understands this, he does not grasp the essential meaning of his life” (5). More
recently, Slavoj Žižek’s book The Courage of Hopelessness makes a similar argument.
According to Žižek, the greatest danger facing humanity is the irrational hope that, somehow,
everything will work out. He asserts that, ironically, the best chance we have of avoiding
catastrophe is to accept that catastrophe is inevitable:
How to stop our slide into this vortex? In both cases, the threat of ecological
catastrophe as well as the threat of global war, the first step is to leave behind all
the pseudo-rational talk about ‘strategic risks’ that we have to assume, as well as
the notion of historical time as the linear process of evolution where, at each
moment, we have to choose between different courses of action. We have to
accept the threat as our fate: it is not just a question of avoiding risks and making
the right choices within the global situation, the true threat resides in the situation
in its entirety, in our ‘fate’—if we continue to ‘roll on’ the way we do now, we

143

are doomed, no matter how carefully we proceed. So the solution is not to be very
careful and avoid risky acts—in acting like this, we fully participate in the logic
that leads to catastrophe. The solution is to become fully aware of the explosive
set of interconnections that makes the entire situation dangerous. Once we do this,
once we embrace the courage that comes with hopelessness, we should embark on
the long and difficult work of changing the coordinates of the entire situation.
Nothing less will do. (Žižek 298)
Žižek, like Naville, thus stands by the initially counter-intuitive argument that pessimism is not
only compatible with, but also essential to, meaningful political activism. Even though its
specific plans for the surrealist movement were never fully implemented, La Révolution et les
intellectuels remains a fascinating and timely attempt to theorize the ways that we might
summon the courage to follow our convictions, even in the face of seemingly certain doom. It
also serves as an interesting point of contrast with surrealists such as Artaud, who adopted a
similarly apocalyptic tone while eschewing direct political engagement. The use of apocalyptic
themes as a means of escaping and/or transcending politics will be the subject of our fourth and
final chapter.
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Chapter 4
Pestilence over Politics:
Surrealism and the Secular Apocalypse
As we have seen in the previous three chapters, apocalyptic imagery within the surrealist
movement often has particular significance for the political projects of its members. The political
dimension of the movement became so important that two of the most prominent early
surrealists, Aragon and Soupault, parted ways with Breton and his group because they refused to
support the PCF, preferring instead to maintain an apolitical or anarchistic stance. Interestingly,
they continued to explore apocalyptic themes in their work, and just as other surrealist
apocalypses often serve as calls to join the revolutionary cause, those of Artaud and Soupault
present reasons for refusing to participate in any such political crusade. Of particular interest is
Philippe Soupault’s Les Dernières nuits de Paris (1928). The novel serves as something of a
refutation of Bretonian surrealism by embracing the literary form of the novel (a genre that
Breton had vehemently condemned in his manifestoes) and by rejecting the notion of objective
chance. Nevertheless, the novel is rife with apocalyptic overtones; Soupault depicts Paris as an
all-consuming fire and the “banlieues” as a devastated wasteland. As such, Les Dernières nuits
falls in line with other avant-garde works from the period which depicted the post-WWI
(sub)urban landscape as a wasteland, notably Eliot’s eponymous poem and Apollinaire’s Zone.
As we will see, however, the novel also portrays a process of rebirth that coincides with
(sub)urban decay.
In addition, we will examine Artaud’s rejection of communism (and of any commitment
to direct involvement with party politics), as articulated in texts like À la grande nuit (1927).
Artaud did not share the communists’ belief in progress, seeing the further development of
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civilization as the problem rather than the solution. He valorized apocalyptic destruction (such as
the plague or the burning of the library of Alexandria) as a new beginning rather than a definitive
end. This desire to create something radically new is perhaps best exemplified in his unfinished
Il n’y a plus de firmament (ca. 1931-33). The piece features an ambiguously apocalyptic threat
that could only be explained in an ending that was never written. As we will see, the refusal to
finish this narrative is consistent with Artaud’s belief that it is impossible to anticipate the impact
of any project that aims to be truly revolutionary.
Finally, although the focus of this study is on French-language authors, we will also
touch briefly on the work of Anaïs Nin. While Nin was not a formal member of the surrealist
movement, its influence on her work is evident, especially in her 1939 novel House of Incest, of
which we will examine an important scene. In addition, Nin was a close friend and confidante of
Artaud, as well as a pivotal member of the interwar Parisian intelligentsia, and especially of the
so-called Villa Seurat network (named for the street of Artaud’s apartments in Paris, which was
in turn named for the great pointillist Georges Seurat).16 As we will see, Soupault’s, Artaud’s and
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Curiously, while Artaud was acquainted with Henry Miller, Nin’s lover and the central figure

of the Villa Seurat network, the two mention each other very little in their respective works. As
Finn Jensen remarks: “Miller knew Artaud very well. […] But aside from scattered comments, in
the Hamlet Letters, for example, Miller never mentions Artaud; perhaps he felt he would be
getting too close to an area that Anaïs Nin considered hers, as she was very close to Artaud for a
short period, but I think that Miller was simply frightened and repelled by Artaud’s terrifying
behavior and frequent hospitalizations.” (Jensen 72)
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Nin’s depictions of apocalypse differ from those of their surrealist contemporaries because they
embrace a model of revelation which is at once anti-prophetic and anti-clerical.

The Secular Apocalypse and “Salvagepunk”

In his Combined and Uneven Apocalypse, Evan Calder Williams studies depictions of the
apocalypse from the 20th and 21st centuries, while also applying the concept to disruptive realworld events. He describes the aesthetic of many works of post-apocalyptic fiction as
“salvagepunk,” since they feature a world haphazardly slapped together from the refuse of the
old world that was left behind after the apocalypse: “Acts of salvagepunk strive against and away
from the ruins on which they cannot help but be built and through which they rummage” (20).
Although he does not endeavor to piece together an exhaustive history of salvagepunk, he does
note that the aesthetic derives at least in part from the innovations of Dada and Surrealism. It is
worth taking a brief look at Williams’ examples of salvagepunk:
The definitive examples I have here, if not necessarily the critical thought of it
[then] at least the nascent ‘look’: the Mad Max trilogy, Marker’s La Jetée (and
Gilliam’s 12 Monkeys as well), the New Crobuzon novels of China Miéville,
Richard Lester’s The Bed Sitting Room, the Strugatskij’s Roadside Picnic, Dada
and Surrealist collage and photomontage, Neil Marshall’s Doomsday, Waterworld
(as utterly terrible as it is), Godspeed You Black Emperor! and other derivations
of anarcho-punk music, Richard Stanley’s Hardware, barricades constructed in
the service of insurrection and the accounts written of them, Yamaguchi Hiroki’s
Hellevator: The Bottled Fools (Gusher No Binds Me), hip-hop sampling and early
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DJ culture, Jean Vigo’s L’Atlante, Steptoe and Son Ride Again, much of Monty
Python, Jeunet’s City of Lost Children and Delicatessen, certain portions of WallE. (20)
Of all the references listed, Dada and Surrealism are the earliest influences on what Williams
identifies as the salvagepunk aesthetic.17 Though he does not dedicate much attention to Dada
and surrealism, their place within his chronology of salvagepunk lends credence to our assertion
that surrealism contributed significantly to the evolution of our contemporary conception of
apocalypse.
This association of Dada and surrealism with salvagepunk deserves expansion, since
Williams limits his own exploration of the topic to the above reference. The Dadaists utilized
collage in both visual media and writing, effectively repurposing ephemeral, disposable material
into a creative outlet. The surrealists (many of whom were originally part of the Paris branch of
Dada) continued to develop the use of these techniques. A good example of a surrealist collage
poem that prefigures the salvagepunk aesthetic is Breton’s “Ah! les Femmes!...” included in the
posthumous collection Poisson soluble II:
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We might also add Charles Baudelaire to Williams’ list, especially in light of the former’s

fascination with the rag pickers of Paris, which we see, for example, in his poem “Le Vin des
Chiffoniers.”
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Fig. 13. Excerpt from the original manuscript of “Ah! les Femmes!...” by Breton. ca. 1924.

Like all works of salvagepunk, this poem is cobbled together from various, discarded scraps. The
visual aesthetic of the original manuscript is particularly in line with Williams’ description of
salvagepunk, but the eclectic typography of all such surrealist collage poems was typically
preserved in the published version of surrealist collage poems, as we see, for example, in certain
sections of the first Manifeste du surréalisme. As for the content of the poem, the biblical
references also contribute to an apocalyptic tone. The “Révélation cruelle” announced at the top
of this manuscript page paints a grim vision of humanity’s fate. While the “elle” mentioned
(presumably Eve), seemingly has all of the new solutions, the future will be nevertheless filled
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with peril and fire. The biblical allusions (Ève, le fruit défendu, etc.) also serve to demonstrate
how interwar surrealism exists in a state of transition between older, religious conceptions of
apocalypse and its more contemporary, secular analogs. Of particular interest are the poem’s
closing lines: “ève / La Nature a voulu que / vous soyez belle / À Biribi” (Breton I : 581). In spite
of the religious iconography, God is never mentioned, and His place seems to have been usurped
by the pantheist conception of “Nature” and, most importantly, the surrealist idea of objective
chance, alluded to by the concluding reference to Biribi, a game of chance. Just as the form of
surrealist poetry was frequently generated by rearranging fragments of discarded texts into
something new, its content often draws from increasingly outmoded elements of religious
iconography, blending them with various other systems of thought to generate novel conceptions
of the marvelous, the sacred and humanity’s destiny. The post-apocalyptic science fiction novels
and films that Williams cites as exemplary of the salvagepunk aesthetic (including Miéville’s
surrealist-inspired Last Days of New Paris) feature people attempting to repurpose the tattered
remains of a now-destroyed world in order to meet the demands of a new, unforgiving
wasteland. In a way, this is not so different from the task that faced the interwar avant-garde in
grappling with the impact of the events of the early twentieth century on Western culture.
To turn our attention to a surrealist author who is of particular interest to this chapter, it is
interesting to see how Artaud’s theater projects also manifest a desire to create something new
out of cultural refuse. The only project for Artaud’s ambitious theater of cruelty that actually
reached the stage was Les Cenci, which was his adaptation of a largely forgotten work by Percy
Shelly. Moreover, several of his other planned (but never realized) projects involved reviving
and reworking obscure or unfinished works. At the end of his first manifesto, Artaud lists several
such projects, including (among others) Arden of Feversham, an apocryphal Shakespeare play;
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Eugénie de Franval, a relatively obscure short story by Sade, which—along with the rest of
Sade’s œuvre—was officially banned in France until 1957 ; and Woyzeck, an unfinished play by
Georg Büchner which tells the tragic story of an exploited soldier who is plagued by apocalyptic
visions (Artaud OC IV : 95-6). While Artaud repeatedly announced his disdain for masterpieces,
he seemed to have a passion for reviving and reinterpreting abandoned, forgotten or censored
pieces of writing. This desire to repurpose literary refuse serves as an interesting parallel to the
logic of salvagepunk.
For our purposes here, the most important aspect of Williams’ essay is his development
of a theoretical framework distinguishing between apocalypse, crisis and catastrophe. To
separate the former term from the latter two, Williams emphasizes its etymological connection to
revelation. For him, a catastrophe is an end to something, but it lacks the revelatory aspect found
in apocalypse. However, in defining a secular conception of apocalypse, Williams endeavors to
separate the idea of revelation from its traditional connection to the religious or supernatural:
An apocalypse is an end with revelation, a ‘lifting of the veil.’ However, we don’t
need an apocalypse in its early Christian usage, the chosen few shown things
hidden from the rest of [the] ignorant flock. […] The sense we pursue, instead, is
the end of a totality, here meaning not the sum of all things but the ordering of
those things in a particular historical shape. This end, therefore, is the collapse of
a system of ‘real abstractions’ and their real effects, of the intersections and
stresses between ideas about the world and how the world is shaped into
accordance with those ideas. (Williams 5)
Williams underscores the revelatory nature of apocalypse, but he dismisses the religious
conception of revelation, stressing instead socio-political awakening. While many (notably
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Pagels) have read John of Patmos’ Book of Revelation as a scathing attack against the Roman
empire and its policies, there is little about the book that is explicitly political. Moreover,
whatever political implications can be drawn from an apocalyptic text like that of John of Patmos
are only one component of a larger tapestry of religious thought. The struggle between early
Christians and the Roman empire is a small part of the greater cosmic war between God and His
enemies that will culminate in the destruction of the world as we know it. For Williams,
however, an apocalypse is not necessarily the end of the world, but rather the collapse of a
worldview. As he elaborates:
[T]his doesn’t mean total destruction but rather a destruction of totalizing
structures, of those universal notions that do not just describe ‘how things are’ but
serve to prescribe and insist that ‘this is how things must be.’ What is revealed is
what has been hidden in plain sight all along, previously only caught askance
from the corner of our eye: the sudden exposure of what was present but not
visible, because it did not accord with those real structuring forces of a totality.
(Williams 5)
While Williams’ definition of apocalypse shares the crucial feature with the Christian model of
being an end with a revelation, the relation between these two elements is inverted. Unlike the
biblical apocalypses, Williams’ idea of apocalypse does not depend on an individual prophet
who foresees the coming doom, but rather on a collective, retrospective realization of previously
unnoticed socio-political factors. Once these factors become visible, they can be influenced. As
Williams elaborates: “[A]pocalypse is not the clarification itself but a wound of the present that
exposes the unseen—but unhidden—from which after-work can begin to dig out all the failed
starts, possible histories. The apocalyptic describes not just the spilling forth of the unseen, but

152

also of the undifferentiated matter of the possible, of what could have been and was not, of what
neither came to be nor went away” (Williams 6). The primary example used in Williams’ book is
the Great Recession that began in December 2007 and its subsequent economic and political
fallout. A more traditional interpretation of this event as an apocalypse would likely focus on the
small number of people who attempted to warn others about the coming financial doom which
had been revealed to them (as we see, for example, in a film like The Big Short). But Williams
argues that the true revelation that came out of the Great Recession was the subsequent
awakening of the general public to the corrupt underpinnings of the global financial apparatus,
leading to political movements like Occupy Wall Street.
In addition, Williams distinguishes between a crisis and an apocalypse, noting that the
former does not represent an end at all, but rather a process of purification that only serves to
further entrench the overall status quo: “A crisis is a cyclical, expected expression, not a
permanent state of affairs. […] It will pass, and be passed through, clearing out systemic dead
wood along the way. And it is not an end in itself. A crisis might be read as threatening times of
non-recovery to come, but those are the times when it can no longer be called a ‘crisis’” (4). For
Williams, then, a crisis is neither an end nor a beginning, but simply an unavoidable stage in an
infinitely repeating cycle. One of the most interesting (post-)surrealist depictions of such a cycle
of crises can be found in Soupault’s Les Dernières nuits de Paris.

Soupault and the Eternally Apocalyptic Landscape of Paris

The few critics who have written on Les Dernières nuits de Paris agree that it is
particularly significant as Soupault’s first narrative work after his break with Breton’s group. In
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particular, the book’s embrace of the genre of the novel, which Breton famously despised, serves
to mark Soupault’s departure from his earlier, staunchly anti-literary stance. As Peter Kuon
notes : “C’est au moment même où ses anciens compagnons de route s’aventurent sur le terrain
miné de la politique que Soupault ancre sa vision d’un surréalisme sensoriel et réceptif dans une
tradition littéraire, romantique et post-romantique” (225). In addition, several critics have seen
the novel’s band of scoundrels as a transparent stand-in for Breton’s surrealist group.18 The wily,
underhanded Volpe (“volpe” is the Italian word for fox) can easily be read as an unflattering
portrait of Breton himself. The narrator nicknames Volpe’s group “aventuriers sans aventures,”
prefiguring André Thirion’s later moniker for the surrealists, Révolutionnaires sans révolution
(Dernières nuits 110). Volpe seems to exercise the same kind of charismatic authority as Breton:
“Volpe était de ceux qui commandent à des hommes qui ont l’obéissance en horreur et dont la
vie est un exemple perpétuel de révolte” (104). In addition, the narrator makes constant reference
to the group’s obsession with chance: “Tous, mes amis d’une après-midi, mes amis de
Longchamp, étaient amoureux du hasard” (75). This obsession often manifests itself within
Volpe’s group, as it did in Breton’s, as an interest in cartomancy: “Volpe lui-même se tirait les
cartes ou se les faisait tirer. Cet homme, qui vivait avec aisance dans le présent, avait une crainte
sincère de l’avenir” (106). Les Dernières nuits de Paris is indeed a meditation on surrealism and
how Soupault drifted apart from Breton. Interestingly, however, politics are almost entirely
absent from the novel, even though political disagreements were ostensibly the primary reason

18

See Aspley p. 190-1
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for the break between Soupault and Breton.19 Instead, the author’s reservations about the
political direction of the surrealist movement can be read in the narrator’s rejection of Volpe’s
apocalypticism.
Those who have written on Les Dernières nuits de Paris have paid little attention to the
apocalyptic themes underscoring it, which the title itself evokes. Indeed, from the beginning the
novel is filled with dark, ominous imagery. In the first chapter, for example, the narrator
discovers that a mysterious, black dog is following him: “Le chien nous suivait au petit galop,
tantôt nous dépassant, tantôt s’arrêtant, indiquant par ce manège qu’il était décidé à nous suivre
jusqu’à la fin du monde” (10). Paris is sometimes presented as a post-apocalyptic ruin : “Mais,
comme après une catastrophe, la gare semblait plus déserte que les quais” (19). Another element
which has received little attention is the role of the voices that the narrator hears, which recall
Breton’s “voix surréaliste” or “hasard objectif” : “Les jours où l’on suit cette voix secrète qui est
celle de la distraction, sont ceux que le hasard choisit pour indiquer ses chemins” (112). Once the
narrator opens his mind and lets go of all concrete intention, he is visited by three voices
(recalling oracular traditions such as the Parcae, the Fates or even the weird sisters from
Macbeth), which share with him an apocalyptic vision of Paris:
J’avais laissé la place à ces êtres bruyants qui viennent me hanter lorsque je ne
m’y oppose point. Ils étaient ce jour-là au moins trois à faire du bruit. […]
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“One of the reasons cited by Breton for the exclusion of Soupault, Artaud and Vitrac from the

movement in 1926 was their lukewarm attitude to this form of political activity” (Aspley 16).
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Je ne songeais plus à les faire taire mais à les écouter. ‘Paris, disaient-ils, s’étale
comme le soleil et le soleil est une tache d’huile, elle dévore ce qui l’entoure
comme le ferait le plus bel incendie du siècle car elle aime à se vêtir de flammes
en chantant, comme savent le faire en certaines saisons toutes les cloches du
monde.’ (112-3)
Paris is destined to be consumed by a beautiful, cleansing flame and then to spread that flame
across the world. This presaged doom for the capital resonates with imagery found elsewhere in
the novel. At several points, the narrator remarks that death hangs over the city, and time itself
seems to have stopped: “Les grandes ombres et la présence de cette femme détruisaient le temps”
(41). Jacqueline Chénieux-Gendron asserts that this kind of discontinuity is typical of Soupault’s
narratives: “La mise en évidence de cette discontinuité temporelle, psychologique (qui reste
évidemment dans l’ordre métonymique), apparaît dans plusieurs autres textes de Soupault […]
Que l’on observe aussi, dans Les Dernières Nuits de Paris (1928), les ‘absences’ d’Octave—le
distrait, le suicidaire aussi—et la double personnalité de sa sœur Georgette—, la Georgette de la
nuit et la Georgette du jour” (211). Georgette, the enigmatic sex worker who serves as a kind of
mascot for Volpe’s group, fascinates the narrator because of her seemingly disjointed
personality. “Georgette de la nuit” is almost unrecognizable when compared with “Georgette du
jour.” The narrator stalks her as she goes about her daily and nightly routines, finding her
nocturnal persona fascinating and her daytime persona disappointingly ordinary.
The novel makes it clear that Georgette is a personification of the city itself: “Cette nuitlà, tandis que nous poursuivions ou plus exactement que nous filions Georgette, je vis Paris pour
la première fois. […] Et Georgette elle-même devenait une ville” (43). Paris, in turn, serves as a
microcosm for the world at large: “Cette large tache au bord de la Seine tournait une fois de plus
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sur elle-même comme le faisait toute la Terre, avec la même obstination et la même résignation.
Comme la Terre, Paris se refroidissait et devenait simplement une idée. Pour combien d’années
encore garderait-elle cette puissance d’illusion, pour combien d’années demeurerait-elle
maîtresse du temps ?” (118-9). This three-tiered allegory, Georgette/Paris/the world, gives
greater meaning to the narrator’s efforts to uncover the secrets surrounding Georgette. By
wandering in the city, the narrator discovers more and more about Georgette and her associates,
which in turn leads him to abstract, metaphysical reflections about the nature of life itself.
However, despite the narrator’s initial fascination with chance and his attraction to the
mystery in which he finds himself embroiled, he ultimately becomes somewhat disenchanted:
“J’avoue même que je ne pouvais chasser une sorte de déception en repensant à la façon trop
simple et trop artificielle à la fois avec laquelle j’avais obtenu les clés” (87). This eventual
disillusionment is prefigured as early as the second chapter, which begins with an epigraph from
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck: “Le hasard n’est que notre ignorance des causes. —Lamarck” (24). The
mysterious, almost supernatural power that chance holds in the surrealist imaginary is thus
reduced to simple ignorance.
Indeed, the narrator foresees his future break with the group, which will only be effected
by a catastrophe and which all parties involved seem to anticipate eagerly:
Je ne pouvais sans doute pas nommer affection le sentiment qui me rapprochait
d’eux, mais il me semblait qu’une catastrophe était nécessaire pour me séparer et
me dégoûter d’eux, ainsi que je le désirais.
Je pressentais cette catastrophe comme l’on prévoit la fin d’une tempête. Euxmêmes n’ignoraient point que tout a une fin et qu’il faut un jour compter sur
l’inévitable. Et ils le souhaitaient ardemment. (Soupault 115)
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Interestingly, the coming catastrophe is not envisioned as a tempest, but rather the end of one.
This can be read as a commentary on Soupault’s relationship with the surrealist group, and how
all parties felt that a rupture was inevitable. Moreover, the extent to which these characters seem
to impatiently await a future disaster parallels the surrealists’ own desire for the apocalypse.
Indeed, Volpe, like his real-life counterpart Breton, is fascinated by cartomancy and prophecy.
Of particular interest to Volpe and his companions are the predictions of future catastrophes:
“C’est pour cette raison sans doute qu’ils aimaient tant à connaître l’avenir. Une de leurs
principales occupations pendant leurs courts loisirs consistait à se tirer les cartes ou à se les faire
tirer. La maîtresse du marin, la plus faible de leurs compagnes, était une virtuose dans cet art. Sa
plus grande et inconsciente habileté consistait à annoncer des événements tragiques” (115). But
this burning desire to know the future does not lead to any significant control over it. Volpe and
his associates are no more immune to or prescient of the vicissitudes of fate than those who
neglect to consult clairvoyants and cartomancers.
In the end, despite all of their efforts to foresee and control the future, the members of the
group (and especially their leader Volpe) are confronted with the multiplying signs of their
failure: Octave’s suicide by fire (of which he was the only victim, in spite of his destructive
intentions), the departure of their cartomancer and finally Georgette’s disappearance. Their
failure to locate Georgette becomes emblematic of their inability to control their own destiny:
“Ils avaient tous conscience de la réalité de la mort. L’aventure qu’avaient tentée ces esprits
devenait un piège, et les voilà qui tournaient pour échapper à cette réalité qui les pressait de
toutes parts” (140). The members gather for a meeting to decide what to do next about Georgette.
However, as the night comes to an end they find that they are no closer to coming up with a
solution: “Cette nuit venait de finir. / Il était temps. / Un à un, les regards s’éteignirent. Le

158

sommeil passa sur nous, visible, et dans le silence ressuscité un silence plus lourd s’imposa. On
n’attendait plus que la lumière comme la fin du monde. Le désespoir s’approchait avec
précaution” (136). The cold light of day seems to signal their doom. Indeed, for most of the
novel, the arrival of dawn signifies an end, often an unwelcome one : “Le jour, en s’installant
définitivement dans Paris, laissait tomber une sécheresse froide qui indiquait la fin de quelque
chose” (100). In the book’s final pages, however, the dawn is no longer associated with an
apocalyptic end, but rather with the typical theme of rebirth: “Toute la ville naissait et nous
allions, nous croyions aller à sa rencontre” (140). At the moment when the group had lost all
hope, Georgette appears at the doorstep without explanation. She does not appear alone,
however. Her arrival coincides not only with the dawn, but also with a nearby housefire20:
Paris était devant nos yeux.
Nous n’attendions plus personne.
Il y eut simplement une grande flamme, une dentelle rouge, une plaie. Non loin de
là, une maison avait pris feu, et je reconnus la ronde des mains.
Nous écoutâmes, sans mot dire. Sur le pas de la porte qu’elle avait laissée ouverte,
Georgette attendait. La fumée s’approcha en même temps que le tumulte des
pompiers.

20

Is the timing of the fire a pure coincidence, or does Georgette perhaps share her brother’s

pyromaniacal tendencies? The novel does not offer any definitive answer, although its somewhat
skeptical stance toward the role of chance might incline us toward the latter interpretation.
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Volpe se précipita pour voir, et un à un nous le suivîmes. Par la porte de
Versailles je vis un lent courant d’hommes, de femmes, d’animaux qui entraient
dans Paris.
Le jour et la nuit reprenaient leur ronde. (141)
The world, of course, does not come to an end. There is little reason to assume that this fire will
be any more apocalyptic than the last one. The cyclical rhythm of Parisian life continues,
remaining largely uninterrupted and indifferent to the individual concerns of its citizens. MarieClaire Bancquart highlights that the novel’s conclusion, while not exactly optimistic, does
present a Paris teeming with life and possibility:
Il indique, au terme des Dernières Nuits de Paris, que l’aventure heureuse n’était
pas pour lui, et que celle où il s’est trouvé mêlé se termine par un fiasco. Dans
Paris, il est allé du pôle positif (quartier Latin, jardins tourmentés du Trocadéro)
au pôle négatif (parc régulier, ennui, attente). La ville n’a cependant pas fermé
toutes ses possibilités ; la scène du parc Monceau est suivie d’un dernier chapitre
où par la porte de Versailles, on voit un lent courant d’hommes, de femmes,
d’animaux, qui entrent dans Paris, prêts à des péripéties nouvelles. Soupault ne se
ressemblerait pas s’il n’avait pas laissé—au plein sens du terme—la porte ouverte.
(Bancquart 58)
In the end, the folly of Volpe and his group is that, in searching only for Georgette de la nuit,
they forgot about Georgette du jour, who appears on the doorstep just as the rising sun appears
on the horizon. The encroaching dawn only feels like the apocalypse when one forgets about the
possibilities of the day. This sentiment is perhaps best summed up by one of the narrator’s
memories from an earlier chapter: “Je songeai tout à coup à cet homme qui en regardant Rome
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me dit avec un calme parfait : —Une civilisation de perdue, dix de retrouvées” (119). Paris
(which, as we have seen, is a microcosm of the world at large) is indeed being destroyed, but it is
also being reborn.
Les Dernières nuits de Paris thus refutes both of the surrealist eschatologies that we
explored earlier. The cyclical nature of destruction and rebirth that we see in the novel’s
conclusion is incompatible both with Breton’s model of climactic revolution and with Bataille’s
model of gradual decay and loss. Soupault thus implicitly dismisses them as “amateurs du feu”
(83), running to catch a glimpse of each fire, believing that perhaps this is the one.21 Or, like
Octave, they might try lighting their own fires, so to speak, but the novel seems dismissive of
such efforts, since Octave’s fire destroys little more than himself. As the narrator remarks, while
the fire seemed threatening at first, it ultimately amounted to little more than a curiosity for the
citizens of Paris: “Chacun, avec le goût commun du malheur, essayait d’imaginer le désastre,
mais chacun le ramenait à un petit incendie de rien du tout” (124). The “revelation” of the novel
is, in reality, more of a demystification. The narrator realizes that Volpe and his group are not
mystics and have no privileged view of the future. The catastrophes they predict (or even
precipitate) can do nothing to alter the cyclical course of life. In a way, every night is the last
night of Paris, and every morning the city is reborn.

21

Boucharenc sees a connection between Soupault’s “amateurs du feu” and Nerval’s “filles du

feu.” Kuon claims however that this connection is “plus suggestive que, sémantiquement ou
structurellement, fondée” (Kuon 221 n. 35).
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Theater, the Plague and ‘le nouveau mal du siècle’

In his 1923 article “Le Bilan d’une enquête,” Benjamin Crémieux coined the term
“nouveau mal du siècle” to describe the work of Soupault and his contemporaries. Just as the fall
of Napoleon had ostensibly provoked the melancholy and ennui of the 19th century romantics
who suffered from the original “mal du siècle,” the embittered young authors of the interwar
period were profoundly affected by the trauma of the First World War. In his essay Les Maladies
du Siècle, Nicholas Hewitt uses this notion of the “nouveau mal du siècle” as just one example of
how malaise and sickness became a common literary metaphor for capturing the zeitgeist of
interwar France. In addition, while Crémieux’s original article does not mention him by name,
Kimberly Jannarone argues that the term applies especially well to Artaud. Indeed, Jannarone
sees certain elements of Artaud’s thinking as harkening back to romanticism’s mistrust of the
sterilizing forces of civilization: “The worldview we’re sketching reveals a Romantic strain in its
exaltation of suffering, in its belief that civilization occludes the forces that really matter, that
laws and society stifle the individual will” (36-37). Artaud therefore valorizes the chaos
unleashed by destruction, since the opportunity to rebuild is a path to revitalization:
On peut brûler la bibliothèque d’Alexandrie. Au-dessus et en dehors des papyrus,
il y a des forces : on nous enlèvera pour quelque temps la faculté de retrouver ces
forces, on ne supprimera pas leur énergie. Et il est bon que de trop grandes
facilités disparaissent et que des formes tombent en oubli, et la culture sans espace
ni temps et que détient notre capacité nerveuse reparaîtra avec une énergie accrue.
(IV : 11-12)
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Here, Artaud argues like Soupault that destruction actually clears the way for new life. Indeed,
Artaud emphasizes above all the energy released by catastrophe: “[I]l est juste que de temps en
temps des cataclysmes se produisent qui nous incitent à en revenir à la nature, c’est-à-dire à
retrouver la vie” (IV: 12). Finn Jensen refers to Artaud’s belief in the creative power of
destruction as “the dualism of eschatological vitality” (72). As Jensen explains: “The double
movement consists […] of emphasizing that we live in a dying culture, while also arguing that
the forces of life remain intact during the demise of this civilization and may be realized at a later
point” (72). For Williams, however, the “cataclysms” evoked by Artaud would be better
described as crises, since they are simply part of a normal cycle of decay and rebirth. This is not
to say that Artaud rejects the concept of apocalypse. Indeed, as we will see, revelation is a vital
aspect of his conception of theater, even if it fits much more comfortably in a more
contemporary framework than in a traditional, religious one. Artaud is not interested in any kind
of divine insight that could allow us to anticipate disasters, rather he celebrates the discoveries
that emerge during and after them. His favorite vehicle of such revelation was the plague.
In his lecture “Le Théâtre et la peste,” Artaud makes the counter-intuitive argument that
theater is beneficial to society not in spite of but because of its similarity to the plague:
[D]u point de vue humain, l’action du théâtre comme celle de la peste, est
bienfaisante, car poussant les hommes à se voir tels qu’ils sont, elle fait tomber le
masque, elle découvre le mensonge, la veulerie, la bassesse, la tartuferie ; elle
secoue l’inertie asphyxiante de la matière qui gagne jusqu’aux données les plus
claires des sens ; et révélant à des collectivités leur puissance sombre, leur force
cachée, elle les invite à prendre en face du destin une attitude héroïque et
supérieure qu’elle n’auraient jamais eue sans cela. (IV : 31)
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Ironically, Artaud claims that the destructive influence of his plague-inspired theater will
ultimately serve to save the world, rather than doom it: “Et la question qui se pose maintenant est
de savoir si dans ce monde qui glisse, qui se suicide sans s’en apercevoir, il se trouvera un noyau
d’hommes capables d’imposer cette notion supérieure du théâtre, qui nous rendra à tous
l’équivalent naturel et magique des dogmes auxquels nous ne croyons plus” (IV : 31). Like other
surrealists, Artaud is cognizant of the hole that was left in European culture when religion began
to fade in importance. He makes the case that avenues of creativity (in his case theater) can
replace the role once played by religion in society.
For Artaud, the most important social function of both theater and the plague is to enact a
kind of purification: “Il semble que par la peste et collectivement un gigantesque abcès, tant
moral que social, se vide ; et de même que la peste, le théâtre est fait pour vider collectivement
des abcès” (IV : 30). Like lancing a boil, the suspension of norms caused by a plague or a
theatrical performance offers the chance to discard the accumulated baggage resulting from
civilized life. It offers, in a sense, a clean slate: “Il y a dans le théâtre comme dans la peste
quelque chose à la fois de victorieux et de vengeur. Cet incendie spontané que la peste allume où
elle passe, on sent très bien qu’il n’est pas autre chose qu’une immense liquidation” (IV : 26). As
societal institutions erode, humanity’s vital forces reemerge, reinvigorating the population: “Un
désastre social si complet, un tel désordre organique, ce débordement de vices, cette sorte
d’exorcisme total qui presse l’âme et la pousse à bout, indiquent la présence d’un état qui est
d’autre part une force extrême et où se retrouvent à vif toutes les puissances de la nature au
moment où celle-ci va accomplir quelque chose d’essentiel” (IV : 26-7). Indeed, what Artaud
seems to most appreciate about the plague is this ability to undermine the structures of society:
“Sous l’action du fléau, les cadres de la société se liquéfient. L’ordre tombe” (IV : 15). Artaud
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also sees parallels between theater and the plague in their contagious nature: “Il importe avant
tout d’admettre que comme la peste, le jeu théâtral soit un délire et qu’il soit communicatif” (IV :
26). However, Artaud minimizes the importance of this particular similarity, insisting that the
most vital point of comparison between theater and the plague is their revelatory nature: “tous les
conflits qui dorment en nous, il nous les restitue avec leurs forces et il donne à ces forces des
noms que nous saluons comme des symbols” (IV : 27). What theater and disease unleash is not a
novel creation, but rather hidden forces that are uncovered. As Artaud elaborates: “Si le théâtre
essentiel est comme la peste, ce n’est pas parce qu’il est contagieux, mais parce que comme la
peste il est la révélation, la mise en avant, la poussée vers l’extérieur d’un fond de cruauté latente
par lequel se localisent sur un individu ou sur un peuple toutes les possibilités perverses de
l’esprit” (IV : 29). It is important to note, however, that the kind of revelation that Artaud
describes is quite different from what we find in The Book of Revelation (even if pestilence
features prominently in both). While John of Patmos claims to have received a divine revelation
of disasters to come, Artaud insists that the true revelation occurs during and after the disaster. In
this sense, Artaud is closer than many of his surrealist contemporaries to a more modern, secular
vision of apocalypse.
The explosion of energy that Artaud sees in the plague is not a supernatural intervention,
but merely an unleashing of forces that had previously been hidden: “Le théâtre, comme la peste,
est à l’image de ce carnage, de cette essentielle séparation. Il dénoue des conflits, il dégage des
forces il déclenche des possibilités, et si ces possibilités et ces forces sont noires, c’est la faute
non pas de la peste ou du théâtre, mais de la vie” (IV : 30). This argument is one that Artaud
would rearticulate many times in defense of his theater of cruelty. The cruelty on display in his
imagined theater does not emerge on the stage, sui generis, to inflict moral harm on an
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unsuspecting audience. Rather, the cruelty to which Artaud refers is latent within everyday life.
Indeed, Artaud argues that Western civilization’s penchant for avoiding cruelty on the stage in a
misguided attempt to mollify the depraved impulses of the public has only ever accomplished the
opposite. Artaud claims that the cultural trajectory of his time would lead to ruin: “Il s’agit de
savoir ce que nous voulons. Si nous sommes tous prêts pour la guerre, la peste, la famine et le
massacre nous n’avons même pas besoin de le dire, nous n’avons qu’à continuer. Continuer à
nous comporter en snobs, et à nous porter en masse devant tel ou tel chanteur, tel ou tel spectacle
admirable et qui ne dépasse pas le domaine de l’art” (IV : 76). Refusing to embrace cruelty in
theater (and by extension in the other arts as well) will not spare humanity from the cruel
realities of human nature. On the contrary, it will unleash all of humanity’s depravity in much
more devastating domains, leading to the further propagation of physical, emotional and
economic violence.
Of course, Artaud was perfectly aware of how counter-intuitive it is to compare theater to
the plague, and above all, to suggest that its virtues lie precisely in its similarities to disease. As
he writes in a letter to Anaïs Nin: “In these recent days I have been possessed in the strict sense
of the word by a lecture, which I will give on Thursday about Theater and the Plague—I am
haunted and occupied by it. This is a harsh and alarming theme, in the course of which the
affinities it will impose on behalf of the spirit will incite a process contradictory to customary
thought” (qtd. in Foldenyi 219-20). Of course, Artaud’s doubts did not prevent him from
presenting his ideas and later publishing them in Le Théâtre et son double. As he would later
reaffirm in articulating his conception of a theater of cruelty, the more arresting an idea, the
better, since it has a better chance to shake the public out of its conformist stupor.
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Artaud, Nin and Lot’s Daughters

In the opening of his essay “La Mise en scène et la métaphysique,” Artaud writes at
length about a painting on display in the Louvre, Loth et ses filles (which Artaud refers to as Les
Filles de Loth):

Fig. 14. Loth et ses filles. Attributed to Lucas van Leyden (ca. 1520). Musée du Louvre.

Artaud explains that the painting is a perfect example of what he tries to accomplish when
staging a play. The aspect he most appreciates is how the righteous fire of God’s wrath not only
destroys, but also reveals:
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Il arrive que dans le grésillement d’un feu d’artifice, à travers le bombardement
nocturne des étoiles, des fusées, des bombes solaires, nous voyions tout à coup se
révéler à nos yeux dans une lumière d’hallucination, venus en relief sur la nuit,
certains détails du paysage : arbres, tour, montagnes, maisons, dont l’éclairage et
dont l’apparition demeureront définitivement liés dans notre esprit avec l’idée de
ce déchirement sonore (Artaud IV : 33)
This emphasis on the revelatory nature of the city’s destruction serves as an interesting example
of how Artaud’s thinking represents a shift toward a more modern model of apocalypse. Even
though Artaud is referencing a biblical story, the revelation in his account is closer in structure to
Williams’ secular model, where the revelation coincides with or follows the end. As for what this
apocalyptic destruction reveals, Lot is shown to be lecherous, even predatory toward his
daughters: “Loth […] semble mis là pour profiter de ses filles abusivement, comme un frelon”
(Artaud IV : 35). The irony of this revelation is that, according to Genesis, Lot was spared
because he, unlike his fellow Sodomites, was supposedly righteous and free of perversion. But in
the revealing light of God’s wrath the elect is revealed to be little better than the damned.
This recontextualization of the biblical tale seriously undermines the traditional logic of
the Judeo-Christian worldview. In the original tale, God had sent his angels to Sodom with the
mission of finding Sodomites of virtue, but the actions of Lot’s family suggest that the decision
to spare them was erroneous. Artaud’s account of the story suggests that even God himself
cannot fully anticipate what will be revealed by the chaos of apocalyptic destruction. This
interpretation is perfectly in line with Artaud’s ambition to move beyond appeals to divine
wisdom, most famously articulated in his piece for radio, Pour en finir avec le jugement de Dieu
(1948). This view, like the traditional biblical account, ultimately reaffirms the necessity of
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apocalypse, but with a completely different function. The apocalypse cannot punish those who
have been predetermined to be evil or save those who have proven themselves to be virtuous,
since it is only at the end of the world that one’s true character is revealed.
No doubt influenced by Artaud’s essay, Nin touches on the same Bible story in her 1939
novel House of Incest, but she places even more emphasis on sexuality. Interestingly, Nin also
broaches the subject by describing a painting of Lot and his daughters:
Stumbling from room to room I came into the room of paintings, and there sat Lot
with his hand upon his daughter’s breast while the city burned behind them,
cracking open and falling into the sea. There where he sat with his daughter the
Oriental rug was red and stiff, but the turmoil which shook them showed through
the rocks splitting around them, through the earth yawning beneath their feet,
through the trees flaming up like torches, through the sky smoking and
smouldering red, all cracking with the joy and terror of their love. Joy of the
father’s hand upon the daughter’s breast, the joy of the fear racking her. (Nin 5255)
Surprisingly, Nin’s description of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah is characterized not
only by the anguish of its victims, but also by Lot’s perverse joy. Nin further develops this
juxtaposition of joy and terror as she continues her description of the scene:
Her costume tightly pressed around her so that her breasts heave and swell under
his fingers, while the city is rent by lightning, and spits under the teeth of fire,
great blocks of a gaping ripped city sinking with the horror of obscenity, and
falling into the sea with the hiss of the eternally damned. No cry of horror from
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Lot and his daughter but from the city in flames, from an unquenchable desire of
father and daughter, of brother and sister, mother and son. (Nin 52-55)
Nin does not specify the precise painting to which she alludes. Based on this description, it
cannot be the same one that Artaud references, even though it shares several key characteristics.
None of the well-known paintings of this scene match all of the elements that Nin includes in her
description. It is possible that it is an amalgam of several depictions of this subject. The most
interesting feature of this description is the way that it inverts the causality found in typical
renditions of the biblical tale. The biblical story implies that the daughters initiated their
incestuous encounters with their father, explaining that they plied him with wine to lower his
inhibitions.22 Moreover, they do so for pragmatic reasons, believing that they have an obligation
to bear offspring, and he remains their only option: “And the firstborn said to the younger, ‘Our
father is old, and there is not a man on earth to come in to us after the manner of all the earth.
Come, let us make our father drink wine, and we will lie with him, that we may preserve
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Curiously, the Old Testament (specifically Leviticus chapter 18) explicitly forbids sexual

union with one’s father, but it rather notably omits any such prohibition of sexual relations with
one’s daughter. As such, even biblical law seems to place the blame for this taboo act squarely
on the daughters, and not on the patriarch. In addition, far from depicting the fruit of this
incestuous union as cursed, the Bible claims that Lot’s descendants were quite illustrious. Lot’s
eldest daughter gave birth to Moab, father of the Moabites. Ruth the Moabite was the greatgrandmother of King David, who in turn figures in Matthew’s genealogy of Jesus Christ. Indeed,
in his poem “Booz endormi,” Hugo comments on the notable progeny of the unlikely union of
Ruth the Moabite and Boaz the Israelite.
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offspring from our father.’ So they made their father drink wine that night. And the firstborn
went in and lay with her father. He did not know when she lay down or when she arose”
(Genesis 19:31-33). However, in Nin’s tableau—as in Artaud’s account—the father seems to
initiate the encounter, lustfully groping his daughter’s breasts, while she is racked by fear. Far
from acting out of solemn obligation to perpetuate the family line, the pair instead are motivated
by joy and desire. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, God is nowhere to be found in this
account; The catastrophic deaths of the sinners of Sodom is not a manifestation of God’s wrath,
but rather a mirror of Lot’s own forbidden passion. The world is both destroyed and reborn
through transgression, and neither God’s plans nor His judgement has anything to do with it.

The Open-Ended Apocalypse of Artaud’s Il n’y a plus de firmament

In our first chapter we explored how Apollinaire effectively postponed the apocalypse in
his Les Mamelles de Tirésias. Of course, Apollinaire’s surrealist drama was enormously
influential on the surrealists, and particularly on Artaud’s theater. This influence is especially
visible in Artaud’s 1925 playlet Jet de sang, which contains an allusion to Les Mamelles de
Tirésias in the form of a female character who discards her breasts to the chagrin of her male
partner. The content of Artaud’s playlet is also apocalyptic in its own right. The eponymous Jet
de sang erupts from the hand of God, which is bitten in self-defense by a target of His divine
wrath: “Elle mord Dieu au poignet. Un immense jet de sang lacère la scène, et on voit au milieu
d’un éclair plus grand que les autres le prêtre qui fait le signe de la croix. Quand la lumière se
refait, tous les personnages sont morts et leurs cadavres gisent de toutes parts sur le sol” (Artaud
I : 80). Artaud draws upon other apocalyptic themes for several of his projects for his theater of
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cruelty. Notably, the fall of Jerusalem, which had a profound impact on early Christianity and
particularly on John of Patmos, is the subject of one of the projects outlined in his manifesto:
La Prise de Jérusalem, d’après la Bible et l’Histoire ; avec la couleur rouge-sang
qui en découle, et ce sentiment d’abandon et de panique des esprits visible jusque
dans la lumière ; et d’autre part les disputes métaphysiques des prophètes, avec
l’effroyable agitation intellectuelle qu’elles créent et dont le contre-coup rejaillit
physiquement sur le Roi, le Temple, la Populace et les Événements. (Artaud IV :
96)
But Artaud’s most interesting exploration of apocalypse come in one of his later pieces, Il n’y a
plus de firmament, which has received very little serious attention from critics.23 The piece
depicts the star Sirius apparently falling from the heavens toward Earth, but Artaud never
finished the piece, leaving it without an ending and effectively postponing the disaster for
eternity.
Il n’y a plus de firmament was originally planned as a libretto for Edgard Varèse’s opera
L’Astronome before the collaboration collapsed. In several of his letters, Varèse reveals his
intense frustration with Artaud’s lack of progress. To provide only one example:
Artaud - Suis depuis longtemps sans nouvelles - Mañana, mañana... n’est pas
l’apanage exclusif de l’Espagne - Je ne m’en fais plus - mais je souhaiterais
toutefois un peu plus d’empressement à me répondre-Je pensais pouvoir faire
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Denis Hollier does touch on the piece briefly in an article, though he focuses on Artaud’s

descriptions of sounds. See Hollier, Denis. “The Death of Paper, Part Two: Artaud’s Sound
System.” October 80 (1997): 27-37.

172

quelque chose pour lui - S’il s’en fout c’est son droit - Je ne puis m’engager et
être rendu responsable - J’ai plusieurs écrivains qui me proposent de collaborer Je verrai ça plus tard, car Artaud paraît vouloir me laisser tomber - Tant pis pour
lui car tout m’est ouvert ici – (Varèse 191)
Ultimately, Varèse did not have more luck with any other collaborator and he was forced to set
the project aside until after the Second World War. Elements of Astronome were worked into
Varèse’s later project Déserts, which was first broadcast in 1954. The piece was hailed by critic
Nicole Hirsch as the “Music of the time of the H-bomb,” despite the fact that, unbeknownst to
her, the project began well before the atomic bomb (qtd. in Salter 189). This anecdote supports
our argument that the modern apocalyptic mindset was already forming before the war, despite it
being most frequently attributed to the post-war condition of mutually assured destruction.
In Il n’y a plus de firmament, the firmament has mysteriously disappeared, eliminating
any barrier between Earth and the heavens. People begin to panic as the sky seems to fall, and
the star Sirius (traditionally associated with dark omens) suddenly appears at one minute’s
distance from Earth. Some characters see this development as a sign of an imminent apocalypse
and others as the beginning of a utopian age, but the piece never offers a definitive answer. The
apocalyptic overtones of Il n’y a plus de firmament are perfectly in keeping with Artaud’s vision
of a theater of cruelty. In Le Théâtre et son double, Artaud takes great pains to clarify that his
theater of cruelty does not focus on blood, gore and physical torture, but rather the cosmic
cruelty of humanity’s position in the universe:
Et, sur le plan de la représentation, il ne s’agit pas de cette cruauté que nous
pouvons exercer les uns contre les autres en nous dépeçant mutuellement les
corps, en sciant nos anatomies personnelles, ou tels des empereurs assyriens, en
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nous adressant par la poste des sacs d’oreilles humaines, de nez ou de narines bien
découpés, mais de celle beaucoup plus terrible et nécessaire que les choses
peuvent exercer contre nous. Nous ne sommes pas libres. Et le ciel peut encore
nous tomber sur la tête. Et le théâtre est fait pour nous apprendre d’abord cela.
(IV: 77)
This latter possibility, that the sky could fall on our heads, is precisely the eventuality that Il n’y
a plus de firmament explores in the most literal way possible.
However, in addition to its fantastical elements, Il n’y a plus de firmament plays with
contemporary anxieties, albeit subtly. The drama’s emphasis on the sudden rearrangement of the
cosmos evokes real scientific upheavals of the time. In the early 1930’s, Hubble’s revolutionary
discovery of the expanding universe invalidated earlier models of the cosmos. The piece’s title is
also significant when viewed in light of the rapidly shifting perspectives on cosmology in the
early twentieth century. John Anderson highlights how Varèse, Artaud’s collaborator on Il n’y a
plus de firmament, was inspired by the paradigm shifts that rocked the scientific community of
his day:
At an even more fundamental level, the discoveries in radiation research seem to
have affected Varèse’s most basic compositional procedure, that of continuous
cellular variation. The realization that matter may spontaneously transform its
inner organization seems to be reflected musically by Varèse at two levels: at the
cellular level and at the level of the sound-mass. To a large extent, Varèse’s
compositions move forward as a result of spontaneous inner change in these
structures. (Anderson 42)

174

Varèse’s attempts to reconceive the laws of musical composition therefore mirror contemporary
shifts in the understanding of the fundamental laws of physics. The parallels between scientific
paradigm shifts and apocalypse were similarly evoked by Apollinaire in his poem “La Maison
des morts”: “Le ciel se peupla d’une apocalypse / Vivace / Et la terre plate à l’infini / Comme
avant Galilée / Se couvrit de mille mythologies immobiles” (“Maison des morts” 18-22). The
complete reconceptualization of the cosmos is an apocalypse in its own way. The flat Earth, the
geocentric cosmos, the static universe, all of these “worlds” came to an end (sometimes a painful
and/or controversial one) when scientific discoveries invalidated earlier models. By the 1930’s,
relativity and quantum mechanics were challenging Newtonian physics, just as Newton’s work
had radically challenged the notions of his predecessors. In Il n’y a plus de firmament, a group of
scientists debate the conclusions to be drawn from the Grand Savant’s assertion that he has
established direct contact with the star Sirius, a feat which should be impossible due to the vast
distance between that star and our own Sun. The scientists find the implications troubling, since
it throws existing models of physics into question:
Un savant crie dans l’oreille d’un sourd, il dit qu’il supprime l’espace, la
gravitation. […]
—Mais de cette façon c’est la fin du monde, jeter des formes comme ça, mais
c’est tout déranger, mais c’est un crime, c’est un crime, et ça a déjà commencé.
—Il dit qu’il s’en fout : la science par-dessus tout.
—Rassurez-vous, c’est du bluff, on n’a jamais fait ça, nous n’en sommes pas
encore là.
—Oui, oui heureusement, nous n’en sommes pas encore là. La fin du monde c’est
pour les livres. On ne verra pas encore l’Antéchrist.
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—Et puis, cher ami, avez-vous songé que les calculs…
—Il fait des rêves, c’est de l’utopie.
—Il dit qu’il a trouvé la radiation instantanée.
—Ce n’est pas scientifique.
—La radiation instantanée c’est la fin du cosmos. (II : 107)
The debate between these scientist characters resembles actual debates that were raging in the
1930s about quantum mechanics. Notably, the phenomenon of quantum entanglement seemed to
violate not only classical physics but also Einstein’s theory of relativity by allowing the
transmission of information at a rate faster than the speed of light. The piece does not directly
reference quantum entanglement, instead using terms like “télégraphie céleste” (indeed the term
“quantum entanglement” would not be coined by Schrödinger until 1935, two years after Artaud
had abandoned Il n’y a plus de firmament), but certain phrases mirror aspects of the debate
around the implications of quantum mechanics. Notably, the scientists who balk at the notion of
“radiation instantanée,” protest that “vous ne pouvez pas aller plus vite que la lumière” (II : 106).
This partially echoes Einstein’s concern that some interpretations of quantum mechanics seemed
to contradict the theory of relativity by allowing information to travel instantly, even across vast
distances. But ultimately, Il n’y a plus de firmament is far from a serious meditation on
theoretical physics. Rather, the upheaval of the scientific community serves as a microcosm of
the social turmoil of Europe at large on the verge of the Second World War.
Each of the movements of this piece illustrates the attempts of a different power structure
to grapple with the sudden possibility of disaster. These clashing perspectives correspond to what
Williams would call “uneven apocalypse.” The title of Williams’ book, Combined and Uneven
Apocalypse (an allusion to the Marxian concept of combined and uneven development),
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emphasizes that the apocalypse is not necessarily a monolithic experience. Most traditional
visions of the apocalypse depict the event as a form of total destruction which levels social
hierarchies, or at least reduces them to a simple dichotomy: good and evil. Williams, however,
claims that an apocalypse may be experienced very differently by different groups, as divided by
social, economic and geographic distinctions. Indeed, rather than creating a utopian brotherhood
of humankind, he asserts that the collapse of the social order may even serve to deepen or
multiply such distinctions: “[W]hat ‘comes back’ in the apocalypse isn’t necessarily—or ever—a
happy unity of broader inclusion. Apocalypse is the coming-apart of the rules of the game, and in
the ruined wake of this, the task isn’t one of rebuilding, of mourning, or of moving on”
(Williams 8). Artaud captures this diversity of apocalyptic experience in his Il n’y a plus de
firmament.
The first movement serves as an introduction, setting the stage and foreshadowing the
later events of the piece (witness for example, the sniffing man, who prefigures le flaireur). The
second movement deals with the bourgeoisie grappling with the chaos of the event and
attempting to find solace in the official announcements from the government, which fail to offer
any real explanation of the events that are unfolding: “LE GOUVERNEMENT
RECOMMANDE LE CALME” (II : 97). The third act depicts a group of working-class
revolutionaries, who opportunistically seize the moment to further their radical agenda. The
leader of the revolutionaries “le Grand Flaireur” sniffs out a moment to strike. He does not
understand what is happening, nor does he care; he only detects an opportunity in the panic that
Sirius has caused:
La terre et le ciel on s’en balance.
La science
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on n’y comprend rien.
En avant pour le grand re [sic] reprise.
[…]
Allez, car notre faim s’aiguise.
De les voir foirer dans leur trou.
C’est quand tout se désorganise
Que notre heure est venue, à nous. (II : 104)
Finally, as we have already explored, the fourth movement shows the academic elite attempting
to make sense of what has just happened. Unsure of how to interpret the aberrant circumstances
of the piece, they cling to their pre-existing dogma, in spite of its inability to adequately explain
the phenomenon that they can see with their own eyes.
Curiously, while political and academic authority have an important presence, religious
authority is seemingly absent from the universe of Il n’y a plus de firmament. A few characters
make biblical allusions, but typically in an ironic or derisive tone. As one scientist jokes : “La fin
du monde c’est pour les livres. On ne verra pas encore l’Antéchrist.” The titular phrase Il n’y a
plus de firmament, repeated several times throughout the piece, calls attention to the loss of
belief in biblical cosmology following the discoveries of thinkers like Galileo. But the
significance of the firmament’s disappearance is much more significant than the shift away from
yet another cosmological paradigm. The use of the word firmament to describe the heavens
emphasizes their supposedly eternal, immutable perfection. In the biblical worldview, the
regularity of the heavens is contrasted with the disorder of the Earth. However, as our knowledge
of the heavens grew more sophisticated, new scientific models challenged the notion that the
stars and planets were immune to the chaos that torments us mortals. What is worse, the
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scientific worldview is fundamentally unstable, constantly subject to debate and revision as new
data are collected. As we have already discussed, one of the major developments of the 1920s30s was quantum mechanics, which presents a universe that—especially in contrast with the
classical, Newtonian model—is fundamentally random and unpredictable. One could very well
read the chaos and panic of Il n’y a plus de firmament as depicting the unrest of an increasingly
secular Europe, unmoored from the traditional beliefs that provided some semblance of societal
stability.
As we have already seen, while religious authority is notably absent, the other forms of
authority do not fare much better in furnishing a single, coherent explanation of the piece’s
events. As a result of the cacophony of different voices throughout the piece, Il n’y a plus de
firmament presents a variety of different, often contradictory views on the apocalypse, including
some of the surrealist attitudes which we have already explored. One character seems to view the
event as a kind of Hegelian synthesis of two worlds: “C’est la fin de tout. On ne dégage pas des
forces comme ça. Ce sont deux mondes qui rentrent l’un dans l’autre. C’est comme si la terre
sautait dans le ciel” (II : 99). Another character raises the specter of Artaud’s favorite vehicle of
apocalyptic destruction, the plague:
Un corps passe sur un brancard. Des gens se précipitent pour voir.
Un homme suit le corps, une femme l’aborde.
—Docteur, est-ce la peste ?
—Mais non, c’est…
La réponse du docteur est emportée dans le tourbillon des voix et des cris. (II : 98)
But ultimately, while many hypotheses are put forward, no definitive explanation is ever given.
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Authority exists within this world, but it is unable to answer the myriad questions that surge forth
from the piece’s characters (or from the reader/spectator, for that matter). The only hope of
receiving answers comes from the “Grand Savant” who seems ready to elucidate the mysterious
events, perhaps even ready to claim responsibility for everything that has occurred. The Grand
Savant’s promise to explain the situation serves as the transition to the fifth movement, but this
final movement was never written. Like the doctor whose answer is drowned out by the
screaming masses, the Grand Savant’s explanation is cut off just as we are finally about to
receive some clarification.

Artaud and the Virtual Reality of the Apocalypse

Under the heading for the fifth and final movement, Artaud scrawled a few notes on the
manuscript for Il n’y a plus de firmament:
M’est suggéré jouer rue,
police me laissera-t-elle, police me laissera-t-elle,
je dois dire ambiance rue moderne n’est pas théâtrale, il s’en faut,
chercher mon ambiance, ambiance,
les intempéries, les intempéries,
théâtre portatif,
en tout cas on ne répète pas dans la rue (II : 109)
While the prospect of performing in the streets appeals to Artaud, the inability to rehearse in
such an environment poses a serious problem for him, since he demanded excruciatingly precise
performances. The other hurdle that frustrates Artaud’s attempts to stage this piece in a
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satisfactory way are the financial burdens implied by the production: “en tout cas monde où tout
basé sur de l’argent et où l’argent ou son absence empêche tout, / on doit pouvoir signifier que
les matériaux n’ont pas de prix, bois, toile, nourriture, acteurs, / qu’ils peuvent s’obtenir sans
argent et qu’on peut rétablir le troc, la coopération des denrées” (II : 109). This last statement
could be read as a rebuttal to Breton’s allegation (prominently featured in his Second manifeste
du surréalisme) that Artaud’s productions were cynically motivated by a desire for financial
gain. In particular, Breton targets the production of August Strindberg’s Le Songe, which Artaud
staged with Roger Vitrac for their Théâtre Alfred Jarry : “il ‘montait’ Le Songe de Strindberg,
ayant ouï dire que l’ambassade de Suède paierait” (Breton’s emphasis I : 786). Artaud here
refutes this criticism by expressing his longing for a world where payment would not be
necessary, while acknowledging that, for the time being, money is sadly indispensable.
Beyond serving as an outlet for his frustrations, these notes at the end of Artaud’s
manuscript are perfectly in keeping with his theoretical writings on theater. Indeed, this is not the
only time that Artaud stressed the importance of bringing theater to the streets. As Artaud argues
in Le Théâtre et son double: “Le public qui prend le faux pour du vrai, a le sens du vrai et il
réagit toujours devant lui quand il se manifeste. Pourtant ce n’est pas sur la scène qu’il faut le
chercher aujourd’hui, mais dans la rue ; et qu’on offre à la foule des rues une occasion de
montrer sa dignité humaine, elle la montrera toujours” (IV : 74). The idea of performing in the
street is consistent with Artaud’s bold ambition to do away with the concept of a stage
altogether:
Nous supprimons la scène et la salle qui sont remplacées par une sorte de lieu
unique, sans cloisonnement, ni barrière d’aucune sorte, et qui deviendra le théâtre
même de l’action. Une communication directe sera rétablie entre le spectateur et
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le spectacle, entre l’acteur et le spectateur, du fait que le spectateur placé au
milieu de l’action est enveloppé et sillonné par elle. Cet enveloppement provient
de la configuration même de la salle. (IV: 92-3)
The effect of removing the stage is to implicate the audience in what is happening in the
performance. The audience no longer has the bourgeois luxury of being an innocent bystander,
instead they become complicit in the action of the piece.
Artaud’s problem with theater as traditionally conceived is that it creates a barrier
between the audience and the spectacle. As such, plays content themselves with merely “telling a
story,” a story from which the audience is largely detached: “[O]n nous a habitués depuis quatre
cents ans, c’est-à-dire depuis la Renaissance, à un théâtre purement descriptif et qui raconte, qui
raconte de la psychologie. C’est qu’on s’est ingénié à faire vivre sur la scène des êtres plausibles
mais détachés, avec le spectacle d’un côté, le public de l’autre,—et qu’on n’a plus montré à la
foule que le miroir de ce qu’elle est” (IV : 74). For Artaud, the greatest sin of this traditional
conception of theater is that it leaves the public largely undisturbed: “Shakespeare lui-même est
responsable de cette aberration et de cette déchéance, de cette idée désintéressée du théâtre qui
veut qu’une représentation théâtrale laisse le public intact, sans qu’une image lancée provoque
son ébranlement dans l’organisme, pose sur lui une empreinte qui ne s’effacera plus” (IV : 74).
Artaud hopes to establish a direct connection between the performers and the spectators, and in
so doing to go beyond the limited form of expression contained within the text of the play. For
Artaud, literature (a term despised by the surrealists, who followed in the footsteps of symbolists
like Verlaine, who closes his poem “Art poétique” with the infamously dismissive line “Et tout le
reste est littérature”) has already gone as far as it can go and the institution has become ossified
and stale. What we need is a force of destruction to clear the detritus. But the destruction Artaud
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calls for is not an end, but rather a new beginning. The chance to recharge culture with life: “Une
des raisons de l’atmosphère asphyxiante, dans laquelle nous vivons sans échappée possible et
sans recours,—et à laquelle nous avons tous notre part, même les plus révolutionnaires d’entre
nous,—est dans ce respect de ce qui est écrit, formulé ou peint, et qui a pris forme, comme si
toute expression n’était pas arrivée au point où il faut que les choses crèvent pour repartir et
recommencer” (IV : 72). Indeed, Artaud’s anti-literary stance leads him to reject writing itself.
He argues that Western culture needs to leave behind its reverence for the written word: “On doit
en finir avec cette superstition des textes et de la poésie écrite. La poésie écrite vaut une fois et
qu’on la détruise. Que les poètes morts laissent la place aux autres” (IV : 76). For Artaud, the
value of art is in the act of creation. In this way, Artaud echoes the same sentiment that Marinetti
expressed in his Futurist Manifesto: “En vérité, la fréquentation quotidienne des musées, des
bibliothèques et des académies (ces cimetières d’efforts perdus, ces calvaires de rêves crucifiés,
ces registres d’élans brisés !...) est pour les artistes ce qu’est la tutelle prolongée des parents pour
des jeunes gens intelligents, ivres de leur talent et de leur volonté ambitieuse” (Marinetti A1).
For Artaud, as for the futurists, museums and libraries are little more than mausoleums, housing
the lifeless corpses of works whose vital energy was unleashed and exhausted in the same stroke.
That said, it is important to clarify that, in spite of its intentionally subversive character,
Artaud’s theater is not intended to be political in the traditional sense of the term. Unlike
Brecht’s epic theater, from which Artaud draws a great deal of inspiration, the discomfort
cultivated by the theater of cruelty does not have an explicitly political goal. As Jannarone
explains: “With the Brechtian idea of engaging the spectator intellectually and politically,
Artaud, famously, shares almost nothing. His conception of which part of the spectator theatre
should seduce and which it should activate is the inverse of Brecht’s and of all politically
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engaged theatre” (Jannarone 198). While Artaud hoped to inspire a vague desire for generalized
revolt, Brecht aimed to awaken and mobilize his audience for the purposes of political
revolution. Jannarone elaborates: “Brechtian theatre theorizes itself more as revolution than
revolt; it will empower the audience politically, intellectually, and, eventually, materially when
spectators become actors in political life” (197). Moreover, Jannarone explains that Artaud’s
efforts to demolish the traditional division between spectacle and spectator was far from an
invitation for audience to take control of the performance : “Artaud did not seek anarchy or
aggression on the spectator's terms, but only aggressiveness on the theatre's terms - what he
called ‘organized anarchy’ […] Artaud does not ask his audience members to remain passive, but
neither will he empower or engage them as individuals” (198). Jannarone ultimately finds more
parallels between the Theater of Cruelty and fascist political rallies than she does between it and
other forms of avant-garde theater. It is for this reason that she finds it particularly ironic that
Artaud’s ideas are so frequently cited as an influence on the counter-culture of the 1960s:
Artaud himself never articulated a social vision that could frame the Theatre of
Cruelty in a socially or politically coherent way. A hatred of Marxism, socialism,
communism, and all forms of dialectical thinking and materialist politics is
foundational to Artaud’s oeuvre. While the counter-cultural moment of the 1960s
clearly shared Artaud’s desire for change as well as his mysticism, emotionalism,
and irrationalism and drew from these for inspiration, that movement also
engaged in material critiques that are anathema to Artaudian ideas. To enlist his
work or the image of his person in the service of politically progressive projects is
a decision many have taken, but one that flies in the face of both Artaud's own
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repeated opposition to such projects and, more importantly, the core of the
Theatre of Cruelty's theorization of its audience. (Jannarone 192)
Jannarone is right to question the political use of the ideas of such a staunchly apolitical thinker.
Artaud would have no doubt objected to many aspects of mid-century revolutionary movements
and the ways that his writing was co-opted to support them. However, I believe that Jannarone’s
insistence on the incoherence of the Theater of Cruelty’s political implications (as well as its
supposed affinity for fascism) deserves further discussion and nuance. In fact, if we examine
Artaud’s earlier writings on politics, we will see that his desire to inspire revolt while remaining
apolitical is not only coherent, but also perfectly consistent with a position that he had held for
years, even though it brought him into conflict with his former associates in Breton’s surrealist
group.
In Artaud’s 1927 essay À la grande nuit (his response to Breton’s politically-charged Au
grand jour), Artaud explains the reasons for breaking with the other surrealists. He criticizes
Breton for working to align the movement with communism, seeing the politicization of the
movement as a betrayal of its original aim to transcend such banal preoccupations: “Y a-t-il
d’ailleurs encore une aventure surréaliste et le surréalisme n’est-il pas mort du jour où Breton et
ses adeptes ont cru devoir se rallier au communisme et chercher dans le domaine des faits et de la
matière immédiate, l’aboutissement d’une action qui ne pouvait normalement se dérouler que
dans les cadres intimes du cerveau” (Artaud I : 284). For Artaud, a simple change of regime will
do nothing to address the fundamental problems facing humanity: ”comme si du point de vue de
l’absolu il pouvait être du moindre intérêt de voir changer l’armature sociale du monde ou de
voir passer le pouvoir des mains de la bourgeoisie dans celles du prolétariat” (I : 284-5). Artaud
claims that his ambitions are much larger in scope. In order to transform the fundamental nature
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of reality, the movement cannot limit its goals to the amelioration of the material conditions of
everyday life:
Le surréalisme n’a jamais été pour moi qu’une nouvelle sorte de magie.
L’imagination, le rêve, toute cette intense libération de l’inconscient qui a pour
but de faire affleurer à la surface de l’âme ce qu’elle a l’habitude de tenir caché
doit nécessairement introduire de profondes transformations dans l’échelle des
apparences, dans la valeur de signification et le symbolisme du créé. Le concret
tout entier change de vêture, d’écorce, ne s’applique plus aux mêmes gestes
mentaux. L’au-delà, l’invisible repoussent la réalité. Le monde ne tient plus.
C’est alors qu’on peut commencer à cribler les fantômes, à arrêter les faux
semblants. (I : 287)
Moreover, Artaud rejects the communist belief that the shape of revolution can be anticipated.
For him, the nature of revolution—indeed its most important feature—is its unpredictability:
“Personne n’a jamais rien compris et les surréalistes eux-mêmes ne comprennent pas et ne
peuvent pas prévoir où leur volonté de Révolution les mènera” (I : 287). Moreover, he mocks the
revolutionary pessimism adopted by the members of Breton’s group, claiming that their fatalistic
(and ultimately counter-productive) outlook is the result of limiting their vision of the future
revolution to the material level: “Incapables d’imaginer, de se représenter une Révolution qui
n’évoluerait pas dans les cadres désespérants de la matière, ils s’en remettent à la fatalité, à un
certain hasard de débilité et d’impuissance qui leur est propre, du soin d’expliquer leur inertie,
leur éternelle stérilité” (I : 287). According to Artaud, true revolution must break radically from
the present conditions of reality. By framing the revolution in a contemporary, political debate, it
is doomed to reproduce and reify the conditions of that context. Even if the communists succeed
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in restructuring the system of political economy, Artaud does not believe they are capable of
transcending it altogether. This is the sense in which Artaud dismisses Breton’s group as
“révolutionnaires qui ne révolutionnent rien” (I : 287).
Artaud believed that an important first step on the path to true revolution was to leave
behind the written word. In Le Théâtre et son double, he theorized a new, “hieroglyphic”
language for his theater, which would allow him to escape the limitations of our present,
linguistically determined reality. As Vassiliki Rapti observes : “Artaud’s theater would abandon
the notion of dialogue with its reasoning value as the primary constitutive element of a wellmade play. In its lieu, Artaud would place the images issued forth by the actor’s body language”
(119). As Rapti highlights, Artaud privileges the visual over the verbal. If Breton attempted to
channel the orphic “surrealist voice” in his apocalyptic predictions, Artaud’s work is more
representative of the apocalyptic vision. In his infamous lecture on theater and the plague, Artaud
attempted to demonstrate his ideas by abandoning his prepared text and acting out the symptoms
of the plague in pantomime. Nin was present at the lecture and she wrote about the spectacle in
her diary:
But then, imperceptibly almost, he let go of the thread we were following and
began to act out dying by plague. No one quite knew when it began. To illustrate
his conference [lecture], he was acting out an agony. “La Peste” in French is so
much more terrible the “The Plague” in English. But no word could describe what
Artaud acted on the platform of the Sorbonne. […]
His face was contorted with anguish, one could see the perspiration dampening
his hair. His eyes dilated, his muscles became cramped, his fingers struggled to
retain their flexibility. He made one feel the parched and burning throat, the pains,
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the fever, the fire in the guts. He was in agony. He was screaming. He was
delirious. He was enacting his own death, his own crucifixion. (qtd. in Földényi
221-2)
While the majority of the audience clearly did not appreciate Artaud’s performance, Nin was
profoundly moved by it: “At first people gasped. And then they began to laugh. Everyone was
laughing. They hissed. Then one by one, they began to leave, noisily, talking, protesting. They
banged the door as they left. […] But Artaud went on, until the last gasp. And stayed on the
floor. Then when the hall had emptied of all but his small group of friends, he walked straight up
to me and kissed my hand” (qtd. in Földényi 221-2). Above all, Nin highlights the ineffable
quality of Artaud’s performance: “no word could describe what Artaud acted on the platform of
the Sorbonne.” It only stands to reason that if Artaud was so dissatisfied with the communicative
abilities of verbal communication, and he was so interested in expressing things alien to
language, he would best be able to present his ideas through pantomime. In this regard, Artaud
recalls the eponymous character of Denis Diderot’s Neveu de Rameau. The character of
Rameau’s nephew similarly masters the art of pantomime and thumbs his nose at didactic,
bourgeois theater.
This rejection of the written word is linked to Artaud’s embrace of the virtual. In Le
Théâtre et son double, Artaud uses the term “réalité virtuelle” to describe his theater. Artaud is
credited with coining the phrase virtual reality, but it must be said that his conception of it is far
removed from the way we typically conceive of it in the 21st century:
Tous les vrais alchimistes savent que le symbole alchimique est un mirage comme
le théâtre est un mirage. Et cette perpétuelle allusion aux choses et au principe du
théâtre que l’on trouve dans à peu près tous les livres alchimiques, doit être
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entendue comme le sentiment (dont les alchimistes avaient la plus extrême
conscience) de l’identité qui existe entre le plan sur lequel évoluent les
personnages, les objets, les images, et d’une manière générale tout ce qui
constitue la réalité virtuelle du théâtre, et le plan purement supposé et illusoire sur
lequel évoluent les symboles de l’alchimie. (IV : 47)
Artaud argues that the plague (and the theater) unleashed what lies hidden, and makes real what
had previously existed in the virtuality of the possible: “La peste prend des images qui dorment,
un désordre latent et les pousse tout à coup jusqu’aux gestes les plus extrêmes ; et le théâtre lui
aussi prend des gestes et les pousse à bout : comme la peste il refait la chaîne entre ce qui est et
ce qui n’est pas, entre la virtualité du possible et ce qui existe dans la nature matérialisée” (IV :
27). Here, Artaud opposes the material and the virtual, that is, what does exist and what could
possibly exist. As Samuel Weber argues, the importance of the virtual in Artaud’s theater is
precisely its open-ended nature:
Despite his attack on verbal discourse, Artaud never dreams of excluding
language as such from theater, but rather of restoring its capacity to signify, in
short, its virtuality. To do this, the tyranny of meaning must be supplanted by a
language of signification: a language, above all, of gesture, intonation, attitude,
and movement, but without a recognizable or identifiable ‘goal.’ The absence of
such a goal could allow the movement of language, its signifying force, to come
into its own without being subordinated to a purpose.24 (Weber 285-6)

24

The distinction that Weber makes between signification and meaning is similar to the

difference that linguist Émile Benveniste maintains between “signification” et “signifiance.”
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Just as Artaud claims that the meaning of a play cannot be predetermined, we might surmise that
the true outcome of his apocalypse cannot be fixed, or even anticipated. Il n’y a plus de
firmament is thus not only unfinished, but in a sense unfinishable, at least on the page and/or
stage. This adds another layer of meaning to the notes that Artaud writes in place of his piece’s
conclusion. Artaud’s notion of taking the piece to the streets suggests perhaps that the events
cannot unfold in a traditional theatrical context. Its true conclusion will manifest on the streets
once the public has been “infected” by the revitalizing plague of a radically new and
unforeseeable worldview.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen how Soupault and Artaud reject the traditional model of
apocalyptic revelation as an anticipation of a specific end to come. Nearly all of the surrealists
have their own, different visions of the end: Breton prophesizes a post-historical utopia; Desnos’
millenarian prophecies anticipate a new world order; Bataille predicts the slow deterioration of
the universe; Péret imagines the collapse of civilization and the return of nature; Aragon awaits
the supposedly inevitable demise of capitalism. Soupault and Artaud separate themselves from
the others, not by avoiding the topic of the apocalypse, but by envisioning the revelation as
coinciding with, rather than preceding, the end.
This rejection of anticipatory revelation is linked to their refusal to join in Breton’s
political crusades. Just as they did not share Breton’s view of the end, they did not share his
enthusiasm for the communist revolution. This is not to say that Soupault and Artaud were
apathetic about the social conditions surrounding them. Soupault was jailed during the Second
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World War for his service to the Resistance. As for Artaud, while he publicly denounced party
communism, we have seen that in his notes for Il n’y a plus de firmament, he privately dreamed
of one day living in a post-capitalist world. What Artaud and Soupault refused to do was
sacrifice their art for the sake of transparently serving a political agenda. As a result, the way
these two authors dealt with apocalyptic themes is very distinct from their fellow surrealists.
Soupault’s Les Dernières nuits de Paris implicitly criticizes the surrealists by showing
that Volpe (Soupault’s stand-in for Breton) and his group were myopic in their search for
Georgette because they had a narrow and incomplete view of who she was. Similarly, Soupault
implies that the surrealist quest for revolution and apocalypse is doomed to frustration, because
of its focus on an overly specific vision of the end. Like Octave, they will do their best to burn
down the old world, pouring themselves into their revolution, but the world will endure as it
always has, and their fire will have destroyed little more than those who ignited it. As for Artaud,
he depicts a society plunged into chaos and uncertainty, but resists the temptation to impose his
own order on the madness. A truly new world cannot be born from ideas dreamed up in the old
one. As such, Artaud leaves his apocalypse completely open-ended. The world will generate its
own ending.
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Conclusion
We have now seen enough examples to conclude that apocalyptic elements form a
recurring theme within the surrealist movement. More importantly, surrealist apocalypses
distinguish themselves from those of other authors by not only borrowing the language and
forms of apocalyptic prophecy, but also by organizing groups and issuing calls to action which
parallel the logic and structure of apocalyptic religion. On this point, Péret once made a
fascinating comment in response to Maurice Nadeau’s question of whether surrealism could be
considered a religion. While he reaffirms his hatred of theism, Péret does not answer with a flat
denial, but rather with the following qualification: “il pourrait tout au plus s’agir d’une religion
pour ruiner toutes les religions et se dissoudre une fois son but atteint” (Péret VII : 214). As Péret
suggests, surrealism was never intended to be a religion, but in parodying religions it did at times
resemble them. Ironically enough, Péret’s view of surrealism does little to separate it from other
religions, particularly apocalyptic ones. Apocalypticism often similarly attempts to supplant
opposing systems of belief until the arrival of the end times, at which point religion will no
longer be necessary.
Indeed, throughout this study, we have touched on several points of comparison between
apocalyptic religion and surrealism. In the first chapter we saw how certain surrealist theories
and practices of writing resemble those employed by the authors of religious apocalypses,
particularly John of Patmos. Breton imagined a post-historical condition that would allow reality
to be superseded, allowing humanity to access surreality. The transition to this state of being
would be precipitated by a glorious revolution. However, as we saw, there could be no coherent,
intentional pathway leading to this prophesied revolution. In the second chapter, we identified
two different surrealist eschatologies. The revolutionary eschatology of Breton found its
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theoretical grounding in Kojève’s theory of the end of history, which posits humanity returning
to its animal origins. Bataille, however, struggled with this conception of history. While, as we
saw in our analysis of L’Anus solaire, Bataille was not always as anti-Hegelian as many have
claimed him to be, he did ultimately move away from this style of dialectics, formulating instead
his theory of general economy. Bataille’s theories constitute a kind of annihilationist
eschatology, emphasizing the inevitable decay of everything in the universe, from the greatest of
celestial bodies to the lowest of organisms. Bataille’s pessimistic outlook ultimately led him to
mostly withdraw from political activism.
As we saw in the third chapter, however, Naville attempted to use pessimism as an
organizing principle of political activism for the surrealist movement. This ultimately split
Breton’s surrealist groups into three camps. On the one hand, surrealists like Péret struggled to
operate within the PCF because he maintained his pessimistic view of humanity’s future.
Aragon, on the other hand, fully embraced the PCF, but had to leave behind both his pessimistic
outlook and his allegiance to surrealism in order to maintain his loyalty to party communism. In
our final chapter we looked at a third camp, best represented by Artaud and Soupault, who
declined Naville’s call to action altogether and refused to share the revolutionary apocalypticism
endorsed by their surrealist comrades. Like Bataille, these two authors both embrace a more
secular vision of apocalypse more in tune with how it would be conceived in the post-war
context. But unlike Bataille, they see apocalyptic devastation as potentially reinvigorating.
Soupault’s Dernières nuits de Paris replaces revelation with demystification. For the novel’s
narrator, there is no apocalypse per se, only a perennial cycle of crisis and rebirth through
periodic catastrophe. Artaud similarly emphasizes the possibility of rebirth and rejects prophecy.
However, as we have explored, Artaud does embrace an idea of apocalypse, albeit one in which
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the revelation follows the end. The true nature of the life that will reemerge cannot be known in
advance. But therein lies its truly revolutionary potential.
In each case, the surrealists’ use of the apocalypse was a way of working through a
profound disaffection with the nature of the reality that they faced. In this regard, surrealism is
surprisingly similar to apocalyptic religions, which arise and flourish among groups that feel
powerless in their political situation. The surrealists, however, had no religious belief in the strict
sense. They did, however, feel the need to fill the gap left behind by the church as it lost more
and more of its influence in the public sphere and in the hearts of its flock. As we saw in the
fourth chapter, even the vehemently antitheist Artaud spoke about his need to uncover
“l’équivalent naturel et magique des dogmes auxquels nous ne croyons plus” (IV: 31). In a way,
surrealism borrowed many of the structures of religion, while hollowing out its content,
especially the content of its beliefs. As Dalí once quipped, “Je suis pratiquant mais pas croyant”
(Dalí 19). Though they did not believe in the imminent arrival of the biblical second coming,
their practices were strikingly similar to those who did. At the same time that the surrealists were
penning prophecies and publishing their manifesto, the Jehovah’s Witnesses were circulating
pamphlets claiming that the world would end in 1925. In addition, the Christian fundamentalist
movement was exploding in popularity in the anglophone world, spreading new variations of
eschatological theories about the imminent end of history and the so-called “rapture.” One could
well argue that the members of these reactionary religious movements and the surrealists seized
upon apocalyptic themes for similar reasons. The socio-political turmoil of the early twentieth
century left many searching for some indication of the final destination of the seemingly
runaway train of history. As we have seen throughout this study, the surrealists had a variety of
answers to the question of the end, and nearly all of them reflect a feeling of political impotence.
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Breton fantasized about violent revolution but postponed it indefinitely. Naville championed the
PCF but promised his comrades nothing but the satisfaction of offering victory to their enemies.
Péret used his poetry to vent his frustration with the leftist politicians who so profoundly
disappointed him. Artaud saw all of politics as a waste of energy, capable only of further
entrenching the miserable status quo. Since they saw no good path forward for the politics of
their age, it is no wonder that the surrealists so often came to embrace the apocalypse.
As we bring this study to a close, it is necessary to point out that there remain several
potential avenues for future inquiry. The most obvious continuation would be a study of the
surrealist use of apocalyptic themes during and after the Second World War. Albert Camus
would write his own take on Artaud’s favorite theme in La Peste. Eugène Ionesco’s Rhinocéros,
could be read as a satirical depiction of Kojève’s theory that history would end with humanity’s
return to the animal condition. Moreover, the lonely, desolate wastelands of Beckett’s plays
(especially En attendant Godot, Fin de partie, and Happy Days), correspond in many ways to
Bataille’s annihilationist view of the universe’s ultimate fate. In addition, it would be useful to
draw connections between the interwar, Parisian surrealists, and their contemporaries in other
parts of the world. Surrealism was always envisioned as an international movement and while
the movement’s geographic epicenter was undoubtedly Paris, its influence was far-reaching.
Surrealists and surrealist-inspired authors across the world had their own visions of apocalypse
to share, which reflect a variety of different political preoccupations. Aimé Césaire, for example,
drew considerable inspiration from surrealism and would go on to befriend and collaborate with
Breton. Nevertheless, in his monumental Cahier d’un retour au pays natal (1939), published
shortly after the poet’s return to his native Martinique, Césaire envisions the apocalypse in very
different terms than his Parisian contemporaries:
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Et nous sommes debout maintenant, mon pays et moi, les cheveux dans le vent,
ma main petite maintenant dans son poing énorme et la force n’est pas en nous,
mais au-dessus de nous, dans une voix qui vrille la nuit et l’audience comme la
pénétrance d’une guêpe apocalyptique. Et la voix prononce que l’Europe nous a
pendant des siècles gavés de mensonges et gonflés de pestilences,
car il n’est point vrai que l’œuvre de l’homme est finie
que nous n’avons rien à faire au monde que nous parasitons le monde
qu’il suffit que nous nous mettions au pas du monde
mais l’œuvre de l’homme vient seulement de commencer (Césaire 139)
As Martin Munro observes, the Caribbean is, in a way, always already post-apocalyptic, and this
condition is particularly palpable in Césaire’s poetry: “One senses with Césaire that he lived still
in the apocalyptic history instigated in the earliest days of slavery and colonialism” (7). The
change Césaire saw on the horizon was not the threat of an end but rather the promise of a new
beginning. As John Drabinski explains: “What begins in abjection, documenting the body and
bodies of the colonial landscape, becomes a militant and surreal affirmation of virility and
possibility in poetic figure and turn of phrase. […] The apocalyptic word […] clears the space
for beginning” (Drabinski 568). While the early twentieth century seemed apocalyptic from the
European perspective, this point of view was far from universal. Indeed, Europe’s waning
dominance offered the promise of a new beginning for those who had suffered under colonial
rule. While somewhat outside of the scope of this particular project, it would be productive to
read the European surrealist accounts of the apocalypse against the largely post-apocalyptic
worldview of (post)colonial authors.
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Finally, while this study aimed primarily to shed light on certain aspects of interwar
surrealism, it may also be illuminating for the seemingly apocalyptic circumstances of the
present. At the time of writing, the COVID-19 pandemic rages on, claiming the lives of hundreds
of thousands and leading to massive disruptions to everyday life across the world. Just as Artaud
suggested that plagues have a revelatory function, this pandemic has led to something of a
political awakening in the United States and beyond. Protests have erupted demanding greater
racial and economic equality. It remains to be seen, however, what the lasting impact will be.
The authors we have covered in this study may not give us any answers, but they do at least offer
some different frameworks for reformulating our questions: Is the political awakening we are
now experiencing the first stage of the glorious revolution envisioned by Breton? Or will it burn
itself out, ceding inevitably to the return of the status quo, like the fire in Soupault’s Dernières
nuits de Paris? Are the crises of 2020 merely symptomatic of the process of decay that Bataille
theorized, which will slowly lead all life to its inevitable demise? Or, finally, are we on the
precipice of something wholly unknown and unforeseeable, like the characters of Artaud’s Il n’y
a plus de firmament, waiting impatiently for a conclusion that will resolve everything, but which
has not yet been written, and may never be? Whatever the case, these unique, surrealist visions
of the apocalypse may prove useful to us as we attempt to imagine what the future holds in store
for us.
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